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I.

INTRODUCTION

Does Congress have the power to force us to eat broccoli by taxing those
of us who do not? The question sounds absurd because the prospect of Congress
ever enacting such a silly law seems so obviously far-fetched. Nevertheless, despite the query's seeming frivolousness, opponents of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act' (the "ACA") repeatedly raised the "issue" of whether Congress has the constitutional authority to compel us to purchase vegetables,2 in the

Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
and 42 U.S.C.).
2
For a description of the genesis and scope of the "broccoli" argument against the ACA, see
infra notes 21, 433 and accompanying text. For a discussion as to why the broccoli hypothetical is
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run-up to the most important Supreme Court decision in years concerning the
scope of Congress's taxing power.' Yet, while the broccoli hypothetical itself is
rather ridiculous, the constitutional question it implicates is actually quite serious: Can Congress use its broad power to tax4 in order to regulate, indirectly,
conduct that it is constitutionally prohibited from regulating directly?
The answer to that question, of course, must be "no." If Congress were
able to use its taxing power to circumvent the limits of its other constitutional
powers, Congress's legislative authority would become unlimited as a practical
matter. Permitting such unfettered exercise of congressional power, in turn,
would effectively nullify the Constitution's reservation to the states of legislative
authority in all matters other than those with respect to which Congress's power
is expressly enumerated. Such an arrangement, in other words, would be inimical
to the federalist structure of American government. Thus, to prevent Congress
from using the power to tax to regulate in areas beyond the scope of its authority,
there must be a clearly recognized (and applied) constitutional distinction between congressional exactions that really are taxes and those that are instead penalties for failure to abide by an extraconstitutional regulation.
The Supreme Court has, without exception, recognized the need to confine Congress to its enumerated constitutional powers. And, in a number of cases,
the Court has indeed dealt with the difference between taxes and penalties. However, as the Court came to adopt an increasingly expansive interpretation of Congress's power to regulate under the Commerce Clause, 5 the tax-vs.-penalty distinction seemed to lose at least some of its practical relevance. 6 In short, Congress
was less likely to resort to pretextual assertions of its taxing power to regulate
conduct indirectly, when it could simply regulate the conduct directly under its
commerce power. Now, however, the legal landscape has changed once again:
Through its analysis of the ACA's constitutionality, the Supreme Court has accorded renewed significance to the question of how to distinguish between taxes
and penalties for constitutional purposes.7

an ineffective argument that trivializes the important constitutional issue it purports to address, see
infra text accompanying notes 431-436.
3
That decision, of course, is NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), in which the Supreme
Court upheld a key provision of the ACA as a federal tax. For a detailed discussion of the Court's
NFIB opinion, see infra Part IV.
4
Congress's power to lay and collect taxes is enumerated in the General Welfare Clause of
the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. For a discussion of the scope of
Congress's taxing power, see infra Part III.B.2.i.
5
Congress's power to regulate interstate and international commerce is enumerated in the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For a discussion of the
Commerce Clause and the Supreme Court's construction thereof, see infra text accompanying
notes 107-152.
6
See infra note 412.
7

See infra text accompanying notes 412-13.
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After the Court's decision to uphold a key component of the ACA as a
tax-even though it found the provision at issue not to be sustainable under the
Commerce Clause-the question of where to draw the boundary between a "legitimate" federal tax, on one hand, and an unconstitutional regulation of conduct
masquerading as a "tax," on the other, has become both murkier and more important than ever. To make sure that some future Congress does not wrongly
attempt to invoke the Court's ACA decision as permission to regulate indirectly
through taxation in areas where direct congressional regulation would be unconstitutional, there needs to be a clear constitutional test for distinguishing between
taxes and disguised penalties. This purpose of this Article is to propose just such
a test.
Love it or hate it, the ACA-which expands Medicaid coverage and imposes sweeping reforms on the private health insurance industry-is among the
most significant pieces of federal legislation to have been enacted within the last
several decades. It is also among the most controversial. President Obama signed
the ACA (which is also often referred to as "Obamacare") into law on March 23,
2010. Beginning on that very same day, opponents of the ACA-including a
total of 27 states, as well as various private plaintiffs-filed multiple lawsuits in
federal court challenging the ACA's constitutionality. 8 Among the law's private
insurance reforms, one provision that drew particular ire from its critics was the
so-called "individual mandate"-a requirement that individuals either obtain a
statutorily specified level of health insurance coverage or pay a monetary exaction called a "shared responsibility payment." 9 Casting it as an unconstitutional
On the date that President Obama signed the ACA into law, Florida and 12 other states (as
8
well as several private plaintiffs) filed an action in the Northern District of Florida challenging the
statute's constitutionality. Eventually 13 other states joined that suit as plaintiffs-bringing the
total number of state plaintiffs to 26: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1263 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 648 F.3d 1235, aff'd in part, rev'd in part
sub nom. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). Separately, the Commonwealth of Virginia
filed its own challenge to the ACA. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d
768 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011). These suits were soon accompanied
by a number of similar actions brought by various private plaintiffs. Altogether, by January 2011,
there were approximately 20 federal court cases pending, involving constitutional challenges to the
ACA. See Brad Joondeph, Introduction of Speakers at the AALS Hot Topic Panel Discussion on
January 7, 2011, 62 MERCERL. REV. 605, 606 (2011).
9
26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b) (2010); see Brietta Clark, SafeguardingFederalismby Saving Health
Reform: Implicationsof National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 46 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 541, 547 (2013) (individual mandate "proved to be a lightning rod for political and legal
challenges to the ACA as a whole"); Matthew A. Melone, The Pundits Doth Protest Too Much:
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius and the Future of the Taxing Power, 2012
MICH. ST. L. REv. 1189, 1190 (noting that the individual mandate is "[p]erhaps the most contentious [ACA] provision"); see also Stewart Jay, On Slippery ConstitutionalSlopes and the Affordable Care Act, 44 CoNN. L. REv. 1133, 1144 (2012) ("Aside from the Medicaid expansion," the
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intrusion by the federal government into matters reserved to the states under the
Tenth Amendment, 10 the plaintiffs in the ACA litigations argued, among other
things, that the individual mandate was beyond the scope of Congress's power
to regulate interstate commerce. The Obama Administration, of course, argued
that the individual mandate was well within Congress's Commerce Clause
power. But, almost as an afterthought, the administration included an additional,
alternative defense of the mandate's constitutionality. Even if the mandate was
not within Congress's commerce power, the government argued, it was nevertheless constitutional under Congress's broad power to tax."
The issue inevitably made its way to the United States Supreme Court,
which delivered its decision on the constitutionality of the ACA in NationalFederation ofIndependentBusiness v. Sebelius12 ("NFIB") on June 28, 2012. Siding
with the ACA's challengers, a majority of the Court held that the Commerce
Clause did not give Congress authority to enact the individual mandate.13 Yet, in
a decision that surprised virtually everyone who followed the case, the Court
ultimately upheld a key component of the mandate-the shared responsibility
payment imposed on those who fail to obtain the requisite health insurance -- on
the ground that it is a constitutionally valid federal tax. 4
To reach its conclusion that the shared responsibility payment is a tax,
the Court needed first to determine that, for constitutional purposes, the exaction
is not a penalty for noncompliance with a mandate to purchase insurance.1 5 The
distinction between taxes and penalties was critical to the outcome of NFIB because the Court had held the individual mandate not to be within the scope of
Congress's commerce power. If the shared responsibility payment had been a
penalty to enforce the mandate, then Congress would have lacked any constitutional power to impose that penalty, given that it had had no power to enact the
mandate itself. On the other hand, because the shared responsibility payment is
a tax, the Court held it to be sustainable under Congress's taxing power.

individual mandate is "the ACA provision that has generated the most opposition on constitutional
grounds ... ").
10
See Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 975,979 (2011) (discussing arguments made by the complaining states).
I
See id. (summarizing federal government's legal defense of the individual mandate).
12 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
13 See id. at 2591 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (rejecting the argument that Commerce Clause
authorized enactment of individual mandate); see also id. at 2648 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas &
Alito, JJ., dissenting) (same).
14
See id. at 2600 (majority opinion) (upholding the shared responsibility payment as a tax).
15
See id. at 2595-97 (finding that, for purposes of determining whether enacting the measure
was within Congress's enumerated constitutional powers, the shared responsibility payment is not
a penalty, but a tax). In contrast, in a threshold determination as to whether it could reach the merits
of the issue, the Court found the shared responsibility payment to be a penalty for purposes of the
Anti-Injunction Act. See id. at 2582-84.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2016

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 7

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 119

Although the Court found the shared responsibility payment not to be a
penalty, it recognized that some exactions styled as federal "taxes" could have
"characteristics of regulation and punishment" that would render them penalties
outside the scope of Congress's power to tax. 16 By acknowledging that "Congress's ability to use its taxing power to influence conduct is [thus] not without
limits[,] ''1 7 the Court seemed to signal its willingness to strike down future penalties on conduct that may be disguised as taxes in cases where Congress lacks a
separate constitutional power to regulate the conduct directly. However, in NFIB,
an exaction becomes
the Court declined to identify "the precise point at which
18
it."
authorize
not
does
power
taxing
the
that
so punitive
By virtue of the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, Congress was not
permitted under the Commerce Clause to mandate the purchase of health insurance directly, but it was nevertheless allowed to impel the same conduct indirectly by taxing those who do not purchase such insurance. Some commentators
who opposed the ACA have now raised a concern that NFIB may pave the way
for Congress to "impos[e] new economic mandates in the form of taxes" in the
future.1 9 They question whether the Court will actually keep its perceived promise to "strike down any congressional effort to exploit the taxing power to enact
what are actually mandates. 2 °
Prior to the Court's decision, some ACA opponents worried that, if the
individual mandate were held to be within Congress's commerce power, then
Congress would just as easily be able to compel citizens to purchase broccoli or
cell phones or "whatever [other] products and services government officials believe[] people should buy. 21 In holding that the Commerce Clause does not authorize the individual mandate, the Court made clear in NFIB that Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce does not include a power to compel people
to engage in commerce in the first place (e.g., a power to force people to make
purchases). But, by sustaining the shared responsibility payment as a tax, does
NFIB simultaneously permit Congress to tax individuals who do not purchase
broccoli or cell phones in order to coerce them to buy those products?

16

Id. at 2599 (quoting Dep't of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994)).

17

Id.

18

Id. at 2600.

19

Timothy Sandefur, So It's a Tax, Now What?: Some of the ProblemsRemaining After NFIB

v. Sebelius, 17 TEX. REv. L. & POL'Y 203, 215 (2013).
20

Id.

Id. at 211-12. As noted above, in advancing slippery-slope arguments against the individual
mandate, many opponents of the ACA seemed particularly drawn to the hypothetical example of a
law requiring individuals to purchase, of all things, broccoli. See infra note 433 (citing a New York
Times article outlining the history and political force of the broccoli hypothetical). For more about
what Professor Andrew Koppelman calls the "Broccoli Objection," see infra notes 432-436 and
accompanying text.
21

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol119/iss1/7

6

Hodaszy: Testing for Regulatory Penalties: Insuring the Health of Fedreali
2016]

TESTING FOR REGULATOR Y PENAL TIES

As a practical matter, the prospect of future congressional mandates to
purchase other products or services probably should not be of great concern. The
public policy reasons for the individual mandate were specific to the ACA's regulatory scheme for private health insurance. Simply put, many of the other private insurance reforms in the ACA depend on everyone obtaining insurance.22 It
seems rather unlikely that a similar public policy rationale in any other area could
persuade a congressional majority to vote to force people to buy anything else.
This hardly means, though, that we need not be concerned about the prospect of Congress abusing its power to tax in order to circumvent the limits of its
other constitutional powers. It stands to reason that, if Congress can use "taxes"
to mandate economic conduct indirectly, then it can just as easily use "taxes" to
mandate noneconomic conduct indirectly. Congress has not been shy about trying to regulate noneconomic behavior in the past, and different constituencies'
strongly held views on various social issues could incent it to try to do so again
in the future. At the same time, the Supreme Court has held that Congress's commerce power generally does not extend to the regulation of noneconomic activity. On that basis, for example, the Court ruled in 1995 that the Commerce Clause
did not give Congress the power to enact a law against carrying guns in school
zones.2 3 As a result, any future congressional attempts at regulating noneconomic
conduct might well take the form of a federal "tax" on disfavored behaviorparticularly if Congress comes to view NFIB as having given a "green light" to
such use of the taxing power.
This Article starts from the premise that the Court in NFIB was correct
to find the shared responsibility payment to be a tax for constitutional purposes,
rather than an unconstitutional penalty to enforce the individual mandate. 24 However, this Article takes seriously the concern that NFIB might nevertheless have
a very negative, unintended consequence. Specifically, the decision may encourage future Congresses to enact "taxes" that really are unconstitutional penalties
in order to engender compliance with rules of conduct that Congress would otherwise lack constitutional authority to enact. After all, Congress may ask, if the
shared responsibility payment passes constitutional muster as a federal tax, what
would prevent "taxing" those who carry guns in school zones or, for that matter,
those who do not purchase broccoli?
22
For a discussion of why the individual mandate was essential to the operation of the ACA's
other private insurance reforms, see infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
23
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-63 (1995).
24
While this Article agrees with the Supreme Court's conclusion that the shared responsibility
payment is appropriately classified as a tax, rather than a penalty, for constitutional purposes, the
question of whether the shared responsibility payment is a constitutionally valid tax is beyond the
scope of this Article. For a discussion of certain constitutional questions affecting the validity of
the shared responsibility payment as a tax-and arguments that the Court did not adequately address those questions in NFIB-see infra note 425. While those questions are obviously critical to
the constitutionality of the shared responsibility payment itself, they do not impact the threshold
tax-vs.-penalty analysis for federal exactions, which is the focus of this Article.
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To permit Congress to overstep the bounds of its enumerated powers in
such fashion would not merely be to sanction some abstract, technical violation
of the Constitution: It would threaten to erode tangible-and valuable-political
benefits that stem from the federalist structure of American government, which
the Constitution establishes. Most notably, it would undercut the ability of subnational communities within the country to be governed in accordance with their
own values and preferences when it comes to matters of local, as opposed to
national, importance."
How can we erect a safeguard against any such misapplication of the
taxing power? The key is to define precisely the distinction between federal
taxes, on one hand, and penalties against conduct, on the other, for purposes of
determining whether any of Congress's enumerated constitutional powers authorizes the exaction. Drawing not only on NFIB, but also on the Court's earlier
taxing-power decisions as well as previous scholarship on the topic, this Article
does just that: It offers a clear and concise rule for determining whether a congressional exaction is a penalty, rather than a tax, in any case where the exaction-even if styled as a revenue measure-is suspect as a means to enforce an
unconstitutional regulation of conduct.
Part II of the Article provides an overview of the ACA and describes the
relevant features of the individual mandate and the shared responsibility payment. Part III discusses both the constitutional challenges that opponents raised
against the individual mandate in federal court and the federal government's defense of the mandate's constitutionality. Part III focuses, in particular, on (i) the
plaintiffs' claims that the mandate exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, (ii) the federal government's defense of the mandate as within
Congress's commerce power, and (iii) the government's alternative defense that,
even if the mandate is not sustainable under the Commerce Clause, the shared
responsibility payment is nevertheless a valid exercise of Congress's power to
tax. To place those arguments in context, Part III also discusses the history and
evolution of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, as well as
the constitutional parameters of the taxing power and the Court's most significant taxing-power decisions prior to NFIB.
Part IV of the Article discusses the NFIB decision itself. In Part V, the
Article addresses the need, after NFIB, to develop a clear test for determining
whether a federal exaction styled as a "tax" is instead really a penalty, the constitutionality of which depends on Congress's power (or lack thereof) to enact
the regulation that the penalty enforces. Part V begins by explaining why the taxvs.-penalty issue is most likely to arise in the context of prospective disguised
penalties enforcing indirect regulations of noneconomic conduct, and by noting
the important benefits of federalism that are at stake. After discussing the extent
to which NFIB and the Court's prior taxing-power decisions shed light on how
best to construct a tax-vs.-penalties test, Part V examines an "effects" theory of
25

See Clark, supra note 9, at 571; Mason, supra note 10, at 979, 993.
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the taxing power presented by Professors Robert Cooter and Neil Siegel. While
acknowledging the significant value of Cooter and Siegel's contribution to the
topic, Part V concludes that their tax-vs.-penalties test is ultimately neither workable nor wholly consistent with Supreme Court precedent.
Drawing on the foregoing considerations, Part VI of the Article presents
a straightforward, workable rule for determining whether a professed federal
"tax" is instead a penalty for failure to conform to some regulation of conduct
embedded in the purported revenue measure. The rule establishes a definitive
bright-line test both for penalties on economic conduct and, most importantly,
for penalties on noneconomic conduct. Application of this rule would result in
striking down any federal legislation that is disguised as an exercise of the taxing
power but that, in substance, is actually a regulation outside the limits of Congress's other enumerated powers.
Part VII is the conclusion of the Article.
II. THE ACA, THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE,
AND THE SHARED RESPONSIBILITY PAYMENT
The stated intent of the ACA is to improve Americans' access to
healthcare and to reduce the cost of that care.26 In an effort to accomplish those
ends, the ACA imposes a number of significant reforms on the nation's
healthcare system.2 7 Among many other things,2 8 the ACA expands Medicaid
coverage to those with incomes equal to or less than 133% of the federal poverty
line,2 9 provides tax credits to smaller employers to encourage them to provide

26

NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012) ("The [ACA] aims to increase the number
of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care.").
27
See, e.g., Clark, supra note 9, at 545 (The ACA "relies on a host of reforms designed to
reduce cost, improve the quality of healthcare and health outcomes, and expand access to care.");
Melone, supra note 9, at 1190 (The ACA, "among its many provisions, imposed reforms on the
health insurance industry, expanded Medicaid, enacted changes to Medicare, introduced illness
prevention programs, and imposed a host of penalties, taxes, and other assessments on individuals
and employers.").
28
For example, some of the significant insurance market regulations included among the ACA
reforms are a guaranteed-issue requirement and a prohibition on insurers' exclusions of coverage
on the basis of pre-existing conditions, community rating requirements designed to spread risk
more evenly among higher- and lower-risk individuals within a given community, new rate regulations on insurance premiums, and "a minimal set of 'essential benefits' that plans must cover."
Clark, supra note 9, at 557. ACA regulations also prohibit insurers from imposing lifetime limits
on insurance benefits or from canceling a policy for reasons other than fraud or misrepresentation,
require insurers to include coverage of a child on a family policy until the "child" reaches the age
of 26, and place certain limits on insurers' profits and administrative expenses relative to amounts
spent on providing medical care. Jay, supra note 9, at 1144.
29
Jay, supra note 9, at 1143 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (West 2003 &
Supp. 2011)).
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health insurance to their employees,3" imposes assessments on larger employers
that do not offer their employees health insurance coverage deemed sufficient by
Congress, 31 "creat[es] government-sponsored health insurance 'exchanges' that
pool purchasers of health insurance in the individual market (with the goal of
reducing premiums for those purchasers),32 and provides tax credits toward the
whose household inpurchase of insurance through such exchanges to persons
33
comes are less than 400% of the federal poverty line.
Among the ACA's numerous 34 provisions, one of the most important is
the individual mandate, which is incorporated into the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended (the "Code") at § 5000A.35 Under § 5000A(a) of the Code, as
enacted, non-exempt 36 individuals are required to arrange coverage for themselves and their dependents under health insurance providing at least a statutorily-prescribed minimum level of benefits. 37 This requirement to obtain such
"minimum essential coverage" can be met in one of several ways38: It can be met
by receiving coverage through a government-sponsored insurance program, such
as Medicare, Medicaid or the Veterans program.39 Or, it can be met by obtaining
sufficient coverage through one's employer.4 0 But for individuals who do not
have government-sponsored or employer-provided insurance, the requirement

Id. at 1144 (citing 26 U.S.C.A. § 45R (West 2003 & Supp. 2011)). A "small employer"
eligible for such tax credits is one that has no more than 25 full-time employees, the average annual
wages of whom do not exceed a certain statutorily-prescribed amount, and which has in place an
"arrangement" whereby the employer is required "to make a nonelective contribution" (in the
amount of at least 50% of the premium costs) to each employee "who enrolls in a qualified health
[insurance] plan offered.., by the employer through [a health insurance] exchange" established
under the ACA. 26 U.S.C. §§ 45R(d)(1), (4) (2010).
31
Id. (citing 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011)). A large employer potentially subject to such an assessment is, in general, one that has at least 50 full-time employees. 26
U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A) (2015).
Jay, supra note 9, at 1143-44 (citing 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 18031-44 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011)).
32
30

Id. at 1143-44 (citing 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B (West 2003 & Supp. 2011)).
34
See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012) ("The [ACA's] 10 titles stretch over
900 pages and contain hundreds of provisions.").
35
See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2010).
Undocumented aliens, incarcerated persons, and persons with certain religious-conscience36
based objections are exempt from the requirements of § 5000A(a). Id. § 5000A(d).
37
Id. § 5000A(a). As discussed below, in upholding the shared responsibility payment as a
tax, the Supreme Court interpreted § 5000A(a) in a way that technically writes the "requirement"
to obtain insurance out of the statute. See infra notes 420-24424 and accompanying text.
See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f) (2010).
38
33

39
40

Id. § 5000A(f)(1)(A).
Id. § 5000A(f)(1)(B).
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must be met through the purchase of a health insurance policy sold in the individual market.4 1
The requirement that all non-exempt individuals obtain health insurance
is an essential part of the ACA's design. Without it, other ACA reforms-such
as the prohibition on insurers from excluding from coverage persons with preexisting conditions-would provide increased incentives for healthier people to
forgo the purchase of health insurance until they needed to use it. 42 Ifenough
healthy people acted on those incentives and decided not to purchase health insurance until necessary, the private health insurance system (as adjusted by those
other ACA reforms) would likely become insolvent and collapse. 43 The reason,
of course, is that insurance pools rely on the premiums paid by healthy insureds
to subsidize the coverage of sick insureds whose claims exceed their premium
payments. 44 To prevent such a collapse of the system, the § 5000A(a) requirement was intended to ensure that the number of healthy people who join the insurance pool will be sufficient to spread risk and control insurance rates. 45 As the
Supreme Court described it at one point, "the mandate forces into the insurance
risk pool more healthy individuals, whose premiums on average will be higher
than their health care expenses. This allows insurers to subsidize the costs of
covering
the unhealthy individuals [that the ACA's] reforms require them to ac46
cept."
If a non-exempt individual fails to maintain the "minimum essential coverage" required under § 5000A(a) during one or more months, then for each such
month § 5000A(b) of the Code imposes on that individual "a penalty for such

41 Id. § 500OA(f)(1)(C). There is a provision in the law permitting the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to recognize other sources of sufficient coverage. See id. § 5000A(f)(1)(E). However, that provision is likely to have very limited application, in practice.
42
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012); see also Andrew Koppelman, BadNewsfor
Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionalityof Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 2

(2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/98 ls4wxl ctl .pdf.
43 Koppelman, supra note 42, at 2.
44

Id.

45

Clark, supra note 9, at 546.

46

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585. Crucially, though the Court referred to the individual mandate as
forcing healthy persons to obtain health insurance in the above-quoted passage, it later found that
many people might reasonably choose not to obtain insurance and to pay the shared responsibility
payment instead. See id. at 2596.
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failures. 47 The formal name of this exaction is the "shared responsibility payment, 4 8 but it is notable that the statute consistently refers to the shared responsibility payment as a "penalty., 49 An individual owing a shared responsibility
payment for any particular month is required to include the penalty amount with
his or her income tax return for the taxable year in which such month falls.5 °
Members of Native American tribes, 51 persons who are statutorily deemed not to
with gross incomes below the
be able to afford health insurance, 52 and taxpayers
54
53
threshold for filing a federal income tax return are exempt from the penalty.
A rather complex formula for calculating the amount of the penalty is
set forth in § 5000A(c) of the Code.15 The penalty amount for a non-exempt individual for any taxable year in which he or she fails to maintain adequate coverage during one or more months is the lesser of (x) the national average premium charged on the new "exchanges" for a statutorily-specified level of health
insurance coverage for such year for a family of the size of such individual's or
(y) the sum of the so-called "monthly penalty amounts" for such individual for
such year. 56 The "monthly penalty amount" for a non-exempt individual for any
month during which he or she fails to maintain adequate coverage, is an amount
equal to one-twelfth of the greater of: (i) a certain "flat dollar amount" or (ii) the
applicable percentage of a certain portion of the individual's income. 7 However,
regardless of the monthly penalty amount that would otherwise apply, an individual's penalty amount is always capped at the above-referenced average

47
48

26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1) (2010).
Id. § 5000A(b).

49
The shared responsibility payment is repeatedly labeled a "penalty" in § 5000A. See, e.g.,
id. § 5000A(b)(2) ("Any penalty imposed by this section..."); id § 5000A(b)(3) ("Payment of
penalty."); id. § 5000A(c) ("Amount of penalty.").
50
Id. § 500OA(b)(2).
51
Id. § 5000A(e)(3).
52

Id. § 5000A(e)(1).

Id. § 5000A(e)(2).
There is also an exemption for persons whom the Secretary of Health and Human Services
deems to have suffered some unspecified "hardship with respect to the capability to obtain coverage under a qualified health plan." Id. § 5000A(e)(5). However, the statutory language provides no
guidance as to when, or if, that provision may actually apply, in practice.
55
See id. § 5000A(c).
56
Id. § 5000A(c)(1); see also Melone, supra note 9, at 1193-95 (describing formula for calculating amount of penalty). The statutorily-required coverage, for purposes of this formula, is the
so-called "bronze level of coverage." 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(1)(B) (2010). The bronze level of
coverage is "the lowest level of health insurance coverage identified by the ACA as sufficient to
comply with the minimum coverage provision." Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power
to Destroy. An Effects Theory of the Taxing Power, 98 VA. L. REv. 1195, 1241 (2012).
57
26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(2) (2010).
53
54
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amount of premiums payable for the specified insurance coverage that the individual decided to forgo.
The flat dollar amount for a non-exempt individual for a given taxable
year is the sum of the "applicable dollar amounts" for such year for each person
with respect to whom the individual failed to maintain required coverage (including the non-exempt individual himself or herself, and his or her dependents). The
"applicable dollar amount" for a person is $695 for 201658 and at least $695 for
each year after 2016 59-subject, in each case, to a 50% reduction for persons
younger than 18 years of age. 60 However, the flat dollar amount for any nonexempt individual is capped at 300% of the standard applicable dollar amount
for the year in question. 61 Consider, for example, a hypothetical a family of sixtwo married adult parents and four children under 18. For those parents, the flat
dollar amount for 2016, before applying the cap, would be $2,780. However,
because of the cap, their actual flat dollar amount would be 300% of the $695
applicable dollar amount for 2016, or $2,085.62
In calculating the percentage-of-income prong of an individual's
"monthly penalty amount," the portion of the individual's income to which the
applicable percentage is applied is the excess of (i) the individual's so-called
"household income" over (ii) the minimum amount of gross income that would
require the individual to file a federal income tax return for the year.63 (Let's
refer to the amount of that excess as the "Excess Income Amount.") An individual's "household income" for this purpose is the aggregate modified adjusted
gross income (as calculated specifically for this reason 64) of the individual and
his or her dependents for the taxable year in question.65 The applicable percentage of such Excess Income Amount for any non-exempt individual is 2.5% for
taxable years beginning in or after 2016.66

58
Id. § 5000A(c)(3)(A)-(B). For 2014, the first year in which the shared responsibility payment was in force, the applicable dollar amount for a person was $95. For 2015, the applicable
dollar amount for a person was $325. Id. § 5000A(c)(3)(B).
59
For each year after 2016, the $695 per-person amount will be subject to increase by the
amount of a statutorily-prescribed cost-of-living adjustment. Id. § 5000A(c)(3)(D).
60
Id. § 5000A(c)(3)(C).
61
Id. § 5000A(c)(2)(A)(ii). "Standard" refers to the applicable dollar amount for the year in
question without giving effect to the 50% reduction for persons under the age of 18.
62
For a similar example using applicable dollar amounts for 2014, see Melone, supra note 9,
at 1194.
63
26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(2)(B) (2010).
64

See id. § 5000A(c)(4)(C).

65

Id. § 5000A(c)(4)(B).

66
Id. § 5000A(c)(2)(B)(iii). The applicable percentage of such Excess Income Amount for a
non-exempt individual was 1.0% for taxable years beginning in 2014 and 2.0% for taxable years
beginning in 2015. Id. § 5000A(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
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Returning to our hypothetical family of six, imagine that the parents do
not maintain the required healthcare coverage for themselves or their dependent
children during any part of 2016. If, for 2016, the family's Excess Income
Amount is $83,400 or less, 67 the sum of the parents ' 6S monthly penalty amounts
for 2016 will be the flat dollar amount of $2,085. Alternatively, if the family's
Excess Income Amount for the year is greater than $83,400, the sum of the parents' monthly penalty amounts will equal 2.5% of that amount (which will be
higher than $2,085). But, in either case, if the national average annual premium
through the exchanges for "bronze level" coverage for the family for 2016 is less
than the sum of the parents' monthly penalty amounts, then their shared responsibility payment for 2016 will be capped at that lower premium amount.69
As shown by the comparison of hypothetical families of six with Excess
Income Amounts over and under $83,400 for taxable year 2016, the penalty will
more likely "be determined by a percentage of income for families of moderate
to moderately high income. 7 ° In contrast, "[f]ower income families will likely
be subject to a flat dollar amount penalty. 71 Moreover, by virtue of the nationalaverage-premium-for-basic-coverage cap, "[h]igh income families will likely
find themselves subject to a penalty that is based on the cost of insurance coverage'72 that they decided to forgo, rather than on either a percentage of income or
a flat dollar amount.
III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE ACA,
AND CHALLENGES TO THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IN THE LOWER COURTS

As part of an effort to determine how best to distinguish between constitutionally-sanctioned taxes and extraconstitutional penalties, it is necessary to
consider both (i) the constitutional objections that opponents raised against the
individual mandate, in particular, and (ii) the reasons why the Supreme Court
ultimately found the shared responsibility payment to be a tax, rather than a penalty for noncompliance with the mandate. Let us begin with some of the ACA
opponents' primary objections.

67
2.5% of $83,400 equals $2,085. Thus, $83,400 is the Excess Income Amount at which the
parents' flat dollar amount and their percentage-of-income amount will be the same for taxable
years beginning in or after 2016.
68
If a non-exempt individual and his or her spouse file a joint federal income tax return, the
individual's spouse is jointly liable for the individual's penalty. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(3)(B)
(2010). For simplicity's sake, in our hypothetical family, let us assume that the parents file jointly.
69
Id. § 5000A(c)(1)(B).
70 Melone, supra note 9, at 1194-95.

71
72

Id. at 1195.
Id.
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Supporters of the ACA hail it as "the most important progressive legislation in decades., 73 They laud it as an attempt to "address[] one of the most
momentous social and economic problems ever to confront the country ' 74 namely, what many had viewed as the United States' "distressingly inadequate
system for providing medical services to its people., 75 Given that a national "single-payer" health insurance system (or "Medicare for all") was not politically
feasible,7 6 proponents of healthcare reform have embraced the ACA's regulatory
scheme for expanding private health insurance coverage.77 In particular, they
view the individual mandate as "necessary to ensure that enough healthy people.., join the insurance pool to help spread the risk and keep insurance rates
down., 78 They believe that individuals have a social responsibility to help to pay
for a system of universal health insurance coverage, and they maintain that the
individual mandate merely requires individuals to assume that responsibility by
making them contribute to the funding of the ACA's system of private insurance
coverage.79
Critics, however, view the ACA-and, especially, the individual mandate-very differently. Focusing more on individual autonomy than on collective
social duty,80 the ACA's detractors see the individual mandate as the "conscription of the healthy to subsidize the sick."81 They argue that it places the economic
burden of funding universal health insurance primarily on "healthy young adults"
who would otherwise choose "not to buy insurance precisely because they do not
expect to use medical care much-and usually they don't. 8 2 Some critics argue
that, "[i]n an insurance pool in which young and healthy people are underrepresented... [t]he uninsured.., do not impose any extra costs on the members of
the pool. They simply refuse to subsidize the [older or sicker] pool members." 3
Considering that those subsidies might help to improve healthcare access for

74
75

Koppelman, supra note 42, at 2, quoted in Jay, supra note 9, at 1135.
Jay, supra note 9, at 1212.
Id. at 113 9.

76

Id. at 1143.

73

See, e.g., Clark, supra note 9, at 545 (asserting that the ACA's attempts to expand private
health insurance "should help improve health outcomes and reduce healthcare costs by ensuring
that people can get access to the right kind of care at the right time").
77

78

Id. at 546.

79

Id. at 557-58.
Professor Andrew Koppelman, a supporter of the ACA, has described the core of the critics'
arguments as "an implicit libertarianism which focuses on the burden a law imposes on individuals
and pays no attention at all to legitimate state interests." Koppelman, supra note 42, at 22.
80

81

82

Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, to Spend, to Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV.83, 83 (2012).
David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Health Care Purchase Mandate: Unconstitutional

and Likely to be Struck Down by the Courts, 158 U. PA. L. REV.PENNuMBRA 94, 95 (2009).

83

David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Health Insurance Purchase Tax: A Mandate by Any

OtherName Is Still a Mandate, 158 U. PA. L. REv. PENNumBRA 109, 110 (2009).
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84
people in need, such a refusal might seem "selfish, even churlish. Nevertheless, critics regard a federal governmental mandate forcing individuals to enter
into contracts8 5 with private companies for health insurance that they do not need
or want, as "a fundamental threat to individual liberty. 8 6

The FederalistStructure ofAmerican Government, and FederalismBased Arguments Against the ACA

A.

Even if their concerns ultimately stemmed from a particular conception
liberty, opponents of the ACA framed many of their objections to
individual
of
about protecting federalism.87 The federalist structure of
arguments
as
the statute
the American government is "one of dual sovereignty, in which the federal government's power is limited and arises from specific enumerated powers in Article
' 88
I of the Constitution, and the states are granted plenary power to regulate. " As
James Madison wrote in The FederalistNo. 45, "the powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
State governments are numerous and indefinite." 8' 9 Accordingly, the United
States Congress does not have plenary police power to legislate on literally any
subject that it so chooses. Instead, Congress may pass laws only in accordance
with one (or more) of the specific grants of legislative authority accorded to it
under the Constitution. Those express delegations of authority are set forth in

84

Id.

Josh Bolus, Note, Legally Ill: Is the FederalHealth InsuranceMandate Constitutional?,16
BARRY L. REv. 179, 195 (2011) ("On its face, the [individual] mandate is nothing more than a
forced contract by the government.").
Metzger, supra note 81, at 83 (describing views of "the ACA's Republican and Tea Party
86
opponents"); see also Clark, supra note 9, at 548 (discussing that the ACA's critics believe that
the individual mandate "as a compelling example of how federal power threaten[s] individual liberties").
Some commentators who support the ACA have challenged the notion that objections to the
87
ACA actually have anything to do with concerns about federalism-or, at least, federalism as (in
their view) properly understood. Instead, they contend that the ACA critics' arguments are based
on an anachronistic notion of economic liberty interests that fell out of fashion with the close of
the Lochner era. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, A Defense of the Constitutionalityof the Individual
Mandate, 62 MERCER L. REv. 618, 618 (2011) (positing that "the real objection to the individual
mandate has nothing to do with the scope of Congress's power," but is instead "an objection to
forcing people to buy insurance if they do not want to buy insurance" based on "an unarticulated
sense that individuals should have a liberty interest to not have health insurance if they do not want
to"); Koppelman, supra note 42, at 29 (arguing that, "[w]hat really drives the constitutional claims
against" the ACA is not an argument concerning the limits of federal power under the Constitution,
but rather libertarian ideology).
Clark, supra note 9, at 567.
88
THE FEDERALIST No. 45, 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), quoted in
89
85

Bolus, supra note 85, at 182 (internal citations omitted).
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Article I, Section 8.90 They include, among other things, "the power to lay and
collect taxes, coin, borrow and spend money, raise and support armies, declare
war, punish counterfeiting, establish federal courts and post offices, and to regulate interstate commerce." 9 1 Under the Tenth Amendment, any powers that are
not so delegated by the Constitution to the federal government (and that are not
expressly denied to the states) "are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."9 2 Congress, therefore, "cannot regulate simply because it sees a problem
to be fixed. Each and every federal law, whether reforming health care or building a new interstate highway, must be grounded in one of the specific grants of
' 93
authority found in the Constitution."
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the division of authority between
the federal government and the states under America's federalist system "was
adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties" 94 -the
theory being that "a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the threat of tyranny and abuse from either front." 95 In
expounding their objections to the new healthcare law, the ACA's critics have
frequently invoked the nexus between individual liberty and limits on federal
power. As discussed below, when bringing their challenges in court, the ACA's
opponents maintained that Congress overstepped its constitutional authority in
passing the law. They argued that none of the enumerated powers under Article
I, Section 8 authorized Congress to enact the ACA. To these critics, the ACAand the individual mandate, in particular-represented an unprecedented (and
unconstitutional) expansion of federal power96 that, if upheld, could "lead to a
general federal police power ' 97 under which Congress could theoretically intrude

§ 8.

90

U.S. CONST. art. I,

91

Rivkin & Casey, supra note 82, at 97 (summarizing many of the most significant enumer-

ated powers of Congress under Article I, Section 8). For the complete list of Congress's enumerated
powers under the Constitution, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1-18.
92

U.S. CONST. amend. X.

93
94

Rivkin & Casey, supra note 82, at 96.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.

452, 458 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Bolus, supra note 85, at 183 (discussing

same).
95 Id. (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoted in Bolus,
supra note 85, at 183). In this way, the division of authority between the federal government and
the states operates much the same as "the separation and independence of the coordinate branches
of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one
branch[.]" Id.
96
For example, Professor Randy Barnett (who has been a vocal critic of the ACA) explained
that, "[iun 2010[,] something happened in this country that has never happened before: Congress
required that every person enter into a contractual relationship with a private company"--namely,
a private health insurer. Randy E. Barnett, Turning Citizens into Subjects: Why the Health Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 62 MERCER L. REv. 608, 608 (2011).
97

Id. at 616.
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into every aspect of one's life. If Congress has the power to make us purchase
private health insurance, critics wondered with alarm what other individual actions the federal government might be able to compel: "Can the government
force us to eat broccoli, buy American-made cars, join a health club?" 98
B.

Legal Challenges to the ACA

Whatever the merits of their objections, opponents of the ACA wasted
no time in mounting challenges to the statute in the federal courts. Within
minutes after President Obama signed the act into law, 99 Florida and 12 other
states1 °° filed a complaint in the District Court for the Northern District of Flor-

10 1
The
ida, claiming that the ACA was unconstitutional on multiple grounds.
original plaintiffs in that case, Floridaex rel. Bondi v. UnitedStates Department
of Health and Human Services, 10 2 were soon joined by 13 other states, several
3
individuals and the National Federation of Independent Business.0 Not long afvarious private parties filed other, similar lawterward, one additional state10and
4
suits in other federal courts.

98
Clark, supra note 9, at 548. These concerns were articulated at length in a plaintiffs brief
in one of the federal lawsuits challenging the ACA:
The federal government will have the absolute and unfettered power to create
complex regulatory schemes to fix every perceived problem imaginable and to
do so by ordering private citizens to engage in affirmative acts, under penalty
of law, such as taking vitamins, losing weight, joining health clubs, buying a
GMC truck, or purchasing an AIG insurance policy, among others. The term
"Nanny State" does not even begin to describe what we will have wrought if
in fact the Health Care Reform Act falls within any imaginable governmental
authority. To be sure, George Orwell's 1984 will be just the primer for our new
civics.
Id. at 568-69 (quoting Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction & Brief in Support at 1718, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (2011) (No. 2: 10-cv-1 1156)).
99
Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1263
(N.D. Fla. 2011), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (1 lth Cir. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,NFIB v. Sebelius, 132
S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
100
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580; see Comment, National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius: The PatientProtection and Affordable CareAct, 126 HARV. L. REv. 72, 73 (2012).
101
Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120

(N.D. Fla. 2010).
Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1256. Note that Bondi and McCollum are the same case. See supra
102
note 101. The change in title reflects the fact that, during the course of the litigation, Pam Bondi
succeeded Bill McCollum as Attorney General of the State of Florida.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580; see Comment, supra note 100, at 73. For a list of 26 states that
103
were plaintiffs in Bondi, see supra note 8.
104
The additional state was the Commonwealth of Virginia. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 770 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011); see
Joondeph, supra note 8, at 606 (noting that, as of January 7, 2011, there were "about twenty cases
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Although the plaintiffs in those suits initially raised a number of arguments against the ACA, only two of their legal theories turned out to have legs:
the claim that the individual mandate was beyond the scope of Congress's enumerated powers under Article I of the Constitution' and a claim that the Medicaid expansion was based
on an unconstitutional coercion of the states by the
06
federal government. 1

being litigated in the lower federal courts that challenge-in some way, shape or form-the constitutionality of the [ACA]"); see also Bolus, supra note 85, at 1238-39 (discussing decisions in
ACA litigations in federal district courts in Michigan and Virginia, as well as the district court
decision in Bondi); Cooter & Siegel, supra note 56, at 1238-39 (outlining decisions in ACA litigations in various federal district courts and federal courts of appeals); Barry Cushman, NFIB v.
Sebelius and the Transformationof the Taxing Power, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 133, 153-58 (2013)
(discussing decisions on taxing power claims, in particular, in ACA litigations in district courts in
Pennsylvania, Ohio, the District of Columbia, Virginia, and Florida and in federal courts of appeals
for the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits). Appeals from district court decisions in ACA cases
were heard by U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Sixth Circuit, Eleventh Circuit, and
D.C. Circuit, respectively. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580-81,2613 n.1 (discussing challenges to the
ACA heard by those federal appeals courts).
105
See Clark, supra note 9, at 570 (noting that "lower courts rejected [the plaintiffs'] individual
rights-based claims" and that "the only viable challenge to reform [concerning private health insurance coverage] was to the individual mandate and whether Congress exceeded the Article I
powers it used to justify the mandate: the power to regulate interstate commerce and the power to
tax and spend").
106 Medicaid is a joint federal-state program, the states' participation in which is voluntary.
States receive federal matching funds for healthcare services to Medicaid beneficiaries as long as
they comply with certain federal program requirements. Id. at 552. As originally enacted, the ACA
required states that wished to continue to participate in Medicaid to provide coverage to the additional persons included under the ACA's expanded Medicaid eligibility criteria. Id. at 555. This
would require the states, as "partners" in the Medicaid program, to spend billions of additional
dollars to cover that additional group of beneficiaries. Jay, supra note 9, at 1143. The prospect of
such additional expense made some states "reticent" to participate in the expansion of Medicaid
coverage. Clark, supra note 9, at 561. However, under the ACA as originally enacted, any state
refusing to participate in the expansion would lose all federal Medicaid funding. Id. at 603. As part
of their court challenge to the ACA, the 26 states in Bondi (the original Florida litigation) sought
to invalidate the Medicaid expansion on the ground that it "exceed[ed] Congress's authority under
the Spending Clause" of the Constitution. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined
by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). In essence, their argument was that Congress was "coercing the States to
adopt [the Medicaid expansion] by threatening to withhold all of a State's Medicaid grants, unless
the State accepts the new expanded funding and accepts the conditions that come with it." Id. Such
coercion, they argued, "violates the basic principle that the 'Federal Government may not compel
the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program."' Id. (quoting New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)). In NFIB, the Supreme Court invalidated the ACA's Medicaid
expansion "insofar as it would allow the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services 'to withdraw existing Medicaid funds for failure to comply with the requirements set out in
the expansion."' Comment, supra note 100, at 78 (quoting NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (opinion of
Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.)). The Court essentially determined that, by conditioning a state's receipt of "traditional" Medicaid funds upon the state's participation in the ACA's
expansion of the program, Congress would coerce the states into taking action (i.e., spending state
funds on expanded Medicaid coverage) that Congress has no constitutional authority to require
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1. The Claim that the Individual Mandate Exceeded Congress's
Commerce Power
The primary legal argument asserted against the individual mandate was
that it exceeded the ambit of Congress's Commerce Clause power. Among Congress's enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution is the power
"[t]o regulate Commerce... among the several States."' 1 7 In modem times, Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce has repeatedly been invoked,
"in one way or another[,] to support most features of the elaborate federal regulatory system."' 10 8 As discussed below, the Supreme Court has "consistently approved expanding uses of the Commerce Clause to support congressional action" 10 9 since 1937-albeit, "unjustifiably" ' 10 in the eyes of some ACA critics.
Thus, the ACA's challengers initially pressed the Commerce Clause argument
because they surmised that the commerce power was the only potential ground
on which the individual mandate might even arguably be defended."' And, indeed, Congress expressly12 relied on its Commerce Clause power when enacting
the individual mandate."
The Commerce Clause is key to an understanding of how the Supreme
Court reached its decision in NFIB, why the NFIB decision has lent renewed

them to take, and that such coercion through provision or withholding of federal funds cannot be
justified under the Spending Clause of the Constitution. Id. (discussing NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 260108). However, over vigorous objections by the dissenters, the Court did not invalidate the Medicaid
expansion in its entirety. Id. at 78-79. As a result, states may now elect, but are not required, to
participate in the expansion.
107
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
108
Rivkin & Casey, supra note 82, at 97.
109
Jay, supra note 9, at 1137.
110
Sandefur, supra note 19, at 206 ("Since 1937, the Supreme Court has unjustifiably expanded
[the commerce] power to allow federal authority over matters the Constitution was not meant to
permit .... ) (footnote omitted).
1
For example, a couple of prominent ACA critics concluded as follows:
If the federal government has any right to reform, revise, or remake the American healthcare system (without simply paying for it out of the federal treasury), it must be found in this all important [Commerce Clause] provision, and
this is especially true of any mandate that every American obtain health care
insurance or face a penalty.
Rivkin & Casey, supra note 82, at 97.
112
Barnett, supra note 96, at 611 & n.34 (citing Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 243 (2010)); see also Rebecca L. McCullough, Note,
What is All the Fuss About?: The United States Congress May Impose a Tax (It's Called the "Individual Mandate"), 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 729, 742 (2013) (same); Sandefur, supra note 19,
at 205-06 (discussing Congress's express reliance on its supposed Commerce Clause power in
enacting the individual mandate).
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urgency to the constitutional distinction between taxes and penalties, and the extent to which future Congresses may be tempted to resort to penalties disguised
as taxes in order to escape the confines of their enumerated powers. To grasp the
primary practical significance of the tax-vs.-penalty distinction (and the legal
context in which the issue now exists), it is imperative to comprehend the scope
of Congress's regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause and how the Supreme Court has interpreted that authority at different points in the nation's history. Accordingly, a brief explication of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence follows.
i.

Commerce Clause JurisprudencePriorto the New
Deal

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court read
the Commerce Clause rather narrowly, in a way that encompassed only "economic activities that entailed crossing state lines or involved the 'instrumentalities' of interstate commerce, such as railroads."'1 3 During that period, the Court
distinguished between commerce, on one hand, and manufacturing or production, on the other, and held that regulation of the latter was solely the province
of the states. As a result, the Court at the time took the view that Congress could
not invoke its Commerce Clause power to regulate intrastate manufacturing or
production activity, even when the resulting product was ultimately sold across
state lines or when local manufacturing or production otherwise had some indirect effect on interstate trade. 114 Up until the New Deal era, this "restrictive distinction between production, which Congress could not regulate, and commerce,
which it could[]" created a formidable "barrier to many national regulatory ef1
forts." 15

11 6

Just as one example, in its 1918 decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart,
the Court invalidated a federal law prohibiting the interstate shipping of goods
manufactured through the use of child labor on the ground that it was beyond the
scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power. Invoking the reasoning of the
time, the Court stated in Dagenhartthat, "[o]ver interstate transportation, or its

113
Rivkin & Casey, supra note 82, at 97 (citing the Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342
(1914); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303-05 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp.
114
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546-47 (1935); United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259
U.S. 344, 407-08 (1922); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1888); see also Jay, supra note 9,
at 1148 n.98 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937)) (noting that
"[a] long line of cases had held that manufacturing was not commerce, which was confined to
'trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication' across either state or international
borders").
115
Metzger, supra note 81, at 90.
116
247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruledby United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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incidents, the regulatory power of Congress is'
ample, but the production of articles, intended for interstate commerce, is a matter of local regulation."'1 17 On that
basis, the Court held that the authority to regulate child labor (even when used to
produce18 goods for sale in interstate commerce) was reserved solely to the
1
states.'
ii.

The Modern, BroadInterpretationof the Commerce
Clause

The Court's earlier, narrower reading of the Commerce Clause changed
in the late 1930s with the demise of the now-discredited Lochner era. In Lochner
v. New York' 19 and a string of cases that followed, the Court had invalidated both
federal and state laws regulating economic activity on the ground that they violated a right to freedom of contract or other economic rights then thought to be
121
120
guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Yet, the Lochner era came to an abrupt end during the constitutional crisis of
1937, when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt threatened his "court-packing"
plan following a string of Supreme Court decisions striking down early New
Deal legislation. 122 Beginning in 1937, the Court suddenly rejected the idea that
117

Dagenhart,247 U.S. at 272.

118

Id. at 275-76.

119
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a New York State labor law prohibiting employers from requiring or permitting employees to work more than 60 hours per week,
on the ground that the law unreasonably infringed on the parties' freedom of contract in violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
120
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
121 In Lochner and its progeny, the Court essentially found a substantive due process right to
freedom of contract, freedom of labor and other economic liberties, and invalidated federal and
state laws that it deemed to have violated those supposed "substantive" due process rights. See
Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1161
(N.D. Fla. 2010) (discussing Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45, and the line of cases that followed, such as
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313
U.S. 177 (1941); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled inpartby W. Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924)
(in which "the Due Process Clause was interpreted to reach economic rights and liberties")). For a
good and distinct description of the substantive due process doctrine, see Ryan McCarl, Incoherent
and Indefensible: An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Supreme Court's "Void-for- Vagueness"
Doctrine,42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 73, 73 n. 1(2014). "Substantive due process refers to the 'due
process limitation on conduct-regulating policy."' Id. (quoting Leonard G. Ratner, The Function
of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1048, 1050 n.8 (1968)). "Its counterpart, procedural
due process, protects values such as the opportunity to be heard in a forum in which one's substantive rights are to be adjudicated, and notice that such adjudication is scheduled to occur." Id.
122
See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 56, at 1215 n. 111 (referencing that crisis and the courtpacking plan, and citing sources providing further discussion of the same).
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there was any due process protection of freedom of contract or similar economic
liberties. 123 Following that repudiation of "substantive due process in the arena
legislatures [to] have
of economic regulation, [the Supreme Court recognized]
12 4
problems.'
economic
with
experiment
to
scope
'broad
The same "switch in time that saved nine" also ushered in a far more
expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause. 125 In its 1937 watershed decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,' 26 the Supreme Court discarded

its former distinction between production and commerce in order to uphold the
National Labor Relations Act as a permissible exercise of Congress's Commerce
Clause power. The Court therein held for the first time that the Commerce Clause
authorized federal regulation of local economic activity (in this case, labor) when
that activity affects interstate commerce.1 27 A few years later, in its 1941 United

123
See W Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 392 (upholding the state of Washington's minimum
wage law and noting that freedom of contract is a qualified right and that due process does not
prevent the government from enacting protective safeguards with respect to the making of contracts). In reaching its West Coast Hotel decision, the Court rhetorically asked: "What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the
deprivation of liberty without due process of law." Id. at 391, quoted in part in Cooter & Siegel,
supra note 56, at 1215 n.112.
124
McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (quoting New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,

439 U.S. 96, 106-07 (1978)). Although the Court has not actually overruled Lochner, the case is
universally considered no longer to be good law. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 56, at 1215 n. 112.
"Lochner is never cited for its legal authority. Although it has never been formally overruled, it is
well understood among constitutional lawyers that relying on Lochner would be a pointless, if not
a self-destructive, endeavor." Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48
DUKE L.J. 243, 244 (1998), quoted in Cooter & Siegel, supra note 56, at 1215 n.112. Since the
rejection of the Lochner-era notion of freedom of contract as a fundamental constitutional right,
substantive due process claims involving laws regulating economic activity are now subjected to
the far more lenient or deferential rational basis test. As a result, "[e]ven if the court is convinced
that the political branch has made an improvident, ill-advised or unnecessary decision, it must
uphold the act if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose." TRM, Inc. v.
United States, 52 F.3d 941, 946 (1 th Cir. 1995), quoted in McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d. at 1161.
125
See Melone, supra note 9, at 1190 n.83 (describing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941), as "one of a series of cases that expanded the scope of the commerce power after the socalled 'switch in time that saved nine' in the New Deal era").
126
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
127
Ryan C. Patterson, Note, "Are You Serious?": Examining the Constitutionalityof an Individual Mandatefor Health Insurance, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2003, 2019 n. 131 (2010) (citing
Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 36-38). In Jones & Laughlin, the Court upheld the National Labor
Relations Act (protecting workers' rights to form unions and engage in collective bargaining with
employers) as applied to a steel manufacturer that used materials shipped in interstate commerce
in order to produce steel intended for sale out of state. Jay, supra note 9, at 1148 (citing Jones &
Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 15-16). Labor, of course, relates directly to production or manufacture of
goods. And, the Court noted in Jones & Laughlin that, if viewed in isolation, the manufacture of
steel may be seen as purely local activity. Id. (citingJones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 38). However,
the Court found that fact not to be dispositive because of the "close and intimate relation" between
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States v. Darby128 decision, the Court overruled Hammer v. Dagenhartand upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (which "regulat[ed] ... wages and
hours of employees of businesses selling products across state lines" 129) as valid
under the Commerce Clause. In so doing, the Court found that Congress's Commerce Clause power extends to intrastate activities that "so affect interstate com-

merce... as to make regulation of [those local activities] appropriate means to
the ... legitimate end" of regulating interstate commerce. 130 Building on these
precedents, the Court cemented its modem, expansive interpretation of the Com13 1
In Wickard, the
merce Clause with its 1942 decision in Wickard v. Filburn.
Court upheld the application of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 to impose quotas on the amount of wheat that a farmer could grow for personal consumption. Growing wheat for personal use is obviously a strictly local activity.
Nevertheless, the Court found that Congress could regulate that activity through

its commerce power because growing more wheat for consumption reduces market demand for the commodity and therefore has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 132 Wickard thus stands for the proposition that Congress may regulate
even entirely local economic activity that "has a cumulative and substantial effect on interstate commerce. 133
The Jones & Laughlin, Darby, and Wickard decisions "effectively eviscerated the Commerce Clause as a barrier to federal action" in the area of economic regulation. 134 In the five decades following the Wickard decision, Congress used the Commerce Clause (together with the power to tax and spend) "to
vastly expand its regulatory reach into almost every area affecting one's daily
life, including labor, education, the environment, public safety, and, of course,

steel manufacturing and interstate commerce. Id. (quoting Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Labor unrest in the steel industry could disrupt the commercial
chain with respect to steel production, ultimately affecting sales of product across the country and
abroad. Id. (citingJones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 41,42). Because the "ramifying activities" of the
steel manufacturing industry "affect[] interstate commerce at every point[,]" the Court found the
Commerce Clause to permit regulation of labor in that industry. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 43.
312 U.S. 100 (1941).
128
129
Jay, supra note 9, at 1146 (citing Darby, 312 U.S. at 111).
130
Darby, 312 U.S. at 118. In Darby, the Court approved the power to regulate wages and
hours of "of workmen in the production of goods 'for interstate commerce"' on the theory that
Congress "could stop the initial step toward transportation" of such goods in interstate commerce,
which was "production with the intention of so transporting" those goods. Id. at 108, 117.
131
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
132
Clark, supra note 9, at 586 (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118-19, 125).

133 Jack M. Balkin, The Constitutionalityof an IndividualMandatefor Health Insurance, 158
U. PA. L. REv. PENNumiRA 102, 106 (2009) (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. at 117; United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 121-22 (1942); Darby, 312 U.S. at 118-24).
134 Melone, supra note 9, at 1227 n.208 (noting the turning point in Commerce Clause jurisprudence reflected in Darby and Wickard).
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healthcare financing and delivery."135 During that time, Congress's "commerce
power was commonly thought to be virtually plenary.' ' 136 Indeed, between 1936
law on the ground
and 1995, the Supreme Court did not invalidate a single federal
137
that it exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority.
iii. Commerce Power Limits ConcerningRegulation of
Noneconomic Activity
Prior to NFIB, the only limit on the commerce power that the Supreme
Court had enforced in the modem era was to reject congressional efforts at regulating intrastate noneconomic activity. In its 1995 United States v. Lopez' 38 decision, the Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which
"made it a federal offense 'for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at
a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone."1 39 Possession of a gun near a school is, of course, a purely local activity
that is not commercial in nature. Noting that it had previously "upheld a wide
variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where ...
the activity substantially affected interstate commerce[,]"' 4 ° the Court thus distinguished the Gun-Free School Zones Act on the ground that it was "a criminal
statute that by its terms ha[d] nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms."14' The federal
government had argued that the statute was sustainable under the Commerce
Clause because having guns near schools substantially affects interstate commerce in several ways: by facilitating violent crime, which in turn would impose
substantial costs to be spread among the population through the mechanism of
insurance; by causing people not to travel to areas that are perceived to be unsafe;

135 Clark, supra note 9, at 570; see also Patterson, supra note 127, at 2019 ("After Wickard,
Congress, taking advantage of the Court's extraordinarily broad interpretation, used the commerce
power to pass regulatory, criminal, and civil rights laws.").
136 Cushman, supra note 104, at 134.
137
Patterson, supranote 127, at 2019.
138 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
139

Id. at 551 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed. Supp. V)).

Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
Id. at 561. The Court observed that "[e]ven Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching
example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a
way that the possession of a gun in a school zone does not." Id. at 560. To be sure, "possession of
a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition
elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce." Id. at 567. Nor was such regulation
of gun possession "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated." Id. at 561.
140
141
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and by adversely affecting education, thereby reducing citizens' ability to contribute to the national economy. 142 The Court, however, found the relationship of
these "costs of crime" to interstate commerce to be far too tenuous to satisfy the
"substantial effects"' 143 test for upholding regulation of intrastate activity on
Commerce Clause grounds. 144
Five years later, in its 2000 decision in UnitedStates v. Morrison,145 the
Court similarly struck down a statute that "provide[d] a federal civil remedy for
the victims of gender-motivated violence." 146 Arguing that the law was sustainable under the Commerce Clause, the federal government and an individual petitioner (who sought to sue her alleged rapist under the statute) essentially asked
the Court to recognize a "but-for causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime ...to every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce., 147 As in
Lopez, however, the Court refused to recognize indirect consequences of local,
noneconomic activities as grounds for federal regulation of such activities under
the guise of the commerce power. To do so, the Court adduced, would threaten

Id. at 563-64.
143
After outlining the prior history of its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and focusing particularly on the modem-era precedents that expanded its interpretation of the clause, the Court listed
the "three broad categories of activity that Congress may [now] regulate under its commerce
power[:]"
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.... Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities....
Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce... i.e., those
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce ....
Id. at 558 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). In articulating the third of category, the
Court acknowledged that, "admittedly, our case law has not been clear whether an activity must
'affect' or 'substantially affect' interstate commerce in order to be within Congress' power to regulate it under the Commerce Clause." Id. at 559. However, the Court "conclude[d], consistent with
the great weight of our case law, that the proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated
activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce." Id. Given that prohibiting the possession of
guns near schools is obviously not a regulation of either a channel or an instrumentality of interstate
commerce, the Court reasoned that the only potential basis for sustaining the law under the Commerce Clause would be if it came within the third category-i.e., if gun possession near a school
somehow substantially affected interstate commerce. Id.
144 Id. at 564. If such attenuated causal connections were considered to satisfy the "substantial
effects" test established in Wickard and other modem-era precedents, then Congress could conceivably use its commerce power to regulate literally "any activity that it found was related to the
economic productivity of individual citizens[.]" Id. Under such an approach, "it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education
where States historically have been sovereign." Id.
145
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
146
Id. at 601-02 (discussing the federal statute in question, 42 U.S.C. § 13891).
147
Id. at 615.
142
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"to completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and local authority." 148 While it stopped short of "adopt[ing] a categorical rule against
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity[,]" the Court in Morrison
once again stressed that "thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld
Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature. 14 9
Although federalism enthusiasts may have taken some comfort from
Lopez and Morrison,those decisions did not call into question the federal authority recognized in Darby and Wickard to regulate local economic activity when
that activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The Court thus left
Congress's broad authority to legislate on economic matters completely intact.150
Indeed, in its 2005 Gonzales v. Raich1 51 decision, "the Court further clarified that
Congress can regulate [even] some noneconomic activity" under the Commerce
Clause "if it is a part of a general class of activity that the Court deems eco' 152
nomic.
148
Id. The Court determined that the logical conclusion of "petitioners' reasoning [would be]
to allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime
has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption." Id. Moreover, petitioners' reasoning could be extended not only to federal regulation of crime, but also "to family
law and other areas of traditional state regulation, since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce,
and childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant." Id. at 615-16.
149
Id. at 613 (emphasis added).
150
Id. at 610 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995)) ("Where economic
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained."), quoted in Koppelman, supra note 42, at 11 n.58; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611
(quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring)) ("Congress may 'regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption that we have a single market and a unified purpose to build a
stable national economy[.]'), quoted in Koppelman, supra note 42, at 11 n.58.
151
545 U.S. 1 (2005).
152
Koppelman, supranote 42, at 11 n.58 (citing Raich, 545 U.S. at 17-19). In Raich, the Court
upheld the federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 ("CSA"), as applied to prohibit "the
intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical purposes" (notwithstanding that
said manufacture and possession for such purposes was allowed under California law). Raich, 545
U.S. at 15. The Court found the prohibition of local cultivation and possession of marijuana for
personal medical use to be a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power, even though
those activities were themselves not economic in nature. Citing Wickard and other precedents, the
Court noted that "[o]ur case law firmly establishes Congress' power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic 'class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce." Id. at 17. Analogizing the prohibition of marijuana possession for personal use to the
quotas on cultivation of wheat for personal use that were at issue in Wickard, the Court found that
"Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself 'commercial,' in that it is not
produced for sale," if it has a rational basis for concluding "that failure to regulate that class of
activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity." Id. at 18; see
also id. at 19 (discussing the rational basis for such a belief on the facts in Wickard). The Court
distinguished applying the CSA to prohibit personal marijuana possession from the Gun Free
School Zones Act of 1990 that it struck down in Lopez. The Gun Free School Zones Act was a
"discrete prohibition" of a local noneconomic activity. Id. at 24. In contrast, the application of the
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Arguments as to Whether the IndividualMandate Was
Within the Scope of Congress's Commerce Power

Given this legal landscape, supporters of the ACA thought there was
for defending the individual mandate on Commerce Clause grounds.
basis
ample
For example, noted constitutional law professor Erwin Chemerinsky maintained
that an individual's decision whether to purchase health insurance constitutes
153
economic activity (even when there is no economic transaction, per se) and
that the consequences of those individual decisions have substantial effects on
interstate commerce. 154 Therefore, he surmised that regulating those decisions
155
through the individual mandate was a legitimate use of the commerce power.
Another prominent legal scholar, Professor Jack Balkin, thought that even if a
decision not to purchase health insurance was "noneconomic" activity, regulation of that activity was still permissible (presumably under Raich) as a necessary
part of a broader regulation of interstate commerce in healthcare. 56
On the other hand, in arguing that the Commerce Clause did not support
the measure, the plaintiffs in the ACA litigation "maintain[ed] that the individual
CSA to noneconomic activity "was merely one of many essential part[s] of a larger regulation of
economic activity," i.e., the interstate sale of illicit drugs, "in which the regulatory scheme could
be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated." Id. at 24-25 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at
561) (internal quotation marks omitted). Though that distinction had been foreshadowed in Lopez
itself, some commentators saw Raich as a "clear departure from the Court's prior efforts" in Lopez
and Morrison"to establish judicially enforceable limits on the commerce power." Patterson, supra
note 127, at 2028; see Sandefur, supra note 19, at 206 (observing that, prior to NFIB, "what limits
[on the Commerce Clause power that] the Court did offer in recent years appeared to have been
once again demolished in the 2005 Raich decision").
153
Chemerinsky, supra note 87, at 620 (arguing that "[t]he act of purchasing health care is, by
definition, economic activity[,]" but that "economic activity does not require an economic transaction[,]" and that "[e]ven the choice to not purchase health care is economic activity because if a
person makes a choice not to purchase health care, the person is making the economic decision to
purchase something else or save the money").
154 Id. at 621 (arguing that "[tihe health care industry is about $800 billion in the United States
economy, and that says that what Congress is doing here [by mandating individuals' purchase of
health insurance] clearly does have a substantial effect on interstate commerce").
Professor Chemerinsky argued that, under Raich and its modem-era precedents, the mandate
155
was a valid exercise of the commerce power so long an individual's decision whether to purchase
health insurance constituted economic activity and Congress had a rational basis for concluding
that such activity substantially affected interstate commerce. See id. at 619-21. He seems to have
focused particularly on the Raich decision because Raich highlighted the rational basis standard
for determinations as to whether intrastate activity substantially affects interstate commerce. Id. at
619 ("This tremendously lessens the burden on the government because the rational basis test is so
deferential.") Interestingly, he interprets Raich as having "changed the law because it broadened
what counts as economic activity." See id. at 620. This differs technically from the more pervasive
interpretation of Raich, which is that the Court there found the Commerce Clause to permit congressional regulation of even noneconomic intrastate activity when necessary as part of a broader
scheme to regulate interstate commerce. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
See Balkin, supra note 133, at 107.
156
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mandate [did] not regulate [any] activity affecting interstate commerce" 157 whatsoever. Instead, they argued, the mandate sought "to impermissibly regulate economic inactivity. The decision not to buy insurance, according to the plaintiffs,
[was] the exact opposite of economic activity."' 15 8 Some legal commentators
agreed,159 contending that to allow Congress to reach such inactivity would enable it to "exercis[e] powers that are even more remote to the regulation of interstate commerce than is the regulation of noneconomic activity." 6 °
The federal government, of course, "responded that the individual mandate represents a valid use of the commerce power,"1 61 and proponents of the
ACA sought to dismiss any distinction between activity and inactivity as irrelevant. 162 Nonetheless, to be on the safe side, the government did not base its defense of the individual mandate solely on Commerce Clause grounds.

157 Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120,
1162 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
158

Id.

See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 96, at 612 ("The individual health insurance mandate, however, is not regulating any economic activity. The mandate is quite literally regulating inactivity.
Rather than regulating or prohibiting economic activity in which a citizen voluntarily chooses to
engage... the mandate is commanding that a citizen must engage in economic activity."); Rivkin
& Casey, supra note 82, at 99 ("[W]hat Congress is contemplating with regard to a health care
mandate is even less defensible under a Commerce Clause analysis than what it sought to do" under
the statutes that the Court struck down in Lopez and Morrison, "both of which, after all, purported
to regulate noneconomic activities that were nevertheless freely engaged in by individuals." In
contrast, "the health care mandate would not regulate any 'activity' at all. Rather, it features an
affirmative federal command that parties engage in a particular commercial activity-i.e., a purchase of insurance.").
160 Barnett, supra note 96, at 614. Professor Barnett argued that such an expansion of the commerce power "would convert all decisions not to sell one's house or car into economic activity that
could be regulated or mandated if Congress deemed the expansion convenient to its regulation of
interstate commerce." Id. at 613.
161 Mason, supranote 10, at 979.
162 Professor Andrew Koppelman, for example, considered it to be "an interesting semantic
question" and conceded that forgoing the purchase of health insurance "may not be economic activity," even though "[i]t is an economic decision with economic consequences." Koppelman, supra note 42, at 6-7. Yet, to Professor Koppelman, the answer to that question "[did] not matter"
because "[u]nder the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is enough that there is a national problem
that only Congress can solve, and that the means chosen are reasonably adapted to the attainment
of a legitimate end." Id. at 7 (internal citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Necessary and Proper Clause grants to Congress the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution" all of Congress's other Article I, Section 8 powers, as well
as "all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or any
Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. While there was no precedent for
invoking that power to regulate inactivity, the Supreme Court had relied on the Necessary and
Proper Clause when expanding its interpretation of the commerce power to reach wholly intrastate
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. Barnett, supranote 96, at 612 & n.39 (citing
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-19 (1941)).
159
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2. The Argument that the Shared Responsibility Payment Was a Valid
Exercise of Congress's Taxing Power
Arguing in the alternative, the government contended that, even if not
authorized by the Commerce Clause, there was nevertheless an independent
source of congressional power to enact the individual mandate: The mandate (or,
at least, the shared responsibility payment owed by individuals not in compliance
within Congress's power to lay and
with the mandate) was valid as a tax that was
1 63
collect under the General Welfare Clause.'
Understanding why the government ultimately prevailed on that argument is essential to crafting a post-NFIB constitutional test to distinguish between actual taxes, on one hand, and penalties masquerading as taxes, on the
other. The Supreme Court's analysis of the constitutional power to tax in NFIB,
of course, drew heavily on the Court's many prior taxing-power decisions. By
illustrating how the Court has historically construed the scope of the taxing
power and how it has approached the constitutional distinction between taxes
and penalties in the past, those earlier tax-power cases not only place NFIB in
context; they also provide useful insights into how best to construct a forwardlooking tax-vs.-penalties test that the Court would actually accept and apply. To
make sense of those previous cases, in turn, it is necessary to understand the
constitutional underpinnings of the taxing power itself. Among other things, it is
important to be mindful of the breadth of that power-and the reasons why it is
so broad-in order to ensure that any proposed tax-vs.-penalties test does not
impinge upon Congress's constitutional authority to lay and collect those exactions that really are taxes. Accordingly, let us turn next to a consideration of the
taxing power, followed by examinations of the foundational cases comprising
three distinct eras of the Court's taxing-power jurisprudence.

See Clark, supra note 9, at 565 & n.93 (citing Reply Brief for Petitioner (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 21-25, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No.
11-398), 2012 WL 748426, at *21-25) ("Alternatively, the federal government argued that the
mandate could also be upheld as an exercise of Congress's taxing power."); Brian Galle, The Taxing Power, the Affordable Care Act, and the Limits of ConstitutionalCompromise, 120 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 407, 407 (2011) (citing Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 19-25, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(No. 3:10-cv-188-HEH)) (noting that the taxing power is one of the "grounds on which the federal
government defend[ed] the constitutionality of the" ACA)); Jay, supra note 9, at 1169 ("The government claim[ed] that there is an independent basis for congressional power: the mandate's assessment is authorized as [a] tax justified under the General Welfare Clause."); Mason, supra note
10, at 979 (noting the federal government's argument that, even if not valid under the Commerce
Clause, "the individual mandate... is nevertheless constitutional as an exercise of the taxing
power").
163
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The Scope of the Taxing Power
The General Welfare Clause (also referred to as the Taxing and Spending Clause 164) provides that "Congress shall have Power [t]o lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States[.]" 165 As the Supreme
Court has recognized from the early days of the republic, "the power of Congress
to tax is a very extensive power." 166 Indeed, the taxing power is among the broadest and most absolute of any of Congress's Article I powers. Though the Constitution places some express limits on congressional taxing authority, those limits
are modest and few. In the words of the Supreme Court, 167 the taxing power is

164
See Mason, supra note 10, at 994 ("The congressional powers to tax and spend derive from
the same clause of the Constitution, alternatively called the General Welfare Clause or the Taxing
and Spending Clause.").
165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
166
License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1867).
167
Id.
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given "with only one exception and two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, 168 and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment,"' and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity." 70 The only other express constitutional
requirement for tax legislation is that the legislation must have originated in the
House of Representatives. 171 Subject to those modest constraints, the Supreme
Court has long construed the federal taxing power to "reach[] every subject"

The Export Clause provides that "[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from
any State." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
169 The apportionment rule for direct taxes appears in two clauses of the Constitution. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
")and
States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers ....
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 ("No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion
to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.") For any direct tax subject to the
apportionment requirement, the federal government must collect from the citizens of each particular state a percentage of the total amount of the tax collected, equal to the percentage of the total
population of all states comprised of population of that particular state. So, if State A has 1,000,000
people, and State B has 2,000,000 people, then the federal government must collect $2 from citizens of State B for every dollar collected from citizens in State A under the tax in question. The
Constitution provides little guidance as to what constitutes a "direct" tax for this purpose. In an
early case, the Supreme Court construed the Direct Tax Clauses very narrowly, indicating that the
only direct taxes were capitation or head taxes and taxes on real property. See Hylton v. United
States, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 171, 179 (1796) (Chase, J.). This narrow construction persisted for nearly
a century, until the Court's 1895 decisions in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock 1),
157 U.S. 429 (1895), and Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Pollockfl), 158 U.S. 601 (1895)
supersededby constitutionalamendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. In Pollock II, the Court invalidated a tax on individual incomes derived from real or personal property, as a direct tax that was
not apportioned among the states. In so doing, the Court expanded the recognized categories of
direct taxes to include taxes on personal property, as well as taxes on income derived from either
real or personal property. Pollock I, 158 U.S. at 637. PollockI'sapplication of the apportionment
rule to income taxes was ultimately overturned by the 1913 ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, which provides that "Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to
any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. However, the apportionment requirement
continues to apply to other direct taxes (whatever they may be). The requirement does not apply to
"indirect" taxes-i.e., duties, imposts and excises.
170 The Uniformity Clause (which is included within the General Welfare Clause) provides that
"all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 1. It "requires that an excise tax apply, at the same rate, in all portions of the United States
where the subject of the tax is found." United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 84 (1983) (citing
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 106 (1900)). The uniformity requirement "is one of geographic
uniformity only; so long as the tax structure does not discriminate among the states, it does not
matter that a tax may not be 'uniform' as it applies to particular individuals." 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 842 (3d ed. 2000), quoted in McCullough, supra note 112, at
750 n. 104. The uniformity requirement does not apply to direct taxes.
171 The Origination Clause provides that "[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other
Bills." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
168
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upon , which
a tax might be levied, and to be exercisable "at [Congress's] discre172
tion.
The strength and breadth of the taxing power are by design. The national
government's need for adequate means by which to raise revenue was a primary
impetus behind the creation of the current constitutional order. 173 During America's "initial national experiment with the Articles of Confederation ... [, t]he
original Congress had the power to request taxes from the. . . states, but it had
no way to enforce collection." 174 The only way that the national government
could finance itself under the Articles was to requisition the states for funds. The
national government could "apportion taxes among the states," but only the states
had the actual power to levy and collect taxes from individual citizens. 75 While
some of the states complied with congressional requisitions, most of them did
not. 176 For example, under the Requisition of 1786 (the last requisition pursuant
to the Articles), the national government required the states to pay a total of
$3,800,000, but it collected only $663.177 Because the states "had failed to meet
congressional requisitions on a massive scale" under the Articles of Confederation, the national government essentially became insolvent and the very survival
of the Union became at stake. 178 Thus, among the foremost reasons for calling
the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was to develop a strong taxing authority
for the national government. 179 Among the Articles of Confederation's several

172

License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1867).

173

See Joel Alicea & Donald L. Drakeman, The Limits ofNew Originalism, 15 U. PA. J. CONST.

L. 1161, 1173-74 n.55 (2013) (citing GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE
EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at 15 (2009)) ("One of the principal reasons for adopting a new
Constitution was to enable the United States government to raise the funds it needed in light of the
manifest failure of the Articles of Confederation to provide an adequate mechanism for doing so.");
McCullough, supra note 112, at 745 ("The power to tax is so fundamental to the United States
Constitution that it was one of the central impetuses for calling the Constitutional Convention.");
Metzger, supra note 81, at 89 ("[P]roviding a mechanism by which the federal government could
raise revenue and pay its debts was a principal motivation behind the creation of a new constitutional order.").
174
Steven J. Willis & Nakku Chung, ConstitutionalDecapitation and Healthcare, 128 TAX
NOTES 169, 178-79 (July 12, 2010).
175
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 56, at 1201-02.
176
Willis & Chung, supra note 174, at 179.
177
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 56, at 1202.
178
Metzger, supra note 81, at 89.
179
Willis & Chung, supra note 174, at 179. After all, one might argue that nominal authority
over such things as "[r]ights, armies, and commerce do not matter if the government has no money
to operate." Id.
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deficiencies, the absence of a meaningful ability to tax was first on James Madison's list. 180 And Washington, Jefferson, and Hamilton also each mentioned an
adequate revenue-raising mechanism either as lacking in the Articles or as a central requirement of the new Constitution.' 8 1Accordingly, attendees of the Constitutional Convention pressed for the federal Congress to have a potent taxing authority, and the breadth of the resulting power is reflected in the General Welfare
Clause. 182
Under the terms of the General Welfare Clause, Congress may exercise
its power to tax only to pay the nation's debts, to provide for the common defense, or otherwise to further the "general welfare." As Justice Joseph Story reasoned in his revered Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, exercise of the taxing power must be seen as permissible only for those purposes;
otherwise, "the federal government would be one of 'general and unlimited powers."1 83 In practice, however, the general welfare requirement has not produced
any significant judicially enforced limits on the taxing power. Rather, in analyzing a congressional taxing or spending measure, the Supreme Court generally
judgment as to what may promote the general welfare of
defers to Congress's
84
1

the nation.

At the time of the Constitution's ratification, at least one of the Framers-James Madison-believed that the taxing power was limited by more than

Id. (quoting

Vices of the PoliticalSystem of the United States, in THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (1787) (eds. William T. Hutchinson, et al., University of Chicago
Press, 1977)).
181 Id. at 179 & nn. 117-19 (citing Letter from George Washington to John Jay (Aug. 1, 1786),
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (Aug. 4, 1787), and Letter from Alexander
Hamilton to James Duane (Sept. 13, 1780)).
182 McCullough, supra note 112, at 745 n.87; see also W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL
TAXATION IN AMERICA 16 (2d ed. 2004) ("The Constitution reflected the desire of James Madison,
Alexander Hamilton, and its other leading supporters to provide the new central government with
far greater capacity to tax than the old national government had enjoyed under the Articles of
Confederation."), quoted in Cooter & Siegel, supranote 56, at 1203 n.36.
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 907 (Mel183
ville M. Bigelow ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 5th ed. 1891), quoted in Jonathan S. Sidhu,
Comment, For the General Welfare: Findinga Limit on the Taxing Power after NFIB v. Sebelius,
103 CALIF. L. REV. 103,112 (2015).
184 While recognizing that the Constitution distinguishes between the general welfare of the
nation, on one hand, and some sort of "particular" welfare, on the other, the Court has said that
discretion as to whether a particular tax or expenditure serves the general welfare belongs not to
the courts but "to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an
exercise of judgment." Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937), quoted in Jay, supra note 9,
at 1163 n.203; see Mason, supra note 10, at 997 (citingHelvering, 301 U.S. at 640) ("The Supreme
Court defers to Congress and voters on whether taxing and spending provisions advance general
welfare."); see also McCullough, supra note 112, at 748 n.100 (citing Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640)
(noting how "the 'general welfare' understanding has been dramatically expanded to include taxing
and spending toward ends not wholly illegitimate").
180

JAMES A. MADISON,
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just the general welfare requirement. Madison thought that Congress could exercise its power to tax (and its power to spend) only to facilitate the exercise of one
of its other enumerated powers under Article I, Section 8.185 On the other hand,
another of the most influential Framers-Alexander Hamilton, the nation's first
Treasury Secretary-saw the taxing power as essentially plenary.186 To Hamilton, the Taxing and Spending Clause was separate and distinct from Congress's
other enumerated powers, and the power to tax thus was unconstrained by the
limits of those other powers. He believed that, subject to the few express requisites mentioned earlier, 87 Congress's ability to lay and collect taxes was restricted only by the requirement that the power be exercised to advance the country's general welfare.188 For more than 140 years after the Constitution was
ratified, the Supreme Court remained officially silent on the Hamilton-Madison
debate-though, from its earliest cases, the Court's construction of the taxing
power plainly comported with Hamilton's. Finally, in its 193 6 decision in United
States v. Butler, the Court formally endorsed the Hamiltonian view. 8 9

185 In The Federalist No. 41, Madison expressly rejected the notion that Congress had been
granted power to tax and spend for any purpose allegedly connected to the general welfare, arguing
that so broad a taxing power would threaten to obliterate protections of individual rights and other
constraints on federal power embedded in the Constitution. See Sidhu, supra note 183, at 114 &
n.59 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 258-59 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003))
(discussing Madison's views); see also McCullough, supra note 112, at 748 n.100 (discussing
Madison's "strict constructionist view, in which the government could only tax and spend for purposes specifically enumerated in the Constitution").
186

Sidhu, supra note 183, at 114 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton)

(Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)) (noting Hamilton's description of the taxing power as plenary in The
FederalistNo. 33).
187 For a discussion of the prohibition against taxing exports, the apportionment requirement
for direct taxes, and the uniformity requirement for excises, duties and imposts, see supra notes
168-70 and accompanying text.
188 As the Supreme Court would later describe his position on the matter:
Hamilton.. . maintained the [Taxing and Spending Clause] confers a power
separate and distinct from those later enumerated, is not restricted in meaning
by the grant of them, and Congress consequently has a substantive power to
tax and to appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised
to provide for the general welfare of the United States.
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936); see also McCullough, supra note 112, at 748
n.100 ("On the other side [of Madison's more restrictive view of the taxing power], Alexander
Hamilton expounded a doctrine of implied powers, in which 'general welfare' was understood
broadly.").
189 Butler, 297 U.S. at 66 (maintaining that "Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries, espouse[d]
the Hamiltonian position[,]" and concluding that "the reading [of the Taxing and Spending Clause]
advocated by Mr. Justice Story is the correct one"); see Jay, supranote 9, at 1162 n.201 (describing
how, in Butler, "the Court agreed with Alexander Hamilton's interpretation of the Taxing and
Spending Clause"); see also McCullough, supra note 112, at 748 n.100 (noting that "this dispute
has been long-settled in favor of the Hamiltonian view"). Butler dealt with the constitutionality of
taxing and spending provisions in the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 1933. Although the Court in
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Early Cases Upholding Congress'sBroad Power to
Tax

The fact that Congress may lay a tax in furtherance of the general welfare, even when the revenue is not used in connection with an exercise of another
enumerated power (such as the commerce power), commended the General Welfare Clause as an independent basis upon which to defend the constitutionality
of the individual mandate. In at least one important respect, the mandate-or,
more precisely, the shared responsibility payment-certainly looks like a tax: It
190
promises to raise significant revenue for the federal government. That revenue,
in turn, may "help[] to pay some of the costs of comprehensive public health
reform that includes an expansion of Medicaid, reform of insurance practices,
and an employer mandate" 19 1-certainly uses that can be said to advance the
general welfare.
Nevertheless, the shared responsibility payment is not intended primarily to raise revenue. Rather, its indisputably primary purpose is to cause individuals to obtain adequate health insurance.' 92 However, ACA supporters argued
that, "[e]ven if the primary purpose of a measure is regulatory, it is still potentially a valid tax. 19 3 Given the breadth of the taxing power, ACA supporters
maintained that the shared responsibility payment could be upheld as a tax, even
health insurance were beyond the scope of Conif compelling people to buy
1 94
gress's commerce power.'
Indeed, there was much Supreme Court precedent to support this argument. In early cases examining the scope of the federal taxing power, the Court
confirmed that Congress could tax objects or activities that it could not otherwise
1 95
Moreover, it held in those cases
regulate under its other enumerated powers.

Butler endorsed Hamilton's broad interpretation of the taxing power in that case, the Court nevertheless struck down the act on the ground that the tax was part of a plan to "regulate and control
agricultural production," which the Court determined to be "beyond the powers delegated to the
federal government." Butler, 297 U.S. at 68. Thus, the Court's actual holding in that case was
essentially that "Congress could tax and spend for anything that served the general welfare, so long
as it did not violate anotherpart of the Constitution." Sidhu, supra note 183, at 112 (citing Butler,
297 U.S. at 65-66) (emphasis added). For further discussion of the Butler decision, see infra text
accompanying notes 295-311.
See infra text accompanying notes 397-99.
190
Balkin, supra note 133, at 103-04.
Gillian Metzger, Defense of the ConstitutionalityofHealth CareReform, 62 Mercer L. Rev.
192
633, 633-34 (2011) (noting how "[n]o one disputes that the primary purpose of the minimum coverage provision is to encourage people to purchase insurance").
Id. at 634.
193
Balkin, supra note 133, at 103-06 (advancing that argument in support of upholding the
194
"tax on uninsured persons").
195 See, e.g., McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 51, 61 (1904) (upholding federal excise tax
on manufacture and sale of artificially colored oleomargarine, even though the power to regulate
191
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that a revenue-producing measure was a valid tax even if it had regulatory effects
that Congress could not achieve through its other enumerated powers, 196 and that
when a revenue-producing measure is a valid tax on its face, the judicial branch
may not invalidate it on the basis of Congress's possible regulatory motives for
enacting it.' 97
For example, in its 1867 decision in the License Tax Cases,'98 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of provisions in an 1864 internal revenue act requiring (upon penalty of imprisonment) merchants of lottery tickets or
liquor to pay for a federal "license" to sell such items. The sale of lottery tickets
was then prohibited in New York State and New Jersey, and the retail sale of
liquor was then prohibited in Massachusetts. Merchants in those states who were
indicted under federal law for selling the items in question without having obtained the requisite licenses challenged the validity of the law on the ground that
only the states had the power to regulate intrastate trade and that, therefore, "penalties for carrying on such trade without [a federal] license could not be constitutionally imposed."' 199 In rejecting that argument, the Court first found that, although labeled a "license," the provision at issue did not confer or purport to
confer any authority to sell lottery tickets or liquor in any state. z° In other words,
it was not a regulation of intrastate trade that exceeded congressional authority
or infringed on any power reserved to the states. Instead, despite the label, the
"license" was merely a tax. 20 ' As such, it was authorized by the extensive "power
of Congress to tax[,]" which (subject only to the restriction on taxation of exports; the apportionment rule for direct taxes; and the uniformity requirement for
such manufacture and sale was reserved exclusively to the states); License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 462, 470-75 (1867) (upholding federal excise taxes on sales of lottery tickets and liquor,
even though regulation of those activities was solely the province of the states).
196
See, e.g., United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 93-95 (1919) (holding that a nominal tax
on narcotics was valid, despite that related requisites for sales of taxed items had a moral end in
view and that regulation of such sales was a police power reserved to the states); McCray, 195 U.S.
at 59 (finding that, whereas tax on artificially colored oleomargarine was a facially valid excise
tax, Congress's power to enact the tax could not be restrained on the basis that the tax would have
an effect of discouraging or restricting the manufacture of such product).
197 See, e.g., Doremus, 249 U.S. at 93 (determining that an otherwise valid federal tax "cannot
be invalidated because of the supposed motives which induced it"); McCray, 195 U.S. at 53-56
(reasoning that the judicial branch may not restrain Congress's valid exercise of the taxing power
on the basis that Congress's objective was to achieve an end beyond the scope of its other powers);
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 548 (1869) (finding that a tax on state-bank notes
could not be invalidated on the ground that the purpose of the tax was to impair the franchise
granted by the state to the bank to issue such notes).
198 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462 (1867).
199
Id. at 470.
200
Id. at 471.
201 Id. In support of its finding that the measure was a tax, the Court took note of the fact that
Congress renamed the "license" in question as a "special tax" in an 1866 internal revenue act. Id.
at 473-74.
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excises, duties and imposts) "reaches every subject and may be exercised at discretion., 20 2 Thus, even if Congress did not have the power to regulate intrastate
sales of lottery tickets or liquor, it nevertheless had the power to tax those who
engaged in that trade.
In Veazie Bank v. Fenno,20 3 decided in 1869, the Court ruled on the constitutionality of a federal excise tax upon notes issued for circulation as currency
by state-chartered banks.20 4 By 1866, when the tax went into effect, "the country
' '20 5 and the objective
had been sufficiently furnished with a National currency[,]
06
of the measure was plainly to remove state-bank notes from circulation. A state
bank against which the tax was levied challenged the measure on several
grounds. Among them was that the rate of the tax-10% of the amount of the
notes in question-was "so excessive as to indicate a purpose on the part of Congress to destroy" the franchises that the states had granted to state banks to issue
such notes for circulation, and thus was "beyond the constitutional power of Congress., 20 7 To this, the Court's first response was that "the judicial cannot prescribe to the legislative departments of the government limitations upon the exercise of its acknowledged powers." 2 8 Thus, the Court determined that, when a
measure is facially valid under the taxing power (as was the measure at issue in
Veazie 20 9), the judicial branch cannot restrict Congress's exercise of that power
on the basis of the tax's effects. In particular, the Court concluded that it may not
substitute its judgment for Congress's and strike down a federal tax because the
rate is too high. Instead, the people's proper recourse against a Congress that
taxes oppressively is to vote the bums out. 210 For these reasons, the Court rejected
the argument that the measure in question could be invalidated on the ground

Id. at 471. For further quotation of the Court's description in the License Tax Cases of the
breadth of the taxing power and the few constraints to which that power is subject, see supra text
accompanying notes 167-70, 172.
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
203
The tax was levied on state banks that paid out any state-bank-issued notes used for circu204
lation after August 1, 1866. Id. at 539.
202

205

Id.

206
207

Cushman, supra note 104, at 138.
Veazie, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 548.

208

Id.

The Court had previously rejected the argument that the tax in question was an unapportioned direct tax. See id. at 541-47.
The Court recognized, of course, that "[t]he power to tax may be exercised oppressively
210
but it reasoned that "the responsibility of the legislature is not to the courts, but to
persons,"
upon
the people by whom its members are elected. So, if a particular tax bears heavily upon a corporation, or a class of corporations, it cannot, for that reason only, be pronounced contrary to the Constitution." Id.
209
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that the tax would effectively eliminate state-bank-issued notes from circulation.21
Because the Court went on to find that Congress had separate authority
for restraining state banks from issuing currency, the statements in Veazie regarding the tax power were arguably mere dicta.212 However, the notion of judicial deference to Congress's exercise of its taxing authority-whatever the effects of, or motives for, the particular tax-was central to the Court's 1904
decision in McCray v. United States. 213 In McCray, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal excise tax on oleomargarine, a butter substitute made from
vegetable oil. Under the act in question, the product was taxed at the rate of ten
cents per pound, except that the rate was reduced to one-quarter cent per pound
in the case of oleomargarine that was "free from artificial coloration that cause[d]
it to look like butter of any shade of yellow. 2 14 The intent of the measure was
clearly to curb the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine that competed with
butter. 15 Thus, the tax on artificially colored oleomargarine, in particular, was
challenged on the ground that it was "of such an onerous character as to make it
manifest that the purpose of Congress in levying it was not to raise revenue but
to suppress the manufacture of the taxed article[,]" even though, under the Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the day, "the power to regulate the manufacture
' 21 6
and sale of oleomargarine [was] solely reserved to the several States.
The Court began its analysis in McCray by noting that, on its face, the
act in question was an excise tax and that Congress plainly has the power to lay
and collect excises.217 That being the case, the Court felt constrained to assume
that the primary motive of the act was to raise revenue, even if it might also serve
to regulate against possible "deception in the sale of oleomargarine as and for
butter. 2 1' 8 The threshold question for the Court was "how far, if at all, the motives or purposes of Congress are open to judicial inquiry in considering the
211

Id.

Among Congress's enumerated Article I, Section 8 powers is the power "[t]o coin Money,
regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. The Court found that, pursuant to the power to establish a national
currency, Congress was authorized to restrain the issuance and circulation of state-bank-issued
currency. Veazie, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 548-49. Consequently, Congress could have achieved the
regulatory effect of the tax in question (essentially eliminating state-bank-issued notes) through
one of its enumerated powers other than the tax power. Accordingly, in reaching its decision to
uphold the measure, the Court arguably did not have to reach the question of whether a facially
valid tax could be invalidated on the basis of that tax's regulatory effects.
213
195 U.S. 27 (1904).
214
Id. at 45.
215
Cushman, supra note 104, at 138.
216
McCray, 195 U.S. at 51.
217
Id. at 50.
218
Id. at 51 (quoting In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526, 536 (1897)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
212
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2 '19
power of that body to enact the laws in question." The answer, in essence, was
that Congress's motives were irrelevant: As long as Congress had the power to
enact the tax, it was of no consequence whether Congress's intention in doing so
was to pursue a regulatory objective that was beyond the scope of its other powers.220 Respect for the separation of powers dictated that, even if Congress "exert[ed] its lawful powers with the object or motive of reaching an end not justi221
fied," the judiciary could not "restrain the exercise of [that] lawful power.,
Just as Congress's motives for implementing the tax did not matter to
the Court in McCray, neither did the onerous effects of the tax. The Court reasoned that, because "the taxing power conferred by the Constitution knows no
limits except those expressly stated in that instrument, it must follow, if a tax be
within the lawful power, the exertion of that power may not be judicially re222
Congress had the
strained because of the results to arise from its exercise.
power to choose artificially colored oleomargarine as an "object[] upon which
'
And when Congress enacts a facially valid tax, the
an excise should be laid."223
224
to
be void because it is deemed the tax is too high.
tax
the
"hold
cannot
courts
Therefore, the Court concluded that the excise on oleomargarine had to be sustained, even if the consequence was to "destroy or restrict the manufacture of'
that product.225
226
decided in 1919,
The subsequent case of United States v. Doremus,
underscored the lengths to which the Court would go to uphold the constitutionality of a purported taxing measure, regardless of the regulatory intent or effects
of the measure--even when the exaction raised only a nominal amount of revenue. Doremus dealt with a constitutional challenge to certain provisions of the
Harrison Drug Act of 1914. Section 1 of the act imposed a "special" federal tax
in the amount of $1.00 per annum on producers or sellers of drugs derived from

219

Id. at 53.

See id. at 56 (rejecting any doctrine "that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of a lawful
220
power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted").
Id.at 54. To say otherwise, according to the Court, would be to "destroy all distinction
221
between the powers of the respective departments of the [federal] government" and to "put an end
to that confidence and respect for each other which it was the purpose of the Constitution to uphold." Id. at 54-55. The contention that the judiciary could restrain the exercise of a valid congressional power under such circumstances amounted, in the Court's view, to an argument that "the
abuse by one department of the government of its lawful powers is to be corrected by th abuse of
its powers by another department." Id.at 54. In other words, two constitutional wrongs don't make
a right. See also Cushman, supra note 104, at 139 (noting how the Court in McCray "quoted at
length from judicial paeans to separation of powers").
222

McCray, 195 U.S. at 59.

223

Id. at 61.

224

Id. at 60.

225

Id. at 59.

226

249 U.S. 86 (1919).
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opium or coca leaves. Section 2 of the act prohibited anyone--other than a doctor
dispensing to patients or a druggist filling a doctor's prescription-from distributing such drugs unless the transaction was memorialized on a particular form
issued in blank by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.227 A doctor who had
paid the special tax was indicted for violating section 2 of the act by distributing
heroin to a habitual drug addict (rather than a patient in treatment) without using
the requisite internal-revenue form.228 He challenged the constitutionality of section 2 on the ground that it was not a revenue-raising measure but was instead a
regulation of intrastate drug sales, which (under the Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the time) was "an invasion of the police power reserved to the States. 229
The Court recognized that section 2 of the act "aim[ed] to confine sales
[of opiates] to registered dealers and those dispensing the drugs as physicians,
230
and to those who come to dealers with legitimate prescriptions of physicians,
Plainly, the primary goal of the provision was to impede illicit drug use, and the
Court noted that "the statute ha[d] a moral end ...in view. 23 1 However, citing
Veazie and McCray, the Court asserted that "the fact that other motives may impel the exercise of federal taxing power does not authorize the courts to inquire
into that subject., 232 As long as the measure "has some reasonable relation to the
exercise of the taxing authority conferred by the Constitution, it cannot be inval2 33
idated because of the supposed motives which induced it."

In a stretch that would make any yoga instructor proud, the Court found
that Congress had inserted the regulatory scheme of section 2 into a tax measure
specifically to facilitate the collection of the revenue. (Keep in mind that the tax
in question was only $1.00 per year.) According to the Court, the regulations in
section 2 of the act "tend[ed] to diminish the opportunity of unauthorized persons
to obtain the drugs and sell them clandestinely without paying the tax imposed
by the federal law., 234 This tenuous connection to revenue-raising was enough
to make the provision pass constitutional muster, notwithstanding the "moral"
ends that Congress intended the act to achieve. Because Congress pursued those
235
ends "through a revenue measure and within the limits of a revenue measure,,,

227
228

Id. at 90-91.
Id. at 90.

230

Id. at 89.
Id. at 94.

231

Id. (quoting United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 402 (1916)) (internal quotation

229

marks omitted).
232
Id. at 93.
233
Id. (citing McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 533, 541 (1869)).
234
Id. at 94.
235 Id. (quoting Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. at 402) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the Court in Doremus upheld section 2 of the Harrison Drug Act as a valid exercise of the taxing power.
iii.

1920s and 1930s DecisionsInvalidating
UnconstitutionalRegulatory PenaltiesDisguisedas
Taxes

Applying precedents such as Veazie, McCray, and Doremus to an analysis of the individual mandate requires a threshold finding that the shared-responsibility payment is, on its face, a tax. The plaintiffs in the ACA litigations,
however, argued that the shared-responsibility payment was actually a "penalty"
236
for noncompliance with the individual mandate and not a tax at all. Instead of
taxing everyone to finance a government subsidy of private health insurance reform, "Congress decided to compel the people to pay insurance companies directly. 2 37 The plaintiffs maintained that the exaction for noncompliance with
that mandate was a penalty that could be sustained only if the mandate were authorized by the Commerce Clause. Since the individual mandate was beyond the
scope of Congress's commerce power, they argued that the penalty for violating
it was necessarily also "untethered to an enumerated power., 238 They contended
that, in mischaracterizing the shared responsibility payment, "the federal government [sought] to smuggle an unconstitutional exercise of the Commerce Clause
past judicial review in the guise of a tax. 239
The plaintiffs found support for their tax-vs.-penalty argument in a line
240 finding
of Supreme Court decisions from the 1920s through the mid-1930s
that "Congress could not use its taxing power in [an] indirect way to regulate

See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 772 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(discussing plaintiff Commonwealth of Virginia's contention that the shared responsibility payment is a penalty unauthorized under the Commerce Clause, rather than a tax authorized under the
General Welfare Clause), vacated,656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011); Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1131-32 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (discussing
236

contention of State of Florida and other plaintiffs that "the individual mandate penalty is not a 'true

tax' because, among other things, it will (at most) 'generate only "some revenue" and then only as
an incident to some persons' failure to obey the law"').
Barnett, supra note 96, at 611.
237
Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (discussing plaintiffs argument that the shared respon238
sibility payment could not "be sustained as a legitimate exercise of the congressional power of
taxation under the General Welfare Clause").
Id. at 784.
239
See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating a federal tax intended to
240
regulate agricultural commodity prices); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935) (invalidating a federal tax intended to regulate liquor sales); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922) (striking
down a federal tax intended to regulate sales of commodities futures); Child Labor Tax Case, 259
U.S. 20 (1922) (striking down a federal tax intended to regulate child labor).
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business not within federal control., 241 Specifically, in this line of cases-decided during the Lochner era 242-the Supreme Court held that "Congress could
not impose a 'tax' in order to penalize conduct... that it could not regulate under
the Commerce Clause. 243 In so doing, the Court emphasized a significant "constitutional difference between taxes properly laid under the General Welfare
Clause and penalties for" engaging in certain proscribed conduct.2 44 Even though
the conduct at issue therein could today be regulated under the modem, more
expansive reading of the Commerce Clause, those decisions still support the
proposition that "Congress cannot use a tax"-or, more precisely, a penalty masquerading as a tax-"to regulate conduct that is otherwise indisputably beyond
its regulatory power., 245 The individual mandate's opponents invoked these
precedents to argue that, if the mandate exceeded Congress's commerce power,
the limits of that power should not be circumvented by treating the shared responsibility payment as a tax. Alluding to concerns about respect for federalism,
they maintained that Congress should not be permitted to "evade all of the constitutional limits on its authority by simply imposing 'taxes' whenever
any indi246
vidual or entity fails to follow a prescribed course of action.',
The best-known decision within this tax-vs.-penalty line of cases is the
Child Labor Tax Case,24 7 decided in 1922. As discussed above, in its 1918 Hammer v. Dagenhartdecision, the Court struck down a federal statute regulating the
employment of minors on the ground that the Commerce Clause did not authorize congressional regulation of child labor. 248 Congress responded by enacting
the Child Labor Tax Law of 1919, which imposed on any business that knowingly employed children for any part of a taxable year a 10% tax on that business's net profits for that taxable year. 249 That measure-which has been aptly
described as "one of the most flagrant examples of congressional chutzpah in
American history ''25° -was plainly intended to achieve the same regulatory result as the statute that the Court had just invalidated. One affected business paid
the purported tax under protest and then filed a refund claim. After that claim
was denied, the business brought suit,251 challenging the Child Labor Tax Law's

constitutionality on the ground that the exaction was really "a regulation of the

241

Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 32 (1923), quoted in Jay, supra note 9, at 1179.

242

For a discussion of the Lochner era, see supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
Rivkin & Casey, supra note 82, at 100 (citing ChildLabor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20).

243

245

Jay, supranote 9, at 1175.
Rivkin & Casey, supra note 82, at 100.

246

Id.

247

259 U.S. 20 (1922).
For further discussion of Dagenhart,see supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
ChildLabor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 34-35.
Jay, supra note 9, at 1177.
ChildLabor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 34.

244

248
249
250
251
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employment of child labor in the States[,]" which the Court had previously de'
termined to be "an exclusively state function under the Federal Constitution."252
In response, the federal government defended the measure as "a mere excise tax
253
levied by the Congress of the United States under its broad power of taxation.,
The Court began its analysis of the Child Labor Tax Case by recognizing
that virtually all taxes have an incidental regulatory effect of discouraging the
thing taxed.254 It also acknowledged that, when Congress imposes a tax on a
"proper subject" with a primary motive of collecting revenue but "an incidental
motive of discouraging" the thing taxed, the incidental motive does not automatically cause the exaction to lose its character as a tax.255 In addition, the Court
reflected on its previous decisions in which, out of a respect for separation of
powers, it had "gone far to sustain taxing acts as such, even though there ha[d]
been ground for suspecting from the weight of the tax [that] it was intended to
destroy its subject., 256 Based on those considerations, the Court hypothesized
that, if the measure in question had been "an excise on a commodity or other
thing of value," precedent may have prevented the Court from inferring "solely
from [the excise's] heavy burden" that the act had "intend[ed] a prohibition" on
child labor "instead of a tax. 257 But the Court found that the Child Labor Tax
Law was more than merely an excise on a thing: Instead, the measure "provide[d]
a heavy exaction for a departurefrom a detailed and specified course of conduct
in business., 258 And, although Congress did not declare a departure from that
course of conduct to be illegal (as Dagenhartsaid it could not), it nevertheless
"exhibit[ed] its intent practically to achieve the [same] result by adopting...
criteria of wrongdoing and imposing" an onerous monetary exaction "on those
who transgress[ed] its standard., 259 Thus, the Court found that, in enacting the

252
253

Id. at 36.
Id.

254
Id.(considering whether the Child Labor Tax Law "impose[d] a tax with only that incidental
restraint and regulation which a tax must inevitably involve").

257

Id. at 38.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 36.

258

Id. (emphasis added). The specified course of conduct was

255
256

that employers shall employ in mines and quarries, children of an age greater
than sixteen years; in mills and factories, children of an age greater than fourteen years, and shall prevent children of less than sixteen years in mills and
factories from working more than eight hours a day or six days in the week.
Id. The heavy exaction was that, "[i]f an employer depart[ed] from this prescribed course of business, he [was] to pay to the Government one-tenth of his entire net income in the business for a
full year." Id.
259

Id. at 38.
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Child Labor Tax Law, Congress attempted to regulate the employment of children "by the use of the so-called tax as a penalty."26
Three features of the act, in particular, impelled the Court to reach that
conclusion. First, the heavy amount of the exaction suggested a prohibitory or
regulatory purpose261: An employer who knowingly utilized child labor was required to pay 10% of his net business income for the year in question, whether
he knowingly "employe[d] five hundred children for a year, or employe[d] only
one for a day., 262 Second, an employer could avoid the exaction if he did not
know that his employees were underage, and "[s]cienter is associated with penalties[,] not with taxes. 263 Third, for the purpose of determining whether underage laborers were being utilized, an employer's business was subject to inspection not only by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), which normally enforces
and collects taxes, but also by the Department of Labo1 6 4 -an agency charged
with regulating employment matters. Given those features, the Court determined
that, on its face, "the so-called tax [was] a penalty to coerce people of a State to
act as Congress wishe[d] them to act in respect of a matter completely the business of the [states] under the Federal Constitution., 265 While a proper tax may
have regulatory effects, or even intents, ancillary to its primary revenue-raising
purpose, the Court reasoned that "there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of [a] so-called tax when it loses its character as such and be266
comes a mere penalty, with the characteristics of regulation and punishment.,
The Court found that "[s]uch [was] the case" with the Child Labor Tax Law.267

260

Id. at 36.

Chief Justice Taft's opinion actually referred to the Child Labor Tax Law as having had a
"prohibitory and regulatory effect and purpose." Id. at 37 (emphasis added). However, in his contemporary analysis of the Child Labor Tax Case, Professor Thomas Reed Powell (then of Columbia University Law School) described those characteristics (and their role in the Court's analysis)
disjunctively. Thomas Reed Powell, The Supreme Court'sAdjudication of ConstitutionalIssues in
1921-1922 (pt. 3), 21 MICH. L. REv. 290, 290 (1922), cited in Cushman, supra note 104, at 181.
Powell interpreted the Court's analysis as requiring a penalty to be either prohibitive or regulatory
because, while unquestionably onerous, the child labor tax was not "completely prohibitive."
Thomas Reed Powell, ChildLabor, Congress,and the Constitution, 1 N.C. L. REv. 61, 69 (1922)
[hereinafter Powell, Child Labor], quoted in Cushman, supra note 104, at 182. For more on why
Professor Powell concluded that the child labor tax did not completely prevent employment of
child labor, see infra note 510. For further discussion of Professor Powell's analysis of the Child
Labor Tax Case, see Cushman, supra note 104, at 181-88.
ChildLabor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 36.
262
263 Id. at 36-37.
261

266

Id. at 37.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 38.

267

Id.

264
265
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Congress had intended the penalty to reach precisely the same result (i.e.,
elimination of child labor) as the regulation that the Court struck down in Dagenhart on Commerce Clause grounds,268 and the Court asserted that an effort to
misuse the taxing power to accomplish what could not be done under the commerce power "must be equally futile., 26 9 Despite the undeniably laudable intentions of the Child Labor Tax Law, the Court posited that giving effect to a statute
designed as an end-run around the limits of Congress's Commerce Clause power
could threaten the federalist system:
Grant the validity of this law, and all that Congress would need
to do, hereafter, in seeking to take over to its control [any] one
of the great number of subjects of public interest, jurisdiction of
which the States have never parted with, and which are reserved
to them by the Tenth Amendment, would be to enact a detailed
measure of complete regulation of the subject and enforce it by
a so-called tax upon departures from it. To give such magic to
the word "tax" would be to break down all constitutional limitation of the powers of Congress
and completely wipe out the sov270
ereignty of the States.
Accordingly, the Court invalidated the Child Labor Tax Law on the ground that
it exceeded Congress's enumerated powers-including the power to tax.271
The Court handed down its decision in Hill v. Wallace272 on the same
day that it decided the Child Labor Tax Case and issued in Hill an identical holding on an identical basis. In Hill, members of the Board of Trade of the City of
Chicago challenged the constitutionality of the Future Trading Act of 1921which imposed federal regulation of grain futures trading-on the ground that it
was beyond the scope of Congress's commerce power. Embedded in section 4
of the act was a tax, in the amount of 20 cents per bushel, on futures contracts
for grain delivery, but the tax did not apply in the case of contracts that were
"made by or through a member of the Board of Trade designated by the Secretary
of Agriculture as a contract market. ' '273 Section 5 of the act, in turn, authorized
the Secretary of Agriculture to designate boards of trade as contract markets-

268
Id. at 39 (noting the similarity between the regulation at issue in Dagenhartand the obvious
intent and effect of the Child Labor Tax Law).
269
Id.

272

Id. at 38.
Id. at 38-39, 44.
259 U.S. 44 (1922).

273

Id. at 63. In addition, the tax did not apply "where the seller holds and owns the grain at the

270
271

time of sale, or is the owner or renter of land on which the grain is to be grown, or is an association
made of such owners or renters." Id.
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but only if the boards complied with a detailed set of conditions and requirements, all aimed at the regulation of grain futures sales. 74
The Court held that the act's regulation of boards of trade could not be
sustained under the Commerce Clause. Under the narrower Commerce Clause
interpretation of the time, the Court found that, because the act regulated grain
futures trading that occurred solely within the City of Chicago, the regulated activity did not constitute interstate commerce within Congress's regulatory
reach. 5 Instead, "[s]uch regulations [were] held to be within the police powers
of the State. 276
Next, the Court considered whether the tax in section 4 could be severed
from the remainder of the act and be sustained under the General Welfare Clause.
It concluded that section 4 of the act could not be upheld on that basis because
the exaction it imposed was really a "penalty to secure compliance with the regulations" that the Court had just invalidated.2 77 The Court found that the amount
of the "tax" levied under section 4 was extremely burdensome2 78 and determined
that the "manifest purpose of the tax [was] to compel boards of trade to comply
with regulations, many of which can have no relevancy to the collection of the
tax at all.",279 Put another way, "[t]he act [was] in essence and on its face a complete regulation of boards of trade, with a penalty of 20 cents a bushel on all
'futures' to coerce boards of trade and their members into compliance. ' 280 For
this reason, the Court concluded that there was "no ground upon which" section 4
of the Future Trading Act could "be sustained as a valid exercise of the taxing
28
power.

1

The 1935 decision in United States v. Constantine2 82 reached a similar
conclusion-although, unlike the ChildLabor Tax Case and Hill, the exaction at
issue in Constantine penalized expressly criminal conduct. A provision originally introduced in the federal Revenue Act of 1918 and readopted in the Revenue Act of 1926 imposed a "special excise tax" in the amount of $1,000 on retailers who sold malt liquor in violation of state law.283 The amount of that special

274

Id. at 64 (listing such conditions and requirements under section 5 of the act).

275

Id. at 68.

276

Id.
Id. at 70.
See id. at 66 (noting that "[t]he tax upon contracts for sales for future delivery under" a

277
278

separate revenue measure then in effect was "only 2 cents upon $100 of value, whereas [the section 4] tax varies according to the price and character of the grain from 15 per cent. of its value to
50 per cent.").
279
Id.
280
Id.
281
Id. at 66-67.
282
296 U.S. 287 (1935).
283 Id. at 295.
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excise was somewhere between ten and fifty times as great as the federal excises
then imposed on liquor dealers more generally.284 A Birmingham retailer who
sold malt liquor in violation of Alabama law was indicted under federal law in
1934 for not having paid the special excise in 1926.285 In Constantine,the retailer
challenged the constitutionality of the tax.
In 1926 (the year in which the retailer was alleged not to have paid the
special excise), the Eighteenth Amendment286gave the federal government the
"power to enforce nation-wide prohibition.,
However, because the Eighteenth
Amendment was "[t]he only color for the assertion of congressional power to
[penalize a] violation of state liquor laws[," the repeal of that Amendment by
the Twentieth Amendment in 1933 made it necessary to consider whether the
special excise was in fact a tax or instead a penalty.287 If the excise had been laid
in order to raise revenue, it plainly would have been sustainable as an exercise
of the taxing power-regardless that the activity being taxed was illegal under
state law-under precedent going back to the License Tax Cases.288 On the other
hand, if its purpose was "to punish rather than to tax[,]" then the special excise
would have become unenforceable following the Eighteenth Amendment's repeal.289
The "highly exorbitant" amount of the exaction (relative to federal excises on liquor dealers in general), coupled with the fact that its imposition was
conditioned on "the commission of a crime[,]" led the Court to conclude that the
"special excise" was not a tax, but was instead a penalty for a violation of state
law.290 As such, it was "beyond the limits of federal power" 29 '-including the
taxing power conferred by the General Welfare Clause.
But how does that decision comport with precedents such as McCray
and Doremus, in which the Supreme Court had held that, "where the power to
' '292 The
tax is conceded[,] the motive for the exaction may not be questioned[?]
Court asserted that those precedents were irrelevant because the "special excise"
at issue in Constantine simply was not a tax. As the Court explained, "[t]he point
here is that the exaction is in no proper sense a tax" but is instead "a penalty"
imposed in order to punish conduct that may be proscribed only under state
law.293 Precedents establishing judicial deference to congressional exercises of

287

Id.
Id. at 288.
Id. at 294.
Id.

288

Id. at 293 (citing License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462 (1867)).

289

Id. at 294.

290

Id. at 294-95.

291
292

Id. at 294.
Id. at 296.

293

Id.

284
285
286
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the taxing power are thus inapplicable to a case such as Constantine where, "under the guise
of a taxing act[,] the purpose is to usurp the police powers of the
29 4
State."
The last in this tax-vs.-penalty line of cases was United States v. Butler,295 decided in 1936. In Butler, the Court considered the constitutionality of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. During the Great Depression, prices of
agricultural goods became significantly lower than prices of other goods, thereby
severely diminishing farmers' purchasing power and real incomes.29 6 To address
this "economic emergency," the avowed purpose of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act was to "establish and maintain such balance between the production and
consumption of agricultural commodities ...as [would] reestablish prices to
farmers at a level" restoring their purchasing power to what it was during a "base
period" between August 1909 and July 1914.297 To accomplish that purpose, the
act empowered the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into agreements with farmers, pursuant to which the farmers would reduce the acreage of their fields or
otherwise reduce their production of agricultural goods for market. In return, the
Secretary would make "rental or benefit payments" to the farmers to compensate
for their reduced production. 29 8 In order to finance those payments, the act provided for certain taxes on processors of agricultural products. The taxes were to
be imposed on processors of a particular product whenever the Secretary determined that such rental or benefit payments were to be made to farmers of that
product.299 Receivers of a cotton processing firm against which such a tax had
been assessed, challenged the assessment on the ground that Congress lacked
constitutional power to make such an exaction.
The federal government argued that the tax was "merely a revenue measure levying an excise upon the activity of processing cotton[.]" 300 The Court,
however, determined that it could not sustain the tax as a revenue-raising measure for support of the government because it could neither sever the tax from the

294

Id. (citing, inter alia, Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S.

44 (1922)).

297 U.S. 1 (1936).
Id. at 53 (outlining recitation, in section 1 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, of a national
economic emergency with respect to agricultural prices).
297
Id. at 54 (quoting the declaration, in section 2 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, of the
policy of Congress in enacting the statute). The August 1909-July 1914 base period applied in the
case of all agricultural commodities except cotton and tobacco. Id.
298
Id. at 54-55 (outlining provisions of section 8(1) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act).
299
Id. at 55 (describing provisions of section 9(a) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act). The
amount of the tax was fixed "at such rate as equals the difference between the current average farm
price for the commodity and the fair exchange value" therefor, as determined by the Secretary. Id.
at 56 (quoting section 9(b) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act) (internal quotation marks omitted).
300
Id. at 57.
295

296
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rest of the Agricultural Adjustment Act nor ignore the stated purpose of the act.3°1
The sole intent of the act was to regulate agricultural production, and the tax
"play[ed] an indispensable part in the plan of regulation., 30 2 In fact, the tax was
"a mere incident of such regulation., 30 3 Accordingly, whether the tax was sustainable depended upon whether the act as a whole was within the scope of Congress's enumerated powers.
The Court found that the Agricultural Adjustment Act was not authorized by the Commerce Clause because it did "not purport to regulate transactions
in interstate or foreign commerce" but instead sought to control "purely local
activity. 30 4 No other clause in Article I, Section 8 gave Congress the power to
control agricultural production either. Thus, that power was reserved to the
states.3°5 In turn, because the act as a whole invaded the police power of the
states, the tax which facilitated the act's plan of regulation was "but [a] means to
an unconstitutional end., 30 6 Citing the landmark case of McCulloch v. Maryland,30 7 the Court again rejected (as it had in Constantine)the notion that separation of powers requires judicial deference when Congress invokes its taxing
power as a pretext to act beyond the limits of its other enumerated powers.30 8 Nor
did the Court accept that Congress could use its power to tax and spend to purchase compliance with regulations that it could not impose through force.30 9 The

301
302
303

Id. at 58.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 61.

304
Id. at 63-64. Like the ChildLaborTax Case andHill,Butlerwas decidedprior to the Court's
recognition that regulation of intrastate economic activity having "substantial effects" on interstate
commerce was within Congress's commerce power.
305 Id. at 68.

306

Id.

307

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

308

To underscore the point, the Court reiterated a crucial statement from McCulloch:

Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are
prohibited by the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to
the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a
case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not
the law of the land.
Id. at 423, quoted in Butler, 297 U.S. at 68-69.
309
As a threshold matter, the Court rejected the contention that the act's regulations were somehow voluntary. While, in theory, a farmer could choose not to enter into an agreement with the
Secretary of Labor to restrict crop production, "the price of such refusal [would be] the loss of
benefits" under the agreement. Butler, 297 U.S. at 70. The amount of the benefits offered by the
Secretary was great enough to put pressure on farmers to enter into such agreements, and the ability
of farmers who accepted the benefits to undersell those who did not, could have resulted in financial ruin for the latter. Id. at 70-71. Under the circumstances, the "asserted power of choice [was]
illusory" and the Secretary's offers of benefits amounted to coercion of farmers to comply with the
act's regulations. Id. at 71. Nor was the coercion inherent in those offers abated by the fact that a
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Court even wondered whether the Agricultural Adjustment Act's tax was in service of the nation's general welfare, but it ultimately declined to reach that question.310 That the tax was an inherent part of a statutory plan of regulation "beyond
the powers delegated to the federal government" 31 1 was a sufficient reason for
the Court to hold it to be unconstitutional.
iv.

Modern Taxing PowerDecisions Upholding Revenue
Measures Regardless ofRegulatory Purposeor Effect

Some legal commentators who supported the ACA hoped to dismiss the
Child Labor Tax Case and its progeny as products of the bygone Lochner era.312
They advocated limiting those precedents "to their particular historical context ''313 and focusing instead on a series of cases beginning in 1937, in which the

Court "repeatedly refused to invalidate taxes314
on the ground[] that Congress ha[d]
used the taxing power to regulate conduct.,
The first of those more modem cases was the 1937 decision in Sonzinsky
v. UnitedStates.315 In Sonzinsky, the Court considered the constitutionality of the
National Firearms Act, which imposed a $500 annual tax on manufacturers or
importers of certain firearms, a $500 annual special excise tax on dealers of those
firearms and a $200 tax on each transfer of such a firearm (payable by the transferor).316 The act also required firearms dealers to register with the Collector of
Internal Revenue and prescribed certain identification requirements for firearms
minority of farmers chose not to enter into agreements with the Secretary: "The coercive purpose
and intent of the statute is not obscured by the fact that it has not been perfectly successful." Id.
Thus, since "Congress has no power to enforce its commands on the farmer... [i]t must follow
that it may not indirectly accomplish those ends by taxing and spending to purchase compliance."
Id. at 74.
310
See id. at 63-68. The Court affirmed Alexander Hamilton's position that Congress can lay
taxes to provide for the general welfare of the nation and that the taxing power is not restricted to
raising revenue for use in the exercise of Congress's other enumerated powers. Id. at 65-66. Yet
the Court raised the question whether a tax that ultimately aided agricultural producers was in
service of the general welfare, or merely the "local" welfare of those pr6ducers. Id. at 64, 67. In
the end, however, the Court did not need to decide that question because, regardless of the answer,
the act at issue "invad[ed] the reserved power of the states." Id. at 68. For more on Hamilton's
view of the taxing power, and the Court's embrace of that view in Butler, see supra notes 186-88
and accompanying text.
311
Id. at 68.
312
Metzger, supranote 192, at 634 (noting that, "to the extent there are cases that have emphasized regulatory purposes to disqualify measures as taxes, those decisions go back to the Lochner
era"); Balkin, supra note 133, at 104 (deriding citation of the Child Labor Tax Case as reliance on
"a decision from the Lochner [e]ra").
313
Mason, supra note 10, at 1006.
314

Balkin, supra note 133, at 104.

315

300 U.S. 506 (1937).
Id. at 511.

316
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purchasers. 1 7 An Illinois gun dealer was convicted of having dealt in the covered
firearms without having paid the special excise tax. He argued that the tax was
really a "penalty imposed for the purpose of suppressing traffic in a certain noxious type of firearms, the local regulation of which [was] reserved to the
319
states[.]" 318 To establish the "penal and prohibitive character" of the exaction,
he pointed to the "limited class of firearms, of relatively small value," covered
by the 1tax320 and the prohibitive effect of the cumulative taxes on those fire32
arms.

The Court was unpersuaded by the argument that the act covered only a
small class of weapons. In exercising its taxing power, "Congress may select the
subjects of taxation, choosing some and omitting others. 322 Moreover, the Court
found that this was not a case-such as the Child Labor Tax Case or Hill-in
which the statute "contain[ed] regulatory provisions related to a purported tax"
indicating that the "tax" was actually a penalty enacted to enforce the regulations. 323 Instead, the National Firearms Act contained no regulations other than
certain registration provisions that the Court thought would aid in collection of
the revenue to be raised under the act. Thus, the Court determined that, on its
face, the act was "only a taxing measure. 324
Interestingly, the Court found the act to be a revenue measure even
though, due to its "prohibitive" effect, it raised only a nominal amount of revenue. 325 Nevertheless, because it was facially a tax, the Court declined to find that
the measure operated "as a regulation which is beyond the congressional power"
on the basis of the tax's deterrent consequences.3 26 The Court noted that "[e]very
tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it interposes an economic

317
318

319
320

Id.
Id. at 512.
Id.
Id. at 511-12. For purposes of the act, a "firearm" consisted of:
a shotgun or a rifle having a barrel less than eighteen inches in length, or any
other weapon, except a pistol or revolver, from which a shot is discharged by
an explosive, if capable of being concealed on the person, or a machine gun,
and includes a muffler or silencer for any firearm.

Id.
321
Id. at 512-13 (The dealer argued that the "successive imposition" of taxes upon the manufacturer or importer, the dealer, and the transfer of the same firearm had a prohibitive effect that
"disclose[d] unmistakably the legislative purpose to regulate rather than to tax").

322
323

Id. at 512.
Id. at 513.

Id.
325
Id. at 514 n. 1 (explaining that "[t]he $200 annual tax on dealers was paid by only 27 dealers
in 1934 and only 22 dealers in 1935"). Yet those de minimis receipts were enough for the Court to
conclude that the $200 tax was "productive of some revenue." Id. at 514.
326
Id. at 513.
324
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impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed. ' 327 Thus, a
revenue measure does not exceed Congress's taxing power just because it has a
regulatory effect. 328 In turn, the Court determined it had no power to strike down
a valid exercise of the taxing power simply "because the tax is burdensome or
tends to restrict or suppress the thing taxed., 329 Nor did the Court think that it
had the power to inquire into any hidden regulatory motives for enacting a facially valid tax. 330 To the Court in Sonzinsky, the question turned on whether a
professed tax enforces or furthers non-revenue-related regulations beyond Congress's constitutional authority. Since the National Firearms Act did not, "and
as a tax," the Court held that it was "within the national taxing
since it operate[d]
331
power."
In United States v. Sanchez,332 decided in 1950, the Court made its most
sweeping statements ever about the degree to which taxes could also regulate
and still remain valid. Sanchez concerned the Marihuana Tax Act of 193 7, which
seems clearly to have been modeled on the Harrison Drug Act of 1914 that the
Court upheld in Doremus.333 The Marihuana Tax Act imposed a "special tax" of
between $1 and $24 on importers, producers, and distributors of marihuana.334
The act also required such importers, producers and distributors to register with
the Collector of Internal Revenue and made transfers of marijuana unlawful unless the transactions were memorialized on a specific form issued by the Secretary of the Treasury.33 5 In the case of transfers made pursuant to the authorized
form by registered persons who had paid the special tax, the act imposed a tax
on transferees of $1 per ounce; however, in the case of transfers by unregistered
persons 6or without use of the proper form, the transfer tax rose to $100 per
ounce.

33

Congress had expressly stated two objectives in enacting the Marihuana
Tax Act:

327

Id.

Id. (citing, inter alia, United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 93, 94 (1919); Child Labor
Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922); License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462 (1867)).
Id. (citing, inter alia, Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 548 (1869); McCray v.
329
United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56-59 (1904)).
Id. at 513-14 (citing, inter alia, Veazie, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 533; McCray, 195 U.S. at 60330
61; Doremus, 249 U.S. at 93-94).
331
Id. at 514.
328

332

340 U.S. 42 (1950).

Cushman, supra note 104, at 149.
334 Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 43.
333

335
336

Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 44.
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First, the development of a plan of taxation which will raise revenue and at the same time render extremely difficult the acquisition of marihuana by persons who desire it for illicit uses and,
second, the development of an adequate means of publicizing
dealings in marihuana in order to tax and control the traffic effectively.337
There thus could be no question but that the primary purpose of the act
was to restrict illicit marihuana use and trafficking. Accordingly, the constitutionality of the act was challenged on the basis of its "regulatory character and
prohibitive burden" as well as "the penal nature of' the tax on unauthorized transfers.338 Yet, the Court upheld the act "despite [its] regulatory effect and [its] close
' 339
resemblance to a penalty[.]

Citing Sonzinsky, the Court asserted that "a tax does not cease to be valid
merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities
taxed"--even when the revenue obtained from the purported tax "is obviously
negligible" and even when "the revenue purpose of the tax [is] secondary. '3 4 °
Nor did it matter that the tax may "touch[] on activities which Congress might
not otherwise regulate." 34 Ignoring distinctions drawn in earlier cases (including
Sonzinsky) between taxes with regulatory effects and penalties to enforce nonrevenue-related regulations,3 42 the Court proclaimed in Sanchez that, "[fjrom the
beginning of our government, the courts have sustained taxes although imposed
with the collateral intent of effecting ulterior ends which, considered apart, were
beyond the constitutional power of the lawmakers to realize by legislation directly addressed to their accomplishment. 343 Applying those principles, the
Court held that the Marihuana Tax Act was a "legitimate exercise of the taxing
344
power despite its collateral regulatory purpose and effect.

338

S. REP. No. 75-900, at 3 (1937), quoted in Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 43.
Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44.

339

Id.

340

Id.

337

341

Id.
Just as it had done with similar Harrison Drug Act regulations at issue in Doremus, the Court
took the dubious view in Sanchez that the Marihuana Tax Act's registration requirements and increased tax rate on transfers without the proper forms were primarily to prevent avoidance of the
tax. See id. at 45-46.
343
Id. at 45 (quoting Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 47 (1934)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
344
Id. That it could characterize that regulatory purpose and effect as "collateral," despite Congress's stated intent to curb illicit marihuana use and despite the meager revenue generated by the
measure, reveals how far the Supreme Court was willing to bend to uphold anti-drug legislation.
The Court demonstrated similar litheness in sustaining anti-drug measures in Doremus and, arguably, in Gonzales.
342
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Three years later, in its 1953 decision in UnitedStates v. Kahriger,345 the
Court again upheld a tax that had a clear regulatory purpose. But this time, in so
doing, the Court also reaffirmed the critical constitutional distinction between
valid revenue measures with regulatory effects, on one hand, and invalid penalties for engaging in conduct that Congress could not otherwise regulate, on the
other. The issue in Kahrigerwas the constitutionality of a federal occupation tax
on "persons engaged in the business of accepting wagers" and an accompanying
requirement that such persons register with the Collector of Internal Revenue.3 46
The tax was challenged on the ground that it was a pretext for penalizing intrastate gambling and was thus an infringement of the police powers reserved to the
states.347
As the Court explained, Congress plainly had the authority to choose the
business of accepting wagers as a subject of taxation, even though that business
was not within Congress's power to regulate.348 Therefore, while the legislative
history of the tax may have indicated "a congressional motive to suppress wagering, '349 that fact alone was not enough to render the measure constitutionally
infirm.35 ° Whatever Congress's other intentions may have been, the wagering tax
actually produced revenue-more, for example, than taxes on narcotics, marihuana, colored margarine or firearms that the Court had previously upheld.351
Thus, it was indisputably a facially valid tax, and it did not become invalid
simply by virtue of its deterrent effects. After all, as the Court observed, "[i]t is
axiomatic that the power of Congress to tax is extensive and sometimes falls with
crushing 2effect on businesses deemed unessential or inimical to the public wel' 35
fare [.]
Importantly, the Court found that the registration provisions associated
with the wagering tax were not "offensive" regulations of conduct beyond federal control. Instead, the registration requirements merely made "the tax simpler
to collect.5 353 The only such requirements were the filing of the registrants'

345 345 U.S. 22 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39
(1968).
346 Id. at 23.
347 Id. at 23-24
348 Id. at 26 (citing License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462 (1867)).
349 Id. at 27 n.3 (outlining pertinent legislative history of the act).

350 See id. at 27 (citing, inter alia, Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 533 (1869);
McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 59 (1904); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919);
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937); United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950)).
Indeed, the Court had previously upheld a number of facially valid revenue measures where the
legislative intent was not only to tax, but also to discourage, curtail or hinder the product or activity
that was taxed. Id.
351 Id. at 28 n.4 (comparing amounts of revenue generated by the aforementioned taxes).
352
353

Id.at 28.
Id. at 31-32.
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names, addresses and places of business. Those data, which are also required on
354
tax returns, were "directly and intimately related to the collection of the tax."
The Court noted that it had previously invalidated "[p]enalty provisions in tax
statutes added for breach of a regulation concerning activities in themselves subject only to state regulation., 355 In citing such prior decisions, the Court confirmed the continued vitality of those precedents. At the same time, however, the
Court granted that it cannot limit Congress's exercise of the taxing power when
the enactment in question plainly relates to a "tax need., 356 Because the wagering
tax was a facially valid excise, and because the tax's modest registration provisions were "obviously supportable as in aid of a revenue purpose[,] 357 the Court
in Kahrigerupheld the measure.
v.

Rejection of the Taxing PowerDefense by the Lower
Courts in the A CA Litigations

Despite the contrary result that might have been commended by the
Court's modem taxing-power decisions, none of the lower federal courts hearing
challenges to the ACA upheld the shared responsibility payment as a tax.
Some of the lower courts never reached the merits of the taxing power argument, 359 but those that did unanimously rejected it. 360 Some held that the shared
responsibility payment was a regulatory penalty of the kind that had been inval-

354 Id.
355
Id. at 31 (citing Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 34, 38 (1922); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S.

44, 63, 70 (1922); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935)).
356
Id.
357
Id. at 32 (quoting Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
358
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 56, at 1239; McCullough, supranote 112, at 741 & n.65 (citing
cases).
359
For example, the D.C. Circuit upheld the individual mandate as constitutional under Congress's Commerce Clause power, but did not even address whether the shared responsibility payment was also constitutional under Congress's taxing power (despite having requested the parties
to brief the issue). McCullough, supra note 112, at 741 (citing Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2011)). The Fourth Circuit found the shared responsibility payment to be a tax, not for
constitutional purposes, but for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, thus concluding that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to reach the merits of the constitutional claims and enjoin enforcement
of the exaction. Id. at 741 n.60 (citing Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011)).
360
Cushman, supra note 104, at 153-54; Clark, supra note 9, at 547.
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idated in the Child Labor Tax Case; others found that the payment was a "penalty" simply because Congress had labeled it as such in the statute.361 In the district courts and circuit courts of appeals, "[t]he only support for the government's
'
taxing-power arguments came in concurrences or dissents."362
There was, however, disagreement among the lower courts on the question of whether the individual mandate was within Congress's commerce power.
The Sixth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit each upheld the mandate on the basis that
individual decisions whether to purchase health insurance had substantial effects
on interstate commerce and were thus within Congress's power to regulate under
the Commerce Clause (either alone or in conjunction with the Necessary and
Proper Clause).363 In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit found the mandate outside
the scope of the commerce power because the Commerce Clause does not authorize regulation of economic inactivity. 364 This circuit split guaranteed that the
Supreme Court would take up the issue.36 5
The Supreme Court accepted certiorari in the original Florida ACA lawsuit to review the Eleventh Circuit's judgment denying the constitutionality of
the individual mandate, as well as its upholding of the Medicaid expansion.366
Most observers expected the decision on the mandate to turn on the commerce
power rather than the taxing power.367 Perhaps because none of the lower courts
had accepted the government's tax-power hypothesis, the parties devoted little

See Cushman, supra note 104, at 153-57. The label of the payment as a "penalty" seemed
a peculiarly weak basis on which to invalidate the measure, given that the Supreme Court had held
in the License Tax Cases that labels were not dispositive of whether an exaction was a tax for
constitutional purposes. See supratext accompanying notes 200-01.
McCullough, supra note 112, at 741 n.65.
362
See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 56, at 1238 (citing Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651
363
F.3d 529, 544 (6th Cir. 2011); Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 20).
364
See id. (citing Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235, 1311-13 (11 th Cir. 2011)). At the same time, the Eleventh Circuit held that the individual
mandate could be severed from the rest of the ACA and that, even if the individual mandate was
unconstitutional, the entire ACA need not be invalidated. Comment, supra note 100, at 75 (citing
Floridaex rel. Att'y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1328).
365
Clark, supra note 9, at 547.
366
Comment, supra note 100, at 75 (citing NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 603 (2011)). The Court
also granted certiorari on the issue of whether the individual mandate was severable from the rest
of the ACA. Id. The Court combined the original Florida case with DepartmentofHealth & Human
Services v. Floridaand Florida v. Department of Health & Human Services, two other Eleventh
Circuit decisions "for which certiorari on the same issues had been granted." Id. (citing NFIB, 132
S. Ct. at 2566).
Clark, supra note 9, at 584; Melone, supra note 9, at 1191.
367
361

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2016

57

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 7

WEST VIR GINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 119

attention to that theory during arguments before the Supreme Court. 3 68 The government addressed the theory that the individual mandate is a tax in only a few
pages within its extensive briefing of the case, and the parties spent practically
no time debating the taxing-power issue during the three days of oral argument
in the case.369 It thus came as a great surprise to most observers when the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the shared responsibility payment as constitutional under Congress's power to tax.370
Nevertheless, that is exactly what a majority of the Court did.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN NFIB

The Supreme Court issued its decision in NFIB on June 28, 2012.371 The
majority's opinion was penned by Chief Justice John G. Roberts. After describing the procedural history of the case and confirming the Court's authority to
reach the merits,372 Chief Justice Roberts began by considering whether the individual mandate is within Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. Writ-

368 Erik M. Jensen, The IndividualMandate, Taxation, and the Constitution, J. TAX'N INV., Fall
2012, at 31, 34 (noting that none of the lower courts hearing cases relating to the individual mandate grounded their decisions in the taxing power, and that the parties' briefing and argument before the Supreme Court on taxing-power issues were "minimal").
369
Sandefur, supra note 19, at 204; see also Metzger, supra note 81, at 88 (noting that, of the
156 briefs filed with the Supreme Court in NFIB, only 10 contained more than a passing reference
to the taxing-power argument, and that the government itself devoted only 15 pages to the argument, and also noting that the taxing-power issue received less than 14 minutes of discussion at
oral argument); Cushman, supra note 104, at 159 (noting that the parties' briefs contained almost
no discussion of the main taxing-power precedents and that the government's brief, in particular,
did not even mention the ChildLabor Tax Case).
370
See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 368, at 34 ("Almost everyone outside the confines of the Supreme Court was flabbergasted that the taxing power was dispositive in NFIB."); Metzger, supra
note 81, at 88 (noting that, to some, the Court's upholding of the shared responsibility payment as
a tax "seemed to come out of nowhere"); Melone, supra note 9, at 1191 ("The fact that the taxing
power ultimately was held to support the mandate came as quite a surprise to many .....
371
See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
372
Before turning to the merits, the Court determined that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar
it from hearing a challenge to the individual mandate. See id. at 2582-84. For a discussion of the
Court's reasoning on this point, see infra note 408.
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ing on behalf of himself only (but reaching the same conclusion as the four dissenters in the case),373 he determined that it is not.374 He began his analysis by
noting that the Commerce Clause grants Congress "the power to 'regulate Commerce"' and that "[t]he power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence
of commercial activity to be regulated., 375 As expansive as the Court's construction of Congress's commerce power has become, the Court's prior decisions
"uniformly describe the power as reaching 'activity.' '376 Chief Justice Roberts
found that "[t]he individual mandate, however, does not regulate existing commercial activity. It instead compels individuals to become active in commerce by
377
purchasing a product.,

Because forgoing health insurance constitutes inactivity, Chief Justice
Roberts found that the mandate could not be justified as a regulation of local
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.3 78 He conceded that, "[t]o
an economist, perhaps, there is no difference between activity and inactivity;
both have measurable economic effects on commerce. But," he continued, "the
distinction between doing something and doing nothing would not have been lost
on the Framers, who were 'practical statesmen,' not metaphysical philosophers. 379 Chief Justice Roberts concluded that "[t]he individual mandate forces

373 Chief Justice Roberts's opinion on the Commerce Clause issue is contained in Part III-A of
his opinion, in which none of the other Justices joined. Of course, the four Justices who dissented
in the case-Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito-also concluded that the individual mandate was outside Congress's Commerce Clause power. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2644-47 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). However, because that conclusion is contained in their
dissent, rather than in a concurrence with the relevant portion of Chief Justice Roberts's opinion,
it is unclear whether the five Justices' determination on the Commerce Clause issue is binding
precedent. Moreover, "Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, argued
that upholding the mandate under the Taxing Clause renders Chief Justice Roberts's Commerce
Clause discussion 'not outcome determinative', and therefore not part of the ratio decidendi."
Sandefur, supra note 19, at 212-13 (citing NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2629 n.12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). Accordingly, it is unclear whether Chief Justice Roberts's Commerce Clause opinion is
mere dicta, and there is already a split amongst lower courts and legal scholars as to "how much
of the Commerce Clause element of NFIB is binding." Id. at 212 & nn. 38-39 (citing cases and legal scholars' writings reaching divergent conclusions on the issue).
374 See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2585-93 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). For an additional discussion of
Chief Justice Roberts's Commerce Clause opinion, see Comment, supra note 100, at 76-77.
375 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (emphasis in original).
376
Id. at 2587.

377 Id. (emphasis in original). Chief Justice Roberts observed that "most of those regulated by
the individual mandate are not currently engaged in any commercial activity involving health care"
and that "[t]he mandate primarily affects healthy, often young adults who are less likely to need
significant health care and have other priorities for spending their money." Id. at 2590.
378
See id. at 2587-89.
379 Id. at 2589 (quoting Indus. Union Dep't. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 673 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
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individuals into commerce precisely because they elected to refrain from combe sustained under a clause authorizing Conmercial activity. Such a law cannot
38 0
Commerce.'
'regulate
gress to
Having concluded that the individual mandate is outside Congress's
Commerce Clause power, Chief Justice Roberts turned next to the question of
whether the mandate is valid under Congress's power to lay and collect38taxes.
1
Writing for a five-member majority of the Court, he determined that it is.
The federal government's taxing-power defense rested on a different interpretation of the individual mandate than did its commerce-power defense. In
making its commerce-power argument, the government "defended the mandate
as a regulation requiring individuals to purchase health insurance. 382 In contrast,
when making its taxing-power argument, the government asked the Court "to
read the mandate not as ordering individuals to buy insurance, but rather as imposing a tax on those who do not buy that product. 383 The only consequence to
an individual for failing to comply with the mandate and forgoing adequate
health insurance is "that he must make an additional payment to the IRS when
he pays his taxes., 384 Therefore, the government contended that "the mandate
can be regarded as establishing a condition-not owning health insurance-that
triggers a tax-the required payment to the IRS. 38 5 On this reading, the mandate
does not impose "a legal command to buy insurance," but instead "makes going
without insurance just another thing the [g]overnment taxes. 386
Writing for himself, Chief Justice Roberts considered this alternative
reading of the individual mandate in light of the well-established "savings" principle, perhaps most famously articulated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:
"[T]he rule is settled that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by
one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty
is to adopt that which will save the Act., 387 Chief Justice Roberts found that

Id. at 2591-92. Chief Justice Roberts also concluded that, by extension, the individual mandate also cannot be sustained under the Necessary and Proper Clause because each of the Court's
"prior cases upholding laws under that Clause involved exercises of authority derivative of, and in
service to, a granted power." Id. at 2592.
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court that the individual mandate is valid
381
as a tax, in Part III-C of his opinion. See id. at 2593-2600 (majority opinion). The other four Justices joining in that part of opinion were Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan.
Id. at 2593.
382
383
Id.
380

385

Id. at 2593-94.
Id. at 2594.

386

Id.

384

387
Id. at 2593 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927)
(Holmes, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor,
Breyer, and Kagan (who did not join Part III-B of Chief Justice Roberts's opinion) did not find any
need to adopt a "saving" construction of the mandate because they concluded it was sustainable
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"[t]he most straightforward reading of the mandate is that it commands individuals to purchase insurance., 388 However, because both he and the four dissenting
Justices found such a command not to be within Congress's Commerce Clause
power, Chief Justice Roberts sought to determine whether an alternative view of
the individual mandate-as a tax-could bring the mandate within constitutional
muster. 389 The government had asked the Court "to interpret the mandate as imposing a tax, if it would otherwise violate the Constitution. '390 Given the Court's
duty to resort to "every reasonable construction.. . in order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality[,] 3 9 1 the question was not whether this alternative was "the
most natural interpretation of the mandate, but only whether it [was] a 'fairly
possible' one.' ' 392
Writing at this point for a five-member majority of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts found that the shared responsibility payment due from individuals
without health insurance "looks like a tax in many respects.' 3 93 The relevant statutory provision is contained in the Code and requires the exaction to be "paid
into the Treasury by 'taxpayer[s]' when they file their tax returns. 394 The amount
of the exaction to be paid depends on such tax-like factors as the taxpayer's taxable income, filing status and number of dependents,395 and the statute requires
the IRS to assess and collect the payment "in the same manner as taxes. 396 Moreover, as the majority observed, the Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") has
estimated that approximately four million individuals annually will choose to pay
the shared responsibility payment rather than to obtain the health insurance required under the individual mandate.397 As a result, the CBO predicts that the
shared responsibility payment will raise at least $4 billion per year by 2017.398

under the Commerce Clause. However, they joined in Part 111-C of the opinion, in which the Court
upheld the shared responsibility payment as a tax.
388
Id.
389
Id.
390
Id. at 2594.
391

Id. (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895) (internal quotation marks omit-

ted)).
392

Id. (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).

393 Id. (majority opinion).
394 Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b) (2010)).
395 Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(3), (c)(2), (c)(4) (2010)).
396
Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g)(1) (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
397 Id.at 2597 (citing Congressional Budget Office, Payments ofPenaltiesfor Being Uninsured
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Apr. 30, 2010), in SELECTED CBO
PUBLICATIONS RELATED TO HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION, 2009-2010, at 71 (rev. 2010) [hereinafter

CBO, Payments of Penalties]).
398
Id. at 2594 (citing CBO, Payments of Penalties,supranote 397, at 71).
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feature of
Thus, the shared responsibility payment presents the most "essential
'399
any tax: it produces at least some revenue for the [g]overnment.
Of course, as the Court stated, the mere fact that the shared responsibility
payment produces revenue is by no means "to say that the payment is not intended to affect individual conduct. 4 °° Indeed, the Court acknowledged that,
"even though the [shared responsibility] payment will raise considerable revenue, it is plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage., 40 1 Yet, pointing
to the tax on sawed-off shotguns that it sustained in Sonzinsky and the marihuana
tax it sustained in Sanchez, the Court noted that it had previously upheld "obviously" regulatory measures under the taxing power and that "taxes [intended] to
influence conduct are nothing new., 40 2 "Indeed," as the Court had previously
observed in Sonzinsky, "every tax is in some measure regulatory. ''4°3 Moreover,
the breadth of Congress's power to tax and spend "gives the Federal Government
considerable influence even in areas where it cannot directly regulate. 40 4 As the
License Tax Cases established, Congress "may enact a tax on an activity that it
cannot authorize, forbid, or otherwise control., 40 5 Thus, the fact that the individual mandate "seeks to shape decisions about whether to buy health insurance[J"
responsibility payment from being "a valid exercise
did not prevent the shared
46
of the taxing power.,
The majority noted that the ACA statute refers to the shared responsibility payment as a "penalty ' 40 7 and, based on that label, found that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the Court from reaching the merits of the case.40 8 However,

399

Id. (citing Kahriger,345 U.S. at 28 n.4).

400

Id. at 2596.

401

Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44-45 (1950); Sonzinsky v. United States,

402

300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937)). In addition to those examples, the Court observed that "some of our
earliest federal taxes sought to deter the purchase of imported manufactured goods in order to foster
the growth of domestic industry" and that, today, federal cigarette taxes are intended not only to
raise money, "but [also] to encourage people to quit smoking." Id.
403
Id. (quoting Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513) (internal quotation marks omitted).
404

Id. at 2579.

Id. (citing License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall) 462, 471 (1867)).
406
Id. at 2596.
407
Id. at 2594. See also supra note 49 and accompanying text (citing various subsections of 26
U.S.C. § 5000A in which the shared responsibility payment is referred to as a "penalty").
408 Id. at 2582-84. The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits any lawsuit for the purposes of restraining
the assessment or collection of any tax. See 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a). Thus, if the shared responsibility
payment were a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, the Court would not have had the
authority to consider the merits of the challenge to the individual mandate. The Court, however,
determined that, because Congress labeled the shared responsibility payment as a "penalty" in the
ACA, the payment was indeed a penalty, rather than a tax, for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.
NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2583. The Court reasoned that, because both the ACA and the Anti-Injunction
Act are "creatures of Congress's own creation[,]" it is for Congress to decide how the two statutes
405
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the label did not mean that the shared responsibility was automatically a penalty
for constitutional purposes. 40 9 As the License Tax Cases also established, an exaction's label is not dispositive for purposes of determining whether it is a tax
authorized by the General Welfare Clause.410 Instead, the Court sought to determine whether the shared responsibility payment was a tax or a penalty based
solely on the "substance and application" of the measure.411
For the first time since the Butler case in 1936, the constitutional distinction between taxes and penalties thus became the cornerstone of a taxing-power
decision412: If it were a penalty for failure to comply with the individual mandate
to obtain health insurance, the shared responsibility payment could not have
passed constitutional muster, because five Justices had just determined the mandate itself to be beyond the scope of Congress's commerce power. As a tax, however, the shared responsibility payment could nevertheless be upheld under the
taxing power. NFIB marked the reemergence of the tax-vs.-penalty distinction as
a significant constitutional issue because, for the first time in decades, the Court
had recognized a limit on economic legislation sustainable under the Commerce
Clause.4 13
To determine whether the shared responsibility payment was an unconstitutional regulatory penalty, the Court used a "functional" analysis that it
adopted from the Child Labor Tax Case.4 14 The Court identified three characteristics that caused it to find the Child Labor Tax Law to be a regulatory penalty,

relate to one another, and the best evidence of Congress's intent is its explicit labeling of the shared
responsibility payment as a "penalty" in the statutory text. Id. As a result, the Court concluded that
it had the authority to decide the merits of the case. Id. at 2584.
409
Id. at 2594. The Court found that, while the ACA's description of the shared responsibility
payment as a "penalty" is "fatal" to the applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act, "it does not determine whether the payment may be viewed as an exercise of Congress's taxing power." Id. In short,
the Court determined, "Congress cannot change whether an exaction is a tax or a penalty for constitutionalpurposes simply by describing it as one or the other." Id. at 2583 (emphasis in original).
410
Id. 2594-95 (citing License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall) at 471). In the License Tax Cases,
as described above, an exaction called a "license" was found to be a tax rather than a regulation
conferring authority to conduct activity. See supra text accompanying notes 200-01.
411
Id. at 2595 (quoting United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935)).
412
See Cushman, supra note 104, at 185 (noting that, after the Court expanded its Commerce
Clause interpretation, the tax-vs.-penalty question did not arise again until the Court found the
individual mandate to be beyond the scope of the commerce power); see also Cooter & Siegel,
supra note 56, at 1196-97 (noting that, following its "post-1937 decisions essentially abandon[ing]
judicially enforceable limits on the Commerce Clause," the Court "had no need to rethink distinctions between taxes and penalties" until NFIB).
413
As the Court itself had previously observed, "[w]here the sovereign enacting the law has
power to impose both tax and penalty, the difference between revenue production and mere regulation may be immaterial, but not so when one sovereign can impose a tax only, and the power of
regulation rests in another." Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 38.
414
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595 (citing ChildLabor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 36-37).
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but concluded that those same considerations indicate that the shared responsibility payment is instead a tax. First, the Court found that the shared responsibility payment imposes significantly less of a burden on taxpayers than the Child
Labor Tax Law had imposed. The child labor tax had "imposed an exceedingly
heavy burden-10percent of a company's net income-on those who employed
children, no matter how small their infraction., 415 In contrast, the Court observed
that the amount of an individual's shared responsibility payment will, in most
cases, "be far less than the price of insurance" that the individual would otherwise have to buy, and, pursuant to the statute, the payment "can never be more"
than the cost of such insurance.4 16 Second, the Court found that, whereas the child
labor tax contained a scienter requirement (which indicates a penalty), the shared
responsibility payment is not conditioned on scienter.417 Third, the Court found
that the shared responsibility payment is collected only by the IRS, whereas the
child labor tax was also enforced by the Department of Labor. 4 18 Thus, the same
reasons why what had been called a "tax" was instead a penalty in the Child
in NFIB that "what is called a 'penLabor Tax Case, supported a conclusion
4 19
alty' . . . may be viewed as a tax.,
The Court further posited that, "if the concept ofpenalty means anything,
it means punishment for an unlawful act or omission., 420 It maintained, however,
that "[w]hile the individual mandate clearly aims to induce the purchase of health
insurance, it need not be read to declare that failing to do so is unlawful. '421 The
Court found that wording within § 5000A(a) of the Code--stating that an indi-

415
Id. (emphasis added). The exaction under the Child Labor Tax Law was in all cases onetenth of the employer's annual net profits-regardless of "whether he employ[ed] five hundred
children for a year, or employ[ed] only one for a day." ChildLabor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 36. To
comprehend the potential effects of that exaction, imagine an employer whose net profits are attributable entirely to the work of his or her employees, and imagine further that each employee
contributes equally to the profit: If all of that employer's workers during the year were children,
the "tax" on the employer would have been 10% of the gain derived from the employment of those
children. However, if only 5% of the employer's workers during the year were children, the "tax"
on the employer would have been 2,000% of the gain derived from the employment of the children.
416
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595-96. The Court noted that, in 2016, the shared responsibility payment for an individual with $35,000 of annual income would be approximately $60 per month, and
the payment for an individual with $100,000 of annual income would be approximately $200 per
month. In contrast, for each person, the cost of premiums for "a qualifying insurance policy" would
be approximately $400 per month. Id. at 2596 n.8 (citing D. Newman, CRS Report for Congress,
Individual Mandate and RelatedInformation Requirements Under PPACA 7 & n.25 (2011)). For
those individuals, the exaction would amount to 15% or 50%, respectively, of the cost saved by
forgoing the purchase of health insurance.
417
Id. at 2595, 2596.
418
Id.
419

Id. at 2596.

420

Id. (internal quotation marks and internal citations omitted).
Id. at 2596-97.

421
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vidual "shall" obtain insurance or otherwise pay a "penalty"-need not be interpreted as punishing unlawful conduct.422 Rather, the Court concluded that §
5000A(a) could instead be read as "impos[ing] only 'a series of incentives' to
obtain health insurance, thus leaving the shared responsibility payment as "an
exercise of the taxing power. 423 In adopting that construction, the Court technically wrote the "requirement" to obtain insurance out of the law, but left the teeth
of the individual mandate-the shared responsibility payment-intact.4 24
The Court thus held that the shared responsibility payment is a tax for
constitutional purposes. Having done so, and after finding no other constitutional
impediment to the enactment of such a tax,425 the Court upheld the payment as
within the scope of Congress's authority under the General Welfare Clause.426

422

Id.at 2597.

Id. (analogizing the individual mandate to a federal statute upheld under a similar approach
in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)).
424
See Sandefur, supra note 19, at 213 (discussing the Court's "refashioning of the statute" that
"eliminates the mandatory nature of the individual mandate, and upholds not the command itself,
but only the tax triggered by a person not purchasing insurance").
425
The Court recognized that, "[e]ven if the taxing power enables Congress to impose a tax on
not obtaining health insurance, any tax must still comply with other requirements in the Constitution." NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2598. Thus, the Court next considered whether the shared responsibility
payment was a direct tax subject to the apportionment requirement, and concluded in rather summary fashion that it is not. Id. at 2598-99. This facet of the Court's opinion has been widely criticized as inadequately reasoned. See id. at 2655 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(pointing out insufficiency of briefing of direct-tax issue before the Court and arguing that the
majority should have demanded more thoughtful consideration than the "lick-and-a-promise accorded by the [g]overnment" before deciding the question); see also Melone, supra note 9, at 1191
(characterizing the Court's attention to the direct-tax issue as "laconic"); Jensen, supra note 368,
at 44 (describing Chief Justice Roberts' direct-tax analysis as "excessively simplistic"); Sandefur,
supra note 19, at 216 (arguing that the Court's direct-tax analysis "makes little logical sense").
After declaring the shared responsibility payment not to be a direct tax, the Court failed even to
mention whether it satisfies the Uniformity Clause's requirements for indirect taxes. For an interesting argument that it may not, see Sandefur, supra note 19, at 220-27. For an argument that the
shared responsibility payment may also have run afoul of the Origination Clause (another constitutional requirement left unaddressed by the Court in NFIB), see id. at 227-36; see also Tessa L.
Dysart, The OriginationClause, the Affordable Care Act, and Indirect ConstitutionalViolations,
24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 451, 490-91 (2015) (arguing that Senate's amendment of original
ACA bill was effectively "new" Senate-originated legislation and thus constituted an "indirect"
violation of the Origination Clause). Whether the shared responsibility payment is an unapportioned direct tax, whether it is instead an indirect tax that may violate the Uniformity Clause, and
whether it was developed in a legislative process that violated the Origination Clause are all matters
beyond the scope of this Article. Accordingly, while this Article starts from the proposition that
the Supreme Court was correct in finding the shared responsibility payment to be a tax (rather than
a penalty) for constitutional purposes, this Article takes no position as to whether the shared responsibility payment is ultimately a constitutionally valid tax.
426
NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2600.
423
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concluded, "it is not our
"Because the Constitution permits such a tax," the Court' 427
role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness.
V. THE NEED TO DEVELOP A CLEAR TEST FOR
REGULATORY PENALTIES IN THE WAKE OF NFIB

To those concerned with protecting the constitutional division between
federal and state authority, the Court's refusal to uphold the individual mandate
under the Commerce Clause was a welcome affirmation that Congress's commerce power has not mutated into a de facto plenary police power. Even in the
realm of economic regulation, the commerce power still has some boundaries.
At the same time, some devotees of federalism fear that, as a result of the Court's
decision to uphold the shared responsibility payment as a tax, "the taxing power
as cover for virtually limitless federal intrusion into the lives of
will now serve
428
Americans.,
Congress has surely taken note that what started out as a purported exercise of its Commerce Clause power was ultimately validated in NFIB as an
exercise of its taxing power instead. Will this precedent embolden future Congresses to side-step the limits of its commerce power by imposing monetary penalties styled as "taxes" in order to punish activity (or inactivity) that it could not
regulate under the Commerce Clause? Some have predicted that the NFIB decision "will serve as a catalyst for challenges to exactions that Congress may
choose to enact in similar form" to the shared responsibility payment.429 That
prediction presupposes that Congress will actually enact other measures similar
to the shared responsibility payment. In other words, it rests on a premise that
Congress will make future attempts to compel taxpayers to engage in various
sorts of commerce. 430 But should that possibility really be a focus of our concern?
The Unlikeliness of FutureMonetary Penaltieson Economic Conduct
Beyond the Reach of Congress's Commerce Power

A.

Opponents of the individual mandate had worried about the mandate's
wider implications for the limits of congressional power since the ACA was
signed into law. But they did their cause no favors by the way they framed the
issue. Typical of their approach, for example, was the argument posed by former
Justice Department attorneys David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey: "If Congress can mandate the purchase of health care insurance, it can similarly impose,

427

Id.

428

Melone, supra note 9, at 1191.
Id. at 1230.

429

430 See id. at 1210 (speculating that "the taxing power issues raised in [NFIB] will surface with
more regularity now that the Court has held that individuals cannot be compelled to enter into
commerce through Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce").
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under the Commerce Clause guise, an infinite array of other mandates, ranging
from health club memberships to a requirement to consume a given quantity of
fruits and vegetables annually., 431 Unfortunately for the cause, this argument
verges on silliness. Even the most cynical among us can concede how unlikely it
is that Congress would ever try to make us purchase, say, turnips. Could upholding the shared responsibility payment really portend such ridiculous legislation
in the future?
By concentrating on such seemingly trivial examples of prospective congressional overreach, critics of the ACA subjected a crucial concern-about preserving the constitutional limits of Congress's power-to ridicule. Professor Andrew M. Koppelman, for example, has mockingly referred to arguments that the
individual mandate could lead to laws compelling vegetable purchases, as the
"Broccoli Objection. '432 He refers to broccoli (rather than the more odious turnip) because of a peculiar hypothetical developed by ACA opponents and popularized by at least one federal judge: In the district court's opinion in the original
Florida ACA litigation, Judge C. Roger Vinson of the Northern District of Florida famously mused that, if the individual mandate were permitted to stand, then
"Congress could require that people buy and consume broccoli at regular intervals. 433 According to Professor Koppelman, a primary fallacy of the Broccoli
Objection is that it "treat[s] a slippery slope argument as a logical one, when in
fact it is an empirical one. 434 Citing the work of Professor Frederick Schauer,
Koppelman asserts that "any slippery slope argument depends on a prediction
that doing the right thing in the instant case will, in fact, increase the likelihood
of doing the wrong thing in the danger case. If there is no danger, then the fact

431
Rivkin & Casey, supra note 82, at 101. Though they were then focused on hypothetical
mandates sustained under the Commerce Clause, Rivkin and Casey-as well as other ACA opponents-would presumably have been equally alarmed if such mandates were recast as taxes that
provide "a series of incentives" in order to achieve the same regulatory ends.
432
See Koppelman, supra note 42, at 18-21.
433
Florida ax rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1289
(2011), quoted in Koppelman, supra note 42, at 18. Critics of the ACA seized on Judge Vinson's
hypothetical of the dreaded broccoli mandate and repeated it often. See James B. Stewart, How
Broccoli Landed on Supreme Court Menu, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2012, at Al (noting how the broccoli mandate became a powerful, if simplistic, metaphor for the sort of unrestrained, intrusive federal power that ACA opponents feared, and describing how the broccoli hypothetical originated on
a conservative website, was embraced by libertarian attorneys arguing against the individual mandate, was highlighted in Judge Vinson's Bondi opinion, and was repeated by various conservative
commentators), cited in Clark, supra note 9, at 548 n.22. During oral argument in NFIB, even
Justice Antonin Scalia raised the hypothetical, asking a government attorney whether, if the federal
government could mandate the purchase of health insurance, it could also require people to purchase broccoli. See id.

434

Koppelman, supra note 42, at 20.
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that there logically could be has no weight., 435 On this view, because there is
little chance that Congress will try to make us eat our vegetables, the theoretical
possibility that the individual mandate could serve as a precedent for such an
436
absurd law is not a valid objection to the mandate itself. In other words, if a
law compelling the purchase of broccoli is the worst that can happen, then the
individual mandate (or, more specifically, the shared responsibility payment)
does not set a precedent that should worry us in the least.
Professor Koppelman's argument suggests that there is probably little
cause for concern about future congressional attempts to impose unconstitutional
regulatory penalties on economic conduct. As significant as it is, the NFIB decision does not fundamentally alter the "substantial effects" doctrine or any other
facet of the Court's modern, broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause. In the
aftermath of NFIB, the Commerce Clause continues to authorize congressional
regulation of virtually all economic activity. NFIB merely states that the commerce power does not extend to regulation of economic inactivity by compelling
persons to engage in commerce. That being the case, when seeking to regulate
economic activity in the future, Congress will likely have little incentive to enact
a penalty disguised as a tax. After all, why would Congress employ such subterfuge in order to regulate indirectly that which it could instead regulate directly
under its commerce power? Under the Court's current reading of the Commerce
Clause, virtually the only future economic regulations (besides the individual
mandate itself) that Congress might not be able to enact directly under its commerce power would be regulations to compel the purchase of other products or
services.4 37 For that reason, barring some unexpected narrowing of the Court's
construction of the Commerce Clause somewhere down the road, virtually the
only unconstitutional penalty against economic conduct that a future Congress
might theoretically impose in the guise of a tax would be some sort of far-fetched,
eat-your-broccoli-type mandate.
That is not the end of the matter, however.
B.

The GreaterLikelihood of Future MonetaryPenalties on Noneconomic
Conduct Beyond the Reach of Congress'sCommerce Power

Despite the low probability that the issue might ever arise in the context
of an attempt to regulate economic conduct, there nonetheless remains cause for
concern that NFIB may embolden a future Congress to circumvent the limits of

435
Id. (citing Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REv. 361, 369 (1985)). As an
example, Koppelman postulates that, in theory, the federal taxing power "empowers the government to tax incomes at 100 percent, thereby wrecking the economy." Id. But, he advises, "Relax!
It will not happen." Id.
436
See id. at 20-21.
437
See Melone, supra note 9, at 1216 ("We now know that Congress cannot compel persons to
engage in commercial activities under the Commerce Clause.").
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its commerce power by fashioning a regulatory penalty disguised as a tax. The
reason for that concern, quite simply, is that Congress likes to regulate noneconomic conduct, too. Moreover, as the Lopez and Morrison cases amply demonstrate, Congress sometimes likes to try to regulate noneconomic conduct even
when it has no constitutional authority to do so. Recall that, prior to NFIB, the
only limit on Congress's commerce power to have been recognized during the
post-New Deal era was when the Court struck down certain noneconomic regulations in Lopez and Morrison.438 Lopez concerned congressional regulation of
gun possession near schools, and Morrison concerned congressional regulation
of gender-based violent crime. Even though the Supreme Court held in those
cases that Congress generally cannot use its commerce power to regulate noneconomic behavior,43 9 we cannot assume that Congress has been dissuaded from
ever trying to regulate noneconomic conduct again.
Indeed, one can imagine myriad ways in which Congress might wish to
regulate personal, noneconomic behavior in the future-especially in light of the
persistent divisions within the country over various social issues. A liberal congressional majority might again seek to ban gun possession not only in schools,
but also in other noncommercial spaces such as libraries or houses of worship. A
conservative congressional majority might opt to ban transgender persons from
using certain bathrooms in those same places.44 ° In today's political climate, the
prospect of such regulatory efforts is hardly fantastical. At the same time, in the
wake of the Lopez and Morrisondecisions, it is likely that any such efforts would
not be sustainable under the Commerce Clause. As a result, Congress may be
incented to shape any future attempts at regulating noneconomic behavior as
"taxes" that penalize the behavior in question. 441 Thus, we should not ignore the

For a discussion of the Lopez and Morrison decisions, see supra text accompanying notes
138-49.
439
The one narrow exception, recognized in Raich, is that the Commerce Clause permits congressional regulation of noneconomic activity if that regulation is an essential part of a larger
scheme of regulation of interstate economic activity. For a discussion of the Raich opinion, see
supra text accompanying note 152.
440
This is by no means far-fetched. After all, such bans-like North Carolina's highly publicized "HB2" law-have already been either enacted or proposed in a number of states. See Michael
Gordon et al., UnderstandingHB2: North Carolina'sNewest Law Solidifies State's Role in Defining Discrimination, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 26, 2016, 11:00 AM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article68401147.html (describing North Carolina law
that, inter alia, "requires students to use public school restrooms and locker rooms based on the
gender on their birth certificates" and mentioning similar measures proposed in Georgia, Indiana,
Kentucky, and West Virginia); see also Sam Brodey & Julia Lurie, Get Readyfor the Conservative
Assault on Where Transgender Americans Pee, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 9, 2015, 6:00 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/03/transgender-bathroom-discrimination-bills
(describing transgender bathroom bills introduced by state legislators in Texas, Florida, and Kentucky
in early 2015, and mentioning prior attempts at similar legislation in Colorado and Arizona).
441
Because the distinction between taxes and regulatory penalties is of constitutional moment
only when a congressional exaction cannot be supported by any enumerated power other than the
438
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plausible risk that Congress might resort to penalties styled as "taxes" in order to
regulate noneconomic activity that it cannot reach directly through its commerce
power.
If Lopez and Morrisongave Congress a motive to use monetary penalties
to regulate noneconomic behavior, the question now is whether NFIB has given
Congress the means to do so. Did the Court's holding that the shared responsibility payment is a tax (rather than a penalty) make it easier for Congress to levy
purported "taxes" to regulate conduct that it could not regulate directly under the
Commerce Clause? In an effort to uphold the constitutionality of the individual
mandate, did the Court inadvertently grant Congress a license to circumvent the
limits of its other enumerated powers in the future simply by invoking (as a pretext) its power to tax?
As an example of how unclear the issue presently is, legal scholars are
currently divided as to whether Congress could refashion as a tax the regulation
banning gun possession near a school that the Court struck down in Lopez. Professor Jack Balkin asserts that Congress could provide "tax advantages" to
schools that ban gun possession. 44 2 If so, Congress might just as easily levy an
additional "tax" on persons who carry guns near schools. Professors Robert
Cooter and Neil Siegel have suggested that a $25,000 federal exaction on a person carrying a gun in a school zone would not pass muster as a "tax" after
Lopez. 443 But what if the exaction were only $2,000, or $1,000? Would it then
still constitute the kind of "exceedingly heavy burden" that the Court referred to
in NFIB as a hallmark of a regulatory penalty? Professor Erik Jensen essentially
thinks the question could go either way: "A straightforward punitive levy"
against those who possess guns near schools "probably... would not be considimaginative drafters might be able to come up with legislation that
ered a tax, but444
work.,
would
This doctrinal uncertainty should not be allowed to persist. If a future
Congress purports to invoke the taxing power to penalize conduct-particularly
noneconomic, personal conduct-beyond the regulatory reach of its other enumerated powers, the safeguards in place to repel such an attempt have to amount
to more than a constitutional crapshoot. In the event that NFIB spurs Congress
ever to enact anything akin to a "tax" on the possession of a gun in a school zone,
there must be a concrete rule for invalidating such legislation as the end-run
taxing power, Lopez and Morrison were arguably the first modem decisions to make the tax-vs.penalty issue potentially salient once again. See Cushman, supra note 104, at 134-35; see also
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 56, at 1219 (arguing that the Court's "impos[ition]" of limits on the
Commerce Clause in Lopez and Morrison "renewed the significance of this constitutional distinction" between taxes and regulatory penalties).
Balkin, supra note 133, at 106 (Professor Balkin suggested that "[d]espite Lopez, Congress
442
could withhold federal subsidies or offer tax advantages to schools-and businesses within 1000
feet of schools that agree to ban possession of guns ....
443 Cooter & Siegel, supra note 56, at 1234.
444 Jensen, supra note 368, at 47.
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around the Commerce Clause that it plainly would be. To establish beyond question that the Constitution prohibits such congressional overreach, there needs to
be a clear and concise test-consistent with relevant Supreme Court precedentfor distinguishing disguised regulatory penalties from valid exercises of the taxing power.
C.

What Is at Stake: Preservingthe Benefits of Federalism

Before proceeding to consider what the constitutional test for regulatory
penalties should look like, it is worth pausing briefly to reflect on why confining
congressional action to the limits of the Article I, Section 8 powers matters in the
first place. If a particular congressional regulation of noneconomic behavior is
"beneficial," why should we be concerned whether it is within the scope of Congress's enumerated powers? Assuming the legislation serves a valid public policy purpose, why focus on such constitutional niceties rather than the legislation's advancement of the social good?
The answer, in short, is that federalism is more than a legal technicality
or a quaint anachronism. The federalist structure of American government, in
which limited congressional powers are enumerated in the Constitution and all
other powers are reserved to the states, continues to yield substantive and important political benefits. For one thing, federalism fosters regulatory competition among the states.445 When regulations are made at the state (rather than federal) level, states compete with each other for residents and businesses by trying
to develop comparatively better solutions to various public policy problems.44 6
This, in turn, gives rise to propitious policy experimentation within the states. 447
As the states pursue different paths to given public policy goals, they become, as
Justice Louis D. Brandeis once famously stated, "'laborator[ies]' for 'social and
economic experiments. ,,448 In addition, when regulations are enacted at a state
or local level, the process involves more direct political participation and thus
greater political accountability than if the same issue were being decided at the
federal level. The smaller size of a state or a locality means that each voter has a
comparatively larger voice in the process and that the representatives making the
decision are more directly answerable to each person they represent.44 9

445
446

Mason, supra note 10, at 979, 992.
Id. at 992.

Clark, supra note 9, at 571.
Mason, supra note 10, at 993 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
449 See Clark, supra note 9, at 571 ("[S]tate sovereignty ensures that decisions impacting people's lives will be made at the state level, ensuring better local participation and clear political
accountability."); see also Mason, supra note 10, at 979, 992-93 ("[S]tates' smaller size compared
to that of the nation also may facilitate political participation, at least when a single voter's voice
carries more weight in state than federal elections.").
447
448
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Closely related to that last point is perhaps the most valuable purpose
that federalism serves: allowing subnational communities to make certain decisions about how to govern themselves based on their own policy preferences
450
rather than the preferences of other communities or the nation as a whole. The
value in federalism's promotion of local self-governance lies not so much in an
abstract "respect ...for the autonomy or dignity of states qua states. ''451 Rather,
the value is in enabling individuals and the communities in which they live to
function according to laws that reflect, to the greatest extent possible, their own
particular wants and principles.452
Of course, many public policy problems are truly national in scope and
require a national response. A prime example of such a problem is the set of
4 53
deficiencies in our healthcare delivery system that the ACA seeks to remedy.
Generally speaking, as the country's economy has grown larger and more complex, economic challenges have increasingly necessitated federal action, and the
Court's broader, post-New Deal interpretation of the Commerce Clause rightly
reflects that fact.
At the same time, however, many noneconomic policy issues remain decidedly local in nature, and the limits of the commerce power recognized in
Lopez and Morrison reflect that fact, as well. Take, for example, the question of
whether guns should be permitted in school zones. Should firearms be completely banned in such areas, or could arming students and teachers actually deter
violent crime in schools? The right answer for New York City and the right answer for a small town in Wyoming might well be different. More to the point,
residents of those two communities may have very different ideas as to what the
correct approach is. 4 54 It is for precisely this reason that, as the Court held in
Lopez, the power to regulate such matters is reserved to the states.455
To the extent that Congress is permitted to impose monetary penaltiesdisguised as taxes-on taxpayers who engage in conduct that Congress cannot

450

See Clark, supra note 9, at 571; see also Mason, supra note 10, at 979, 993.

451
Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting offthe Dole: Why the CourtShouldAbandon
Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J.
459, 479-80 (2003), quoted in Clark, supra note 9, at 571.
See Baker & Berman, supra note 451, at 479-80; see also Clark, supra note 9, at 571.
452

453 See Jay, supra note 9, at 1140 (noting the inability of individual states to address on their
own the problem of insuring persons with preexisting conditions, and recounting the experience of
seven states that tried to mandate coverage of such persons, in each case with the result that either
premiums "soared" or insurers exited the market in the particular state).
454 After all, "[a] state's freedom from federal interference, like an individual's freedom from
governmental restrictions on expression or private choices, is a freedom to make choices, not just
a freedom to choose wisely." Baker & Berman, supra note 451, at 479, quoted in Clark, supra note
9, at 571.
455 For a discussion of the Lopez holding, see supra text accompanying notes 138-44.
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regulate directly, the "values served by federalism" are jeopardized.4 5 6 If Congress were to lay more than a de minimis "tax" on those who possess guns in
school zones, the exaction would constrain people from carrying guns in those
areas. The practical, coercive effect of such an exaction would thus be the
same--certainly in kind, if not necessarily in degree-as the direct ban on guns
near schools that the Court struck down in Lopez. We must identify a doctrinal
rule of general application for determining when a purported tax is really a regulatory penalty instead, to prevent Congress from overstepping the constitutional
limits of its authority in that way.
D.

Guidancefrom NFIB and PriorTaxing-Power DecisionsAbout the
ConstitutionalDistinctionBetween Taxes and Penalties,and Questions
Left Open by Those Decisions

Although the Court found the shared responsibility payment to be a tax,
it nevertheless emphasized in NFIB that "Congress's ability to use its taxing
power to influence conduct is not without limits. ' 45 7 Citing the Child Labor Tax
Case and Butler, the Court noted that "[a] few of [its prior] cases policed these
limits aggressively, invalidating punitive exactions obviously designed to regulate behavior otherwise regarded at the time as beyond federal authority. ' 45 8 Of
course, the Court also noted that, in most of its taxing-power decisions (including
its more recent ones), it has "declined to closely examine the regulatory motive
or effect of revenue-raising measures. 4 59 Still, the Court expressly confirmed
what it had originally recognized in the Child Labor Tax Case: Certain "characteristics of regulation and punishment" establish a purported revenue measure to
be a penalty rather than a tax.460
Thus, in NFIB, the Court verified beyond doubt what its prior cases had
already indicated: Both the Child Labor Tax Case and its progeny, on one hand,
and the taxing-power decisions that came either before or after, on the other, are
simultaneously good law.461 In a case like McCray, Sonzinsky, or Kahriger,Congress's power to choose subjects (and rates) of taxation is to be respected, and a
Mason, supra note 10, at 979.
457 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2599 (2012).
458
Id. (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 70-71 (1936); Child Labor Tax Case, 259
U.S. 20, 42 (1922)).
459 Id. (citing United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 27-31 (1953)).
460
Id. (quoting Dep't of Rev. of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994)) (quoting
ChildLabor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 38) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Melone, supra note
9, at 1215 (observing that "despite the fact that the Court refused to consider the mandate a penalty,
it clearly noted that the distinction between a penalty and a tax has continuing vitality-which,
given the case law during the past seventy years or so, is no small matter").
461
In the ChildLabor Tax Case and Hill, for example, the Court did not overrule or call into
question the reasoning of Veazie, McCray, or Doremus; rather, it distinguished those earlier decisions on factual grounds. See Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 40-43 (distinguishing the facts
456
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measure that produces even modest revenue for the government is not to be invalidated on the basis of any non-revenue-related aims or consequences that the
legislation may have. At the same time, in a case like the Child Labor Tax Case,
Hill, or Constantine, Congress will not be permitted to avoid constitutional constraints on its powers by enacting monetary penalties (disguised as taxes) against
conduct that it could not otherwise regulate. The question, of course, is how to
tell when a particular exaction comes within the latter category instead of the
former.
The threshold criterion for determining when a purported tax should receive heightened judicial scrutiny as a potential penalty was first identified in the
Child Labor Tax Case. Because Congress has the power to choose what to tax
and how much to tax it, the Court stated in that case that it may not have had the
authority to strike down the Child Labor Tax Law-regardless of the evidence
of its aim and effect of curtailing child labor-if the act had been a tax on a "thing
of value., 462 Instead, however, the Court viewed the measure as an "exaction for
a departure from a ... specified course of conduct.' 463 The exactions invalidated

of the case from those of Veazie, McCray, and Doremus, respectively); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S.
44, 67 (1922) (distinguishing cases such as Veazie and McCray on the ground that "in none of
those cases did the law objected to show on its face.., detailed regulation of a concern or business wholly within the police power of the State, with a heavy exaction to promote the efficacy of
such regulation"). Similarly, in Sonzinsky, the Court distinguished the facts of the case from those
of the ChildLabor Tax Case or Hill, noting that the measures at issue in the earlier cases contained
suspect regulatory provisions. See supra text accompanying note 323 (quoting relevant language
from Sonzinsky). By so doing, the Court indicated that, in any future cases involving such regulations, the Child Labor Tax Case and Hill would continue to be valid precedent. In Kahriger,the
Court noted with continued approval that it had previously invalidated unconstitutional penalties
in purported tax statutes, and cited the Child Labor Tax Case and Constantine as authority.
Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 31, 32. It is thus clear that, as the Court's taxing-power jurisprudence
evolved, the decisions that came later never negated or undermined those that came before. See
Cushman, supra note 104, at 147-48, 151-53 (noting thatMcCrayand ChildLaborTax Case lines
of cases "coexisted" with one another, that Kahrigertreated the ChildLabor Tax Case and Hill as
good law, and that none of the Court's post- 1936 taxing-power decisions overruled the ChildLabor
Tax Case or its progeny). Nevertheless, prior to NFIB, some legal scholars took the position that
"the Lochner-era tax cases [were] a special product of that historical period and [are] therefore of
limited precedential value today." Mason, supra note 10, at 1030. The Court's discussion of the
tax-vs.-penalty issue in NFIB-and its reference back to the ChildLabor Tax Case in particularmakes clear, however, that the distinction between taxes and penalties continues to have constitutional significance and that the Child Labor Tax Case and its progeny continue to be good law.
Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 36.
462
Id. (emphasis added). The Court's exact reference was to "a departure from a detailed and
463
specified course of conduct in business." Id. (emphasis added). In his contemporary analysis of the
Child Labor Tax Case, Professor Thomas Reed Powell assigned great significance to the Court's
observations concerning the elaborateness of the behavioral regulations inherent in the Child Labor
Tax Law. See Cushman, supra note 104, at 184 (citing Powell, Child Labor,supra note 261, at 72,
75). However, in a later decision citing that case, the Court made clear that behavioral regulations
embedded in a purported revenue measure need not be detailed or complex in order to be indicia
of a penalty against the behavior at issue. In Departmentof Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch,
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as penalties in Hill, Constantine, and Butler also shared this same defining characteristic: They were all imposed on behavior or conduct that Congress did not
have the power to compel or prohibit directly.464
The Court has continued to recognize and apply that criterion--even in
its later taxing-power cases: If the imposition of a purported federal tax is conditioned on the taxpayer's failure to abide by some rule or standard that is regulatory in nature and that relates to some activity (or inactivity) beyond the reach of
any congressional power other than the taxing power, that exaction is constitutionally suspect as a penalty, in a way that other revenue measures are not.465
Because such measures are rightly suspected to be bald attempts at unconstitutional regulation, and not really taxes at all, the Court has both the authority and
the obligation to scrutinize them more aggressively than it evaluates federal

511 U.S. 767 (1994), the Court considered whether the Double Jeopardy Clause was violated by
the State of Montana's imposition of a tax on marijuana possession upon persons previously convicted of (and sentenced to prison for) criminal possession of the same drugs that were the subject
of the tax. After noting how it had previously recognized-in, inter alia, the Child Labor Tax
Case-thatpunitive characteristics can cause a purported tax to be a penalty instead, id. at 779, the
Court concluded that the Montana tax was indeed a penalty and that the proceeding initiated (after
respondents' criminal conviction) to impose the tax "was the functional equivalent of a successive
criminal prosecution that placed the [respondents] in jeopardy a second time 'for the same offense."' Id. at 784. There plainly was nothing elaborate or complicated about the regulation inherent in the Montana tax: It was conditioned simply on criminal possession of marijuana. By adopting
the tax-vs.-penalty analysis in the Child Labor Tax Case to that "simple" Montana statute and
finding it to be a penalty, the Court clearly signaled that there need not be significant detail or
complexity to the behavioral regulations embedded in a purported revenue measure in order for
the exaction to constitute a regulatory penalty rather than a tax.
464
See supra text accompanying notes 273-74 (discussing regulations of local grain futures
trading activity under the Futures Trading Act of 1921, which regulations were enforced by the
"tax" invalidated in Hill); see also supra text accompanying notes 283-89 (noting that the "tax"
invalidated in Constantinewas imposed specifically on those who violated state laws banning liquor sales following the repeal of national prohibition); supra text accompanying notes 298-303
(describing how the "tax" embedded in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, and invalidated
in Butler, facilitated federal coercion of farmers to restrict or modify their intrastate agricultural
activities in accordance with the act's regulations).
465
See Kahriger,345 U.S. at 29-31 (distinguishing the Court's authority to strike down penalty
provisions for breaches of regulations concerning activities subject only to state regulation, on one
hand, from the Court's obligation to defer to Congress's exercise of the taxing power when the
exaction plainly relates to some "tax need," on the other); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S.
506, 513-14 (1937) (distinguishing cases in which a statute "contains regulatory provisions related
to a purported tax[,]" where the Court will recognize the exaction as a penalty to enforce the regulations, from cases where the tax "is not attended by ... offensive regulation[s,]" in which case the
Court will not inquire into the regulatory effects of, or motives for, the tax); cf Steward Mach. Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 591 (1937) (distinguishing credit against federal unemployment tax for
employers contributing to state unemployment funds, which the Court found not to be unconstitutional coercion of the states, from the plainly coercive imposition of "a tax dependent upon the
conduct of the taxpayers, or of the state in which they live, where the conduct to be stimulated or
discouraged is unrelated to the fiscal need subserved by the tax in its normal operation, or to any
other end legitimately national" (emphasis added)).
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taxes. The Court has unequivocally stated that, when considering a constitutional
challenge to such a measure, it need not and should not exercise the sort ofjudicial deference to congressional judgment that the Constitution's separation of
federal powers requires in the case of a valid exercise of the taxing power.4 66
Accordingly, when determining whether such a measure should be invalidated
as an unconstitutional penalty, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to ignore
467
the regulatory effects of the measure or the regulatory motives underlying it.
Adopting this approach to potentially unconstitutional penalties does not
threaten to constrict or infringe upon Congress's necessarily broad power to tax,
because the heightened standard of review applies only in the narrow case where
(1) the exaction relates to enforcement of some rule of conduct or behavior and
(2) the conduct or behavior in question is outside Congress's constitutional
power to regulate directly.4 68 Applying this standard to suspected penalties on
conduct would not undermine Congress's constitutional authority to choose
which subjects to tax or the rates at which to tax them, even when those choices
are driven by regulatory motives. Instead, it would permit the Supreme Court to
review and invalidate exactions that are not taxes, in cases where Congress tries
to manage or dictate citizens' behavior in ways that the Constitution does not
permit. This approach would not prevent Congress from laying an excise on colored margarine, 6 la MeCray, even at rates designed to restrict the manufacture
or consumption of that product. Nor would it prevent Congress from laying an
occupation tax on bookies, d la Kahriger, even if one impetus for that excise
were to discourage wagering. However, if Congress attempted to force people
either to engage in or to refrain from activities that it is not constitutionally empowered to control, this heightened standard of review would prevent Congress
from imposing punitory monetary exactions on those who deviate from the desired course of conduct-regardless of whether those exactions were labeled
"taxes." For example, in Constantine, while Congress had the power to lay an

See United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 296 (1935) (stating that precedents estab466
lishing judicial deference to congressional exercises of the taxing power are inapplicable in cases
where, "under the guise of a taxing act the purpose is to usurp the police powers of the State"); see
also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68-69 (1936) (quoting McCulloch in support of the proposition that the Court has the duty to invalidate any attempt by Congress to attain the "prohibited
end" of regulating beyond the scope of its other constitutional powers under the pretext of exerting
the power to tax).
467
See Constantine, 296 U.S. at 296 (when exaction is suspect as an unconstitutional penalty,
the motive for the exaction may be questioned); see also Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 514 (indicating
that judicial inquiry into "the regulatory effect of a tax" or "the motives which moved Congress to
impose it," while generally inappropriate, would be warranted whenever evaluating a purported
taxing measure "attended by an offensive regulation").
468
See, e.g., Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 514 (declining to strike down tax on noxious firearms on
basis of tax's regulatory motives or effects, where taxing measure did not include, and was not
enforcement mechanism for, regulations of behavior that were unrelated to facilitating collection
of the revenue).
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excise on liquor dealers generally, it did not have the power to impose an additional exorbitant exaction on liquor dealers who engaged in conduct that could
have been prohibited only by the states. 4 69 By parity of reasoning, while Congress
has the power to lay an excise on guns (or even just on guns that it does not
like), 470 any exaction on the act of carrying a gun in a school zone should be
constitutionally suspect.
In NFIB, the Court curiously regarded "going without insurance" not as
conduct that might be penalized, but rather as "just another thing" that could be
taxed-like gasoline or income.471 It reached that odd and internally inconsistent 472 conclusion only after reading any "legal command to buy insurance"
out of the individual mandate.4 73 From there, the Court determined that the decided lawfulness of not having health insurance strongly militated against finding
the shared responsibility payment to be a penalty.474 It appears to have based that
view on two precedents defining a "penalty" as a punishment for an unlawful act
or omission.475
But does that mean that an exaction can never be a penalty unless the
conduct that triggers the payment obligation is illegal? The short answer is "no."
The definition to which the Court referred in NFIB traces back to a 1931 decision
concerning whether a particular exaction functioned as a second penalty for the
same crime, "in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 476 That decision had
nothing to do with any constitutional distinction between taxes and penalties, and
the conception of what constituted a "penalty" in that case was accordingly far
narrower than the conception that had guided the Court in the Child Labor Tax
Case. The employment of children was legal at the time of the Child Labor Tax
Law, but the Court nevertheless found the exaction to have been an unconstitutional regulatory penalty. Indeed, the very reason why Congress resorted to the
469
See supra text accompanying notes 290-91 (discussing holding in Constantine).
470 See supra text accompanying notes 322-31 (discussing holding in Sonzinsky).
471 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012).
472
To determine whether the shared responsibility payment is a tax or a penalty for constitutional purposes, the Court adopted the "functional approach" that it had used in the Child Labor
Tax Case. Id.at 2595-96. However, as just noted above, in the ChildLabor Tax Case itself, the
Court indicated that it might not have been "permitted" to engage in the tax-vs.-penalty determination in the first place, if the "tax" in question had been an excise on a "thing of value" rather than
an exaction triggered by "a departure from a... specified course of conduct." Child Labor Tax
Case, 259 U.S. 20, 36 (1922). It is thus inconsistent to apply the tax-vs.-penalty analysis from the
Child Labor Tax Case, on one hand, and to determine that forgoing the purchase of health insurance is a "thing" rather than an activity (or inactivity), on the other.
473 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2593-94.
474 Id. at 2596-97; see supra text accompanying note 420 (discussing Court's reference to precedent suggesting that, if anything, a penalty is imposed on unlawful conduct).
475 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596-97 (citing United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah,
518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996); United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931)).

476

Cushman, supranote 104, at 178.
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imposition of a "tax" in that case is because the Court had previously held that
the Commerce Clause did not then authorize Congress to criminalize child labor.477 As the Child Labor Tax Case thus makes clear, the very paradigm of an
unconstitutional regulatory penalty is a coercive exaction
on legal behavior that
478
Congress would like to make unlawful, but cannot.
While plainly acknowledging that a purported tax's punitory or coercive
characteristics could cause it to be a penalty for constitutional purposes, the Supreme Court declined to identify in NFIB "the precise point at which an exaction
becomes so punitive that the taxing power does not authorize it."' 479 The Court
did not need to determine that boundary because it had found that "the shared
responsibility payment's practical characteristics pass muster
as a tax under
480
[even the] narrowest interpretations of the taxing power."
Unfortunately, the three characteristics on which the Court focused to
determine that the shared responsibility payment "functions" as a tax cannot
serve as a definitive test for establishing whether any potentially suspect future
exaction is a tax or a penalty.481 In particular, such a determination cannot possibly depend on the latter two of those characteristics-whether the exaction is
triggered by scienter and whether it is collected by the IRS as opposed to another
agency. 482 If those features were outcome-determinative, the test would not provide adequate protection against extraconstitutional congressional action because Congress could too easily take such features into account when disguising
a penalty as a tax. A drafter with even the dullest pencil could fashion an exaction
4 83
collected by the IRS that is not expressly predicated on a scienter requirement.
Accordingly, the Court acknowledged in a footnote in NFIB that those two factors are not dispositive: "We do not suggest that any exaction lacking a scienter

477 Id. at 178-79. For a discussion of Hammer v. Dagenhart,in which the Court struck down
child labor regulations as beyond the scope of the commerce power, see supra text accompanying
notes 116-18. For a discussion of United States v. Darby, which overruled Dagenhart,see supra
text accompanying notes 128-30.
478
See supra text accompanying notes 268-69 (discussing Court's analysis in the ChildLabor
Tax Case that the Child Labor Tax Law had exhibited Congress's intent to accomplish through a
penalty the same result as it had been prohibited in Dagenhartfrom obtaining by outlawing child
labor). It is also worth noting that the penalties that the Court struck down in Hill and Butler had
also been imposed on legal conduct. Within that line of cases, only Constantineinvolved a penalty
on conduct that was unlawful.
479 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600.
480
Id.

481 See supra text accompanying notes 414-19 (discussing the Court's three-characteristic
"functional" analysis of the shared responsibility payment).
482
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595-96 (identifying those factors from the Child Labor Tax Case and
applying them to an analysis of the shared responsibility payment).
483
See Melone, supra note 9, at 1230 (noting that "a scienter requirement" and "the use of
nontax enforcement powers" are "markers" that could be "easily avoided" by Congress when enacting an exaction).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol119/iss1/7

78

Hodaszy: Testing for Regulatory Penalties: Insuring the Health of Fedreali
2016]

TESTING FOR REGULATORY PENALTIES

requirement and enforced by the IRS is within the taxing power., 484 That leaves
the first characteristic-whether the exaction inflicts an "exceedingly heavy burden" 485 upon those on whom it is imposed.
The Court did not explain exactly how great a particular imposition
would have to be to constitute an "exceedingly heavy burden" and, standing
alone, that phrase is open to differing interpretations.4 86 However, the Court
found that the shared responsibility payment does not impose such a burden because it usually will result in an exaction lower than the cost of the forgone health
insurance and will never result in an exaction greater than the cost of such insurance. 487 This provides at least some guidance. First, by emphasizing that the
shared responsibility payment could never exceed the cost of the health insurance
that Congress intended people to purchase, the Court strongly implied that any
exaction that were greater than the cost of complying with some congressionally
specified course of conduct would impose an "exceedingly heavy burden" on
those who did not so comply. In that case, any such exaction would necessarily
constitute a penalty for noncompliance with what would effectively be a regulation of the conduct in question. Second, the Court also stressed that, because the
shared responsibility payment will be less than the cost of health insurance for
most people, "[i]t may often be a reasonable financial decision to make the payment rather than purchase insurance., 488 This suggests that-at least in the case
of a "tax" that is imposed for failure to follow some rule of economic conductthe exaction is not a penalty if an economic cost-benefit analysis determines that
it would be financially worthwhile for the taxpayer to (1) break the rule that the
exaction is intended to enforce and (2) pay the exaction instead.
Although NFIB identified several factors germane to the constitutional
distinction between taxes and penalties, the only factor that actually seems to be
dispositive is the degree of burden that the exaction imposes on those whose
behavior triggers the obligation to pay. Constructing a test for distinguishing
penalties from taxes thus consists in determining when an exaction for engaging
in (or refraining from) a given course of conduct becomes burdensome enough
to constitute a penalty.

484
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2596 n.9; see Melone, supra note 9, at 1205 (discussing the aforementioned footnote and the Chief Justice's "admi[ssion]" that "the enlistment of the IRS as the enforcement agency and the lack of a scienter requirement do not, per se, qualify an exaction as a tax
but are merely suggestive of this status").
485
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595.
486
See Melone, supra note 9, at 1207 (arguing that "the term 'exceedingly heavy burden' is an
invitation to litigation because it is susceptible to various meanings").
487
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595-96.
488
Id. at 2596. The Court distinguished this "reasonable" choice from what it regarded as "the
'prohibitory' financial punishment in [the ChildLabor Tax Case]." Id. However, as discussed below, although highly burdensome and obviously punitive, the Child Labor Tax Law was in fact not
entirely "prohibitory." See infra note 510.
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The Cooter and Siegel "Effects Test "for DistinguishingTaxesfrom
Penalties,and Certain Shortcomings of That Test

Professors Robert Cooter and Neil Siegel have rightly observed that, because the Supreme Court has in recent years recognized certain limits on Congress's commerce power, and because the distinction between taxes and penalties has thus again become constitutionally significant, "[f]ederalism doctrine
4 89
now requires a distinction between taxing and penalizing that it lacks., To fill
the void, Professors Cooter and Siegel have endeavored "to develop an effects
theory of the tax power in order to distinguish a tax from a penalty" for constitutional purposes, 490 and their work has been an important and influential contri-

bution to the topic. Unfortunately, however, their theory is ultimately insufficient
for at least one of two reasons, depending on exactly how one interprets the test
for penalties that they propose. On one reading, their test would deem an exaction
to be a penalty only if the exaction's effects were more extreme than could ever
actually be possible. In that case, no exaction would be a penalty. On another
reading, the "effects" requirements for a penalty would be so indeterminate or
imprecise that the test would not be useful in deciding any particular case. Moreover, on either reading, certain of their criteria for distinguishing penalties from
taxes are incompatible with the Supreme Court's taxing-power jurisprudence.
Several commentators, including Cooter and Siegel themselves, have
suggested that the Professors' theory may have influenced Chief Justice Roberts'
taxing-power analysis in NFIB.491 They contend, in particular, that two of the
three functional characteristics of the shared responsibility payment on which the
Court focused-the level of the exaction and whether there is a scienter requirement-mirror two of the characteristics that the Professors identify as material
to whether an exaction is a tax or a penalty.492 However, as noted above, the

489 Cooter & Siegel, supra note 56, at 1219. Professors Cooter and Siegel distinguish the
Court's current Commerce Clause jurisprudence-including the limits on the commerce power
recognized in Lopez and Morrison, as well as the limit more recently recognized in NFIB-from
that during the period between 1937 and 1994, when the Court did not enforce any limits on the
commerce power. See id. at 1196-97, 1219. During that earlier period, the Court had no occasion
"to rethink distinctions between taxes and penalties[,]" id. at 1197, but now "[tihe Court requires
a viable theory of the tax power" that takes account of "the difference between taxes and regulations backed by penalties," and such theory must be "consistent with its limits on the commerce
power." Id. at 1221.

490

Id. at 1198 (emphasis in original).

491

See id. at 1197, 1248. Although the final version of the Professors' article was published

after the NFIB decision, an earlier version of their work appeared online prior to that decision. See
id. at 1197 n.10. The Chief Justice's opinion does not cite the Professors' work, however.

Id. at 1248. For a discussion of the Court's "functional" analysis of the shared responsibility
payment, see supra text accompanying notes 414-19. The three characteristics that Cooter and
Siegel identify as "the most important criteria for predicting whether [an exaction] is a tax or a
penalty" are:
492
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Court plainly acknowledged in NFIB that the presence or absence of a scienter
argument is not dispositive.49 3 Thus, the only element of the Professors' theory
with an analog to the Court's actual tax-vs.-penalty analysis in NFIB is their focus on how great the amount of an exaction must be in order for that exaction to
constitute a penalty rather than a tax.494
Cooter and Siegel assert that a tax on conduct "exacts a low cost relative
to the gain from the assessed conduct., 495 Thus, they postulate that, while a tax
may "dampen" the assessed conduct (i.e., reduce the amount of the activity in
question), it does not prevent the conduct altogether. And, since at least some
people will still engage in at least some level of the assessed conduct, the tax will
produce revenue for the government.496 In contrast, Cooter and Siegel assert that
a penalty on conduct "exacts a high cost relative to the gain" from the assessed
conduct.49 7 In turn, they posit that, because a penalty imposes a cost higher than
the gain, it prevents almost everyone from engaging in virtually any of the targeted conduct. And, given that the conduct that triggers the penalty is essentially
stopped, the penalty does not produce revenue for the government. 498 In other
words, Cooter and Siegel hold that "[a]n exaction produces revenues and operates as a tax if it dampens permitted conduct. Conduct is dampened when many

people do less of it."'499 On the other hand, "an exaction raises little or no revenue

and operates as a penalty if it prevents forbidden conduct. Conduct is prevented

when few people do it."' 500 From these hypotheses, Cooter and Siegel deduce the

following "effects" test for determining whether an exaction on conduct is a tax
or a penalty: If the exaction "has the effect of a penalty by preventing conduct,
then it should be interpreted as a penalty. If it has the effect of a tax by dampening
conduct and raising revenue, then it should be interpreted as a tax. 5 °1

(1) Is the amount of the exaction so high that it exceeds the expected benefit
from engaging in the assessed conduct for almost everyone? (2) Does the exaction's amount depend on whether the assessed individual has a certain mental state, especially the intention to perform the assessed conduct? (3) Does the
amount of the exaction increase with repetition of the assessed conduct?
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 56, at 1230.
493
See supra text accompanying note 484.
494
There is no express mention of Cooter and Siegel's third characteristic-whether the exaction increases with repetition of the assessed conduct--either in NFIB or in any of the Court's prior
taxing-power decisions.
495
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 56, at 1224.
496
See id.
497

Id. at 1223-24.

498

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

499
500
501

1224.
1225.
1225-26.
1226.
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Applying their own test to the shared responsibility payment, Cooter and
Siegel conclude that their theory "justifies" the Supreme Court's taxing-power
decision in NFIB.5 °2 The amount of the payment will never exceed the cost of
the health insurance that an individual decides not to obtain, and will often be
less. Accordingly, many people will choose not to get insurance and "will make
the shared responsibility payment" instead. °3 As a result, the payment will produce considerable revenue for the government. °4 Based on these features, Cooter
and Siegel maintain that "the shared responsibility payment has all of the material characteristics of a tax, [and] it should work like a tax by dampening (but not
preventing) behavior and thereby raising revenues from the uninsured., 50 5 On
their view, "[b]ecause the predicted effect of the [shared responsibility payment]
is to dampen uninsured behavior,50 6not to prevent it, it is a tax equivalent for purposes of Congress's tax power.

However, the mere fact that Cooter and Siegel agree with the Court's
conclusion does not mean their theory presents a viable rule of general application that the Court either endorsed in NFIB or would adopt in future cases. The
essence of their theory is that "[t]he test of whether an exaction is a tax or a
penalty is whether it dampens or prevents conduct., 50 7 As it turns out, that test is
neither workable nor consistent with Supreme Court precedent.
Cooter and Siegel do not identify the line between "dampening" and
"preventing" conduct, nor do they propose a plausible rule for determining where
that line exists in any particular case. By just how much must the exaction reduce
occurrences of the conduct in question in order for the conduct to have been
"prevented" rather than merely "dampened?" Cooter and Siegel say that "[a]
50 8
penalty prevents almost everyone from engaging in the forbidden conduct.,
Does that mean the exaction must prevent all (or "almost" all) of the targeted
conduct in order for it to be a penalty? If so, then the test is untenable. After all,
not even the death penalty prevents all of the conduct to which it applies. Certainly, no monetary penalty can realistically be expected to stop all of any particular kind of conduct. If absolute prevention is an absolute requirement, then
no exaction will ever be a penalty.
Perhaps Cooter and Siegel are not arguing for such an extreme standard,
but in that case their test is hopelessly unclear. If the line between dampening
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1246 (noting the Congressional Budget Office's conclusion that four million people
will pay the shared responsibility payment).
See id. at 1248-50 (applying Cooter and Siegel's material characteristics test to the shared
504
responsibility payment and comparing the outcome with the Court's tax-vs.-penalty analysis in
NFIB).
505
Id. at 1242.
506
Id. at 1247 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1229-30.
507
Id. at 1223.
508
502
503
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and preventing conduct falls somewhere short of complete prevention, there has
to be some coherent rule for how and where to draw that line. Cooter and Siegel
say that "[a]n exaction that dampens conduct raises significant revenues, and an
exaction that prevents conduct does not raise significant revenues., 50 9 But that
leads merely to a reshaping of, rather than an answer to, the question of where
the boundary lies. What is the formula or criterion for determining whether the
amount of revenue raised by a given measure is "significant" or "insignificant?"
Cooter and Siegel do not provide one. Beyond summarily announcing these
vague categories, they fail to offer any guiding principle for applying their prevention-vs.-dampening test to future exactions.
Moreover, even if there were a practicable way to apply such a test, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly signaled that the constitutional distinction between a tax and a penalty does not rest on the degree to which the exaction deters
the targeted conduct. In prior taxing-power decisions, the Court has indicated
that an exaction need not prevent all conduct to be a penalty.5 10 Conversely, the
Court has also stated that an exaction is not necessarily a penalty just because it
prevents conduct.5 11 In addition, the Court has plainly eschewed any distinction
between "significant" and "insignificant" revenue as a dispositive factor in a taxvs.-penalty analysis. On one hand, the Court has repeatedly upheld facially valid
taxes even where the funds raised for the government were "obviously negligible. 5 12 On the other, the Court has recognized that "civil penalties ... generate

Id. at 1230.
For example, the unconstitutional penalty in the Child Labor Tax Case did not prevent all
child labor. As Professor Thomas Reed Powell pointed out in his contemporary analysis of that
case, the Child Labor Tax Law "was not completely prohibitive.., as some concerns might prefer
to pay an added ten per cent of their profits rather than to deny to children the opportunity to aid
in supporting themselves and their family." Cushman, supra note 104, at 182 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Powell, Child Labor,supra note 261, at 71). Indeed, as Powell observed,
one of the taxpayers challenging the constitutionality of the measure had paid the tax before bringing a refund claim. Id. (citing Powell, Child Labor,supra note 261, at 71). Similarly, in Butler, the
Court made clear that a regulatory measure need not prevent all of the targeted conduct in order to
constitute unconstitutional coercion. See supra note 309 (discussing Court's finding in Butler that
regulations within the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, facilitated by the "tax" at issue in that
case, were unconstitutionally coercive, even though not perfectly successful at causing all farmers
to act as the regulations intended).
511
See United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950) (proclaiming that "a tax does not cease
to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed")
(emphasis added); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937) (tax on noxious firearms upheld despite its "prohibitive" effects); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 59 (1904)
(whether tax on colored oleomargarine was constitutionally sustainable did not turn on whether it
would "destroy or restrict the manufacture of" that product).
512
Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44; see, e.g., Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513 (tax on noxious firearms upheld as revenue measure even though, due to its "prohibitive" effects, it produced only nominal
revenue); see also supratext accompanying notes 227, 234 (describing nominal amount of revenue
raised by narcotics tax upheld in Doremus).
509
510
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government revenues," just like taxes do.5 13 Thus, adopting the Cooter and Siegel
"effects" test would require the Court to depart from much of its taxing-power
precedent-something it is unlikely to do.
VI. A CLEAR AND CONCISE RULE FOR
IDENTIFYING UNCONSTITUTIONAL REGULATORY PENALTIES

Because of the practical difficulties in applying Cooter and Siegel's test,
and because their theory deviates from Supreme Court precedent, we must construct an alternative test for distinguishing valid exercises of the taxing power
from unconstitutional regulatory penalties. The test must be clear and must provide a dispositive answer when applied to any future constitutionally suspect exaction. Crucially, it must also align with the Court's taxing-power decisions to
date. And, of course, as with any rule of law or legal analysis-the simpler, the
better.
The Rule that Applies in the Case of Exactions on Economic Conduct

A.

The starting point should be with the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the tax-vs.-penalty distinction. In NFIB, the Court declined to
identify "the precise point at which an exaction becomes" a penalty.51 4 Nonetheless, we can identify a logical tipping point from tax to penalty by considering
why the Court found the shared responsibility payment not to be a penalty. The
Court based its finding on the fact that an individual's shared responsibility payment cannot exceed the cost of the health insurance that he or she failed to obtain
and, for most people, will be "far less" than the cost of such insurance.51 5 From
this, we can glean two criteria for determining whether a federal "tax" on one
who fails to comply with some rule of conduct is really (i) a valid exercise of
Congress's taxing power or instead (ii) a penalty imposed to enforce a regulation
of conduct embedded in the purported revenue measure.5 16 First and foremost,
we can infer that, if an exaction is greater-for at least some taxpayers517 than
the cost of complying with the rule of conduct (including the opportunity cost of

513
Dep't of Rev. of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778 (1994)); see Cushman, supranote
104, at 155 (noting Eleventh Circuit's citation of Kurth Ranch, in ACA litigation, for proposition
that "in our world of less than perfect compliance, penalties generate revenue just as surely as
taxes").

514

NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012).

515

Id. at 2595-96.

516

For additional discussion of how these criteria may be deduced from the NFIB decision, see

supra Part V.D.
For example, the penalty at issue in the Child Labor Tax Case would not have exceeded the
517
net profit derived from the employment of children in all cases, but it could have greatly exceeded
such profit as applied to at least some taxpayers. See supra note 415 (discussing potential effects
of Child Labor Tax Law as applied to different taxpayers).
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any forgone economic gain that could have resulted from noncompliance with
the rule),5 1 8 then the exaction is necessarilya penalty. Second, if the amount of
an exaction, relative to the expected gain from not complying with the rule,
the exaction and
makes it financially sensible for at least some taxpayers to pay519
deviate from the prescribed conduct, then the exaction is a tax.
The first criterion is clear-cut: If an exaction exceeds the cost of complying with a related rule of conduct-or exceeds the gain to be expected from
not complying with that rule-by any amount, then it is a penalty. But does the
second criterion mean that, if the expected gain from noncompliance with the
rule exceeds the amount of the exaction by even a de minimis amount, then the
exaction must be a tax? Obviously, the answer has to be "no." Otherwise, the test
for regulatory penalties would be wholly ineffective at curbing extraconstitutional regulation because Congress could too easily draft around it. If that had
been the test at the time, for example, Congress could have rewritten the Child
Labor Tax Law to become a tax rather than a penalty simply by providing that
the exaction would never exceed 99% of the profit derived specifically from
child labor-even though the revised exaction would likely have remained
equally effective at coercing employers to comply with the then-unconstitutional
regulation against employing children.
The NFIB decision makes it clear that, in order for an exaction triggered
by a departure from some rule of conduct not to be a penalty, the gain to be
expected by departing from the rule must exceed the amount of the exaction by
some significant amount. After all, the shared responsibility payment is not
merely less than the cost of health insurance in most cases-it is "far less. ' 520 In
evaluating the potential effects of that exaction, the Court noted, in particular,
two hypothetical taxpayers for whom the amount saved by not paying health insurance premiums would exceed their shared responsibility payment by either
100% or approximately 567%, respectively. 52 1 The lower of those percentages

The cost of complying with the regulation against employing children embedded in the
Child Labor Tax Law, for example, would have included forgoing profits that could have been
generated by the labor of the children whom the taxpayer would otherwise have employed.
519
For example, for some taxpayers, the shared responsibility payment is exactly the same as
the cost of qualifying health insurance would be. However, for most taxpayers who opt not to
purchase such health insurance, the savings resulting from not paying the premiums will be significantly greater than the amount of their shared responsibility payment. See supra note 416 and
accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying notes 55-72 (describing the formula for
determining the amount of an individual's shared responsibility payment, and noting that the
amount of the payment is always capped at the cost of premiums for the health insurance that the
individual failed to obtain).
520 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595 (emphasis added).
521 See supra note 416 (discussing Court's findings as to relative costs for different taxpayers).
For the hypothetical taxpayer with an annual income of $100,000 for 2016, his $400-per-month
insurance premiums would be twice as great (or 100% greater) than his $200-per-month shared
responsibility payment. For the hypothetical taxpayer with an annual income of $35,000 for 2016,
518
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sets a reasonable boundary between exactions that are or are not punitive-at
least in the case of exactions triggered by some rule of economic conduct that
Congress has no authority (independent of the taxing power) to impose. If the
gain to be expected by departing from some course of economic conduct prescribed in a purported revenue measure is at least twice the amount of the "tax"
imposed on those who so depart, then it is plainly rational for a taxpayer to
choose to garner the gain and pay the tax. In such a case, the amount of the exaction cannot be said to be punitory. On the other hand, if the amount of the "tax"
is more than half the amount of the gain to be had by deviating from the prescribed conduct, then the cost-benefit analysis becomes somewhat murkier. It
seems far less obvious that a taxpayer should deviate from the conduct prescribed
in a "revenue measure" when the resulting "tax" would expropriate more than
half of any potential gain. If the exaction wipes out more than half of the gain, it
crosses the line from taxing that gain (or the activity that gave rise to it) to punishing the taxpayer for violating the regulation of conduct embedded in the statute. Any such exaction should thus be deemed a regulatory penalty, and not a
tax.
Of course, the issue will arise in this particular context only if the Court
is faced in the future with an exaction that enforces a regulation on economic
conduct when the regulation itself is not within the scope of Congress's commerce power. Assume, for example, that an unmarried individual's cost of buying broccoli for dinner twice a week for a year would be $200. If Congress were
to impose an annual "tax" of $100 or less on unmarried individuals who choose
not to purchase broccoli, the exaction would indeed be a tax under the aboveproposed rule. However, if the exaction were more than $100, then it would be
an unconstitutional penalty. Because the Court's interpretation of the Commerce
Clause still permits congressional regulation of virtually all economic activity
(other than the choice not to engage in commerce in the first place), it is unlikely
that the Court will have occasion to engage in a tax-vs.-penalty analysis of future
exactions on economic conduct. If it ever does, however, the Court should apply
the rule above to thwart any attempt by Congress to end-run the limits of its
commerce power. After all, if Congress were ever to pursue the ridiculous policy
of coercing the purchase of broccoli by imposing a "tax" of more than half the
amount to be saved by doing without the cruciferous plant, the Justices would
presumably recognize what was happening to the taxpayer as surely as they know
5 22
pornography when they see it.

his $400-per-month insurance premiums would be approximately 5.67 times (or 567%) greater
than his $60-per-month shared responsibility payment. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2596 n.8 (outlining
costs for these hypothetical taxpayers).
522
In perhaps one of the most oft-quoted Court snippets of the modem era, Justice Potter Stewart famously mused that, while unable to define "pornography" precisely, "I know it when I see
it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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B.

TESTING FOR REGULATORY PENALTIES
The Rule that Applies in the Case of Exactions on Noneconomic
Conduct

Given that the commerce power still does not extend generally to the
regulation of noneconomic behavior, the more likely scenario is that the Court
will someday be faced with an exaction that enforces a regulation on noneconomic conduct when the regulation itself is beyond the scope of Congress's enumerated powers. Therefore, the more important question is how to determine
whether a "tax" is really a penalty when it is triggered by the taxpayer's failure
to conform to some course of noneconomic conduct that is prescribed in the purported "revenue measure."
The rule proposed above, suggested by the Court's review of the shared
responsibility payment in NFIB, essentially rests on an economic cost-benefit
analysis. The challenge, though, is how to apply that cost-benefit analysis to an
exaction imposed on noneconomic conduct. Even the first criterion-whereby
the exaction is necessarily a penalty if exceeds the cost of complying with a related rule of conduct by any amount-becomes harder to apply when the conduct
in question is not economic in nature. The difficulty stems from the fact that,
when conduct is undertaken for some reason other than economic gain, it is impossible to quantify the amount or degree by which an exaction on that conduct
decreases the benefit of engaging in the conduct.
For example, how high would a "tax" on possession of a gun in a school
zone have to be in order to eliminate the perceived benefit of carrying the gun?
One student commentator has suggested that a $695 tax would "almost certainly ...exceed[] the expected benefit of possessing a gun near a school, unless
perhaps one is a school security guard. '523 That suggestion is notably lower than
the $25,000 exaction that Cooter and Siegel suggest would constitute a penalty
for gun possession in a school zone.524 What both suggestions have in common,
of course, is that each is entirely without basis. Assuming, arguendo, that a person seeks to carry a gun to school for protection against bodily harm, on what
ground can we possibly conclude that such protection is worth less to the person
than $695 (or, for that matter, less than $25,000)? The precise amount that an
exaction would have to be in order to exceed the benefit of carrying the gun is
impossible to pinpoint because the benefit itself, if any, cannot be measured or
expressed in monetary terms.
There are no principled grounds for determining whether $695 or
$25,000 (or some other specific amount higher or lower or in between) is the
minimum amount of an exaction that would constitute a penalty, rather than a
tax, on gun possession near a school. At the same time, the Commerce Clause
does not permit Congress to regulate that activity. Therefore, there is only one

523
524

Sidhu, supra note 183, at 136-37.
See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 56, at 1234.
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way to prevent Congress from invoking its taxing power as a pretext for circumventing the limits of its commerce power in such a case: Literally any congressional exaction triggered by carrying a gun in a school zone must be pronounced
an unconstitutional penalty on that conduct.
Of course, one might object that such an absolute rule could, in theory,
result in striking down even exactions so modest that they do not intuitively seem
punitive. To this, there are at least two responses. First, in the case of any "tax"
triggered by noneconomic conduct, there should be a particular suspicion that
the intent of the measure is to punish the conduct rather than to raise revenue.
Taxes on noneconomic activity are a comparatively less sensible (and, thus, inherently more suspect) way to raise revenue because the activity being taxed does
not generate any funds with which to pay the tax. Second, because any such exaction would therefore likely be an attempt to effect an unconstitutional regulation of noneconomic conduct through a penalty disguised as a tax, Congress
would likely set the exaction at an amount intended to achieve the change in
conduct it desires. Thus, the question of how to deal with modest or de minimis
exactions on noneconomic conduct is unlikely to arise as a practical matter.
Noneconomic behavior, by its very nature, does not produce an economic benefit. Therefore, there is only one possible conclusion to be drawn from
the economic cost-benefit analysis, suggested by NFIB, of any "tax" triggered
by a failure to follow some particular course of noneconomic conduct. The
amount of the "tax" will always exceed the economic gain to be had by departing
from the specified course of conduct, because the amount of the gain will always
be zero. Accordingly, there is only one possible rule for distinguishing taxes from
monetary penalties on noneconomic conduct that is not completely arbitrary: If
Congress imposes an exaction styled as a "tax" on those who deviate from some
course of noneconomic conduct prescribed in the purported "revenue measure,"
and if no enumerated constitutional power supports direct congressional regulation of such conduct, then the so-called "tax" must always be invalidated as a
penalty that effectuates or enforces the unconstitutional regulation-regardless
of the exaction's amount.
VII.

CONCLUSION

This Article develops a bright-line rule for determining whether a federal
exaction imposed on conduct (as opposed to some "thing" of value) is a tax or a
penalty in the suspect case where Congress has no constitutional authority to
penalize the conduct. The rule derives from an economic cost-benefit analysis
that the Supreme Court applied both in NFIB and prior taxing-power decisions
in which the tax-vs.-penalty distinction was relevant.
Such a rule is necessary because, even if styled as a revenue measure, a
congressional exaction may nevertheless be a penalty outside the scope of the
taxing power if it punishes or coerces certain behavior of the taxpayer on whom
it is imposed. In particular, there are grounds for concern that the NFIB decision
might embolden a future Congress to try to enact penalties masquerading as taxes
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on behavior-especially noneconomic behavior-that Congress cannot regulate
directly under its commerce power. Any such attempt would compromise important interests promoted by our federalist system, including the interests of
subnational communities in being governed in accordance with their own policy
preferences on matters of local (rather than truly national) import. To protect
against such potential congressional overreach, there must be a clear, dispositive
test for identifying unconstitutional penalties on conduct as such.
In any future case of constitutionally suspect exactions on economic conduct, the rule proposed in this Article provides that a supposed "tax" is instead a
penalty whenever the exaction is more than one-half as much as the expected
economic gain from noncompliance with the rule of conduct embedded in the
purported revenue measure. In the more likely future case of a constitutionally
suspect federal exaction on noneconomic conduct, the expected economic gain
from noncompliance with the embedded rule of conduct will be, by definition,
zero. Accordingly, under the rule proposed herein, any federal exaction on noneconomic conduct is a penalty rather than a tax-and is thus constitutionally invalid-unless an Article I, Section 8 power other than the taxing power authorizes Congress to penalize the conduct in question.
By applying the Article's proposed rule in any future case in which Congress may enact a "tax" to regulate conduct beyond its constitutional reach, the
Court would be able to protect important principles of federalism. At the same
time, because there is indeed a constitutional distinction between taxes and penalties-as the Court has long recognized-applying this rule to tell the one from
the other would in no way constrict or infringe upon the obvious and necessary
breadth of Congress's taxing power to enact legitimate revenue measures. If the
rule were adopted, Congress would be unhampered in tending to the nation's
finances. Congress would simply be precluded from exercising plenary police
power under the guise of laying a tax. And best of all, we would never have to
worry about eating our broccoli ever again.
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